North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

North Korean Weapon Issue

North Korea has been intimidating the United States with a series of nuclear threats since October 2002 when U.S. officials stopped the supply of heavy oils to the North in retaliation of its confessed production of nuclear warheads violating agreements signed in 1994. Shortly after, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NTP) and agreements with the United Nations. While there is little proof that North Korea has nuclear weapons, it is strongly suspected that it does. This paper will discuss the North Korean weapon issue.

North Korea's Withdrawal from the NPT

Since its inception in 1970, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) become the most widely subscribed to international treaty in history, with 187 members. However, there used to be 188 members prior to North Korea's withdrawal from the treaty in April 2003. This withdrawal marked the first time in history that a state has ever left the treaty. According to Potter and du Preez (2003): "The significance of North Korea's withdrawal will be measured by its impact on the validity of the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation regime and on peace and security in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. North Korea's withdrawal could trigger further defections from the treaty and cause other states in the region to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. Of equal concern is the potential for North Korea to sell weapons-grade fissile material or nuclear weapons themselves to other states and non-state actors, including terrorist groups."

While North Korea's decision to withdraw from the treaty has shocked some people, many are not surprised. The country begrudgingly signed the NPT in 1985, solely due to the fact that the Soviet Union stated that the North Korean treaty membership was an absolute condition for the provision of coveted nuclear research assistance (Potter and du Preez, 2003). North Korea took five years to sign the treaty-mandated agreement with the IAEA to safeguard its nuclear facilities. Later, the agency discovered that North Korea had presented many discrepancies in the data regarding its nuclear program, leading to a 1993 special investigation at two plutonium storage sites at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. As a result, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT. However, the country's leaders did not follow through with the threat.

While many experts believe that North Korea has produced and separated enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons, there is no hard evidence of such development. North Korean officials have admitted having a nuclear weapons program in the past. In 2003, a North Korean official told a United States official "something to the effect of, 'Your president called us a member of the axis of evil.... Your troops are deployed on the Korean peninsula.... Of course, we have a nuclear program (Koppel and King, 2002)." However, state leaders have since denied making such an admission.

With its departure for the NPT, North Korea announced that it "has no intention of making nuclear weapons" and that its nuclear activities "will be confined only to power production and other peaceful purposes (Potter and du Preez, 2003)." The country says that its withdrawal from the treaty is in reaction to its inclusion in the "axis of evil" and being targeted by the United States' preemptive strike policy. When it withdrew from the treaty, North Korea dismissed IAEA inspectors, restarted a nuclear reactor that had been frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework, and started moving spent fuel rods to a reprocessing facility that can produce plutonium. This has caused great concern worldwide.

Conclusion

There is great controversy over how to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons program today. North Korea demands U.S. recognition of North Korea's sovereignty, security assurances, and no hindrance of the North's economic development (Arms Control Association, 2003). For South Korean political leaders, the U.S. is perceived as an unreasonable country that is unwilling to negotiate directly with North Korean officials in working out a deal that could resolve the current nuclear crisis peacefully. However, U.S. leaders are not convinced that a negotiated deal would permanently eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, and they are reluctant to reward North Korea's bad behavior. President George W. Bush vowed in his State of the Union address, "America and the world will not be blackmailed (Arms Control Association, 2003)."

Basically, it is difficult to assess North Korea's objectives. North Korea says it is not out to blackmail anyone but U.S. leaders suspect that North Korean leaders view nuclear weapons as a means of forcibly reunifying the Korean Peninsula (Arms Control Association, 2003). There is little reliable information about the internal dynamics of North Korean decision-making and North Korean leaders have strong incentives to conceal their true intentions in order to increase their bargaining power and to minimize international reactions to their nuclear weapons program. Thus, the U.S. is simply not confident that negotiations with North Korea are in order.

Negotiating an acceptable agreement will be a difficult task. North Korea violated the Agreed Framework and its other nuclear nonproliferation commitments (Saunders, 2003). Thus, the U.S. And other parties must consider a possible new agreement will require North Korean compliance. However, it is extremely difficult to test North Korean intentions. It seems that it is worth a try, though. Even if negotiations fail, the United States will be in a better position for making the attempt, at least in the eyes of the rest of the world.