Pakistan ISI and GWOT

Pakistan ISI and GWOT

Described variously as a U.S. ally in the war against terror, Pakistan's actual commitment to the U.S. As a reliable partner in the global campaign against terror has in the past come under scrutiny with some accusing the South Asian State of aiding militants in the region. Matters have been made worse by the latent support the U.S. has received from the ISI, the state's foremost national security organ. In this text, I explore whether Pakistan can be considered a reliable partner by the U.S. In the war against terror. Further, I discuss the possibility of a political or military rift emerging between Pakistan and the U.S. given the latter's and by extension ISI's alleged support for some militant groups in the region.

According to Bajoria (2011), the ISI has over time been accused by quite a number of U.S. officials of availing support to various terrorist groups while on the other hand continuing to seek support from the U.S. In the guise of fighting militants. Some of the senior U.S. government officials who have voiced their concerns on this subject include Robert Gates, a former U.S. Secretary of Defense. Gates according to Bajoria (2011) has in the past noted that the ISI plays both sides "to a certain extent." By using the phrase "play both sides," Gates is simply confirming that the ISI maintains some strong links with a number of militant groups including the Afghan Taliban while at the same time appearing to help the U.S. crush terrorist cells in the region. Indeed, this is an assertion supported by a Taliban logistics officer who according to Moreau (2010) is of the opinion that Pakistan does indeed play "a double game" with the Afghan Taliban. Moreau (2010) further points out that some Afghan Taliban officials have reported receiving up to 80% of their funding from Pakistan through the ISI. Others who have accused Pakistan and by extension ISI of aiding militants include the Afghan President Hamid Karzai who has on several occasions claimed that quite a number of militants trained by Pakistan are occasionally sent across the border (Bajoria 2011).

However, it is important to note that in the opinion of some commentators and analysts, ISI is not entirely to blame. Those who subscribe to this view are of the opinion that the support advanced to some militant groupings in the region comes from some "rogue elements" operating from within the ranks of ISI (Bajoria 2011). Others like Winchell (2003, 381) note that the organization has been deemed to have "the makings of a de facto government" by amongst others a Bhutto appointed committee that was formed to investigate the activities ISI. This assertion is however countered by others including but not limited to Nawaz who is of the opinion that the intelligence agency does not operate in a vacuum, that is, its functioning cannot be said to be independent which effectively means that it does what it is asked to do by either "the government or the army"(Bajoria 2011).