Police and firefighting policies since the 1970s

¶ … Police & Firefighting Policies Since 9-11

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. On September 11, 2001, changed the way citizens in the United States view their own safety. The damage done by the terrorists was the most severe that the American homeland had been subjected to since the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Indeed, nearly 3,000 people died in the attacks, including "hundreds of firefighters and police officers" in New York City (Frank, et al., 2004). Clearly those who govern in the U.S. could see that America was unprepared for the 9-11 attacks on many levels. One of those levels that were not prepared was the first responder level -- police and fire. But meantime, governments in cities, towns, states, and indeed the federal government, have subsequently upgraded their police and fire departments in response to the possibility of future attacks by terrorists. This paper reviews some of the changes and upgrades that have taken place in the nine years since the attacks.

Fire in New York City Three Years After 9-11 -- Incomplete Upgrades

The needed changes regarding first responders did not automatically -- or quickly -- fall into place for New Yorkers. Three years after the devastation and death in New York City, a report presented by former Deputy Chief of the New York Fire Department (FDNY), Vincent Dunn, was highly critical of the new policies put in place up to that time. For example, one of the problems that firefighters faced on September 11 was a failure of communication; radios did not work well in the World Trade Center. The brave firefighters carrying heavy equipment up and down the steep stairways needed desperately to know what information was being transmitted to them from the ground; they needed to know what their supervisors were learning about the threat to the buildings but they could not hear nor report back to ground-level supervisors in many instances. So, that was obviously one area that needed to be upgraded.

However, Dunn's report indicated that firefighters in New York City still were not able to "transmit messages in high-rise buildings, subways and tunnels" (Dunn, 2004). Moreover, although battalion chiefs had been issued portable booster radios (that weigh 22 pounds) to enhance the ability to communicate with their firefighters, the "quick fix" was "nowhere near" to being in compliance with the consultant's recommendations, issued in a report called "Increasing FDNY's Preparedness" (according to Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta) (Dunn, 2004). Also, the mayor's office had issued a demand for changes that would lead to a new command protocol; however, three years after 9-11 there still was no "unified incident command, with a single agency in charge," according to Dunn's report.

The elevators that failed in the World Trade Center resulted in many people not being able to get out of the building to safety below. But three years after the fact, elevators "still fail at high-rise fires due to fire, heat and water," Dunn continued. The elevator buttons short out from fire and heat and the water from sprinklers (that are activated during a fire) and from firefighter's hoses shorts out wires in elevator shafts. Dunn believed that this vulnerability was intolerable simply because a study conducted in 1991 (by the FDNY) of 178 major building fires in New York City between 1983 to 1990 showed that one-third of the elevators failed and 37% of those elevator failures were due to water shorting out wiring or call buttons. Without reliable elevators firefighters cannot get to the floors that are on fire and of course citizens cannot be evacuated.

Also found in Dunn's report, the former deputy chief scolds the City for designating the police department as the primary agency for dealing with events involving "hazardous materials"; clearly, Dunn believes that FDNY, not NYPD, should be handling issues relating to hazardous materials. Giving that responsibility to the NYPD is "a departure from the rest of the nation," Dunn asserts. Subsequent to 9-11, New York has closed six fire companies, eliminating 180 firefighter and officer positions, which Dunn observes is a bad idea. Another bad idea he mentions is the removal of many street fire alarm boxes; this removal "was one of the few communications outlets that worked during the August 14, 2003 blackout" in New York (www.vincentdunn.com).

First Responder Communication Issues Approached at the Federal Level -- 2004

The lack of new upgrades for first responders persisted at the national level well into the third year after 9-11, according to an article in Federal Computer Week (Frank, 2004). "Some security problems persist" including "first responders' inability to communicate via certain radio frequencies during emergencies," Frank wrote, reporting on legislation that was working its way through the U.S. Congress. Based on recommendations issued in the "9-11 Commission Report" federal officials and lawmakers in 2004 were beginning to focus on the need to upgrade the "interoperability" within law enforcement and fire safety agencies. David Boyd, then director of the federal Safecom interoperability program, said he agreed with legislation setting a deadline for moving commercial TV broadcasters "out of the 700 MHz spectrum" (Frank, p. 8). Moving television stations out of that area frees up those frequencies for "public safety officials."

First responders (police and fire) need to be able to depend on wireless communication, said then chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Michael Powell. Testifying before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, Powell stated that "It's more than urgent…it's too late, and it's getting that much more too late" (Frank, p. 8). The legislation was in fact signed into law and hence the 700 MHz spectrum for voice, data and broadband communication for first responders was freed up. An important rider in that legislation superseded a 1997 law that had allowed broadcasters "…who resisted the change to push the transition date back indefinitely" (Frank, p. 8). Stephen Devine, a patrol frequency coordinator with the Missouri Highway Patrol -- and also a representative of the International Executive Council of the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials -- said there was some reticence among local city leaders to accept money for equipment "that first responders may not be able to use" (Frank, p. 8).

New First Responder Policies / U.S. Department of Justice -- 2009 - NYPD

Eight years after the tragic events of 9-11, the Police Executive Research Forum published a report called "Learning from 9/11: Organizational Change in the New York City and Arlington County, Va., Police Departments" (Holden, et al., 2009). In the report, which was researched and produced thanks to a grant from the National Institute of Justice, the authors go into great detail, offering recommendations and reporting on upgrades in first responder facilities and polices in New York City and in Arlington County, Virginia. NYPD Commissioner, Raymond W. Kelly, took action within a month of the attacks to fill the gap that had existed in the NYPD regarding counterterrorism readiness.

Kelly established the NYPD Counter Terrorism Bureau (CTB), which now has 205 officers and interacts closely with the FBI "Joint Terrorism Task Forces" (Holden, p. 3). The CTB trains NYPD personnel in counterterrorism strategies and "develops plans for protecting key sites" in New York City. Things at the NYPD are "very different than what it was before 9-11" said an unnamed intelligence division official, quoted by Holden (p. 3). Field intelligence officers have been assigned to the NYPD's 76 precincts along with the borough level, school levels and housing and transit levels. it's called Operation Nexus, and through this operation the NYPD informs businesses to report any unusual or suspicious activities to authorities.

Part of the strategy that NYPD counterterrorism trainers get across to all officers is that if and when there is an event -- a "critical incident" -- the NYPD officers' "first order of business" is to set up a "strong, secure and safe inner perimeter" (Holden, p. 5). Moreover officers are taught that the critical incident they are working with may "be only the first in what terrorists have planned as a series of attacks" (Holden, p. 5). Hence, the officers are cautioned not to "over respond" that that initial incident because the terrorists may well have another "devastating attack" planned in another location; indeed, that first attack may well be a diversion, a distraction from the more vicious, violent attack.

Counterterrorism efforts instituted by the NYPD subsequent to 9-11 include the establishment of the Special Operations Division (SOD). More than 400 "sworn and civilian personnel" are part of the SOD in New York City; the personnel in SOD, the policies and strategies are all "funneled through" the NYPD's Intelligence Division (ID) for smooth coordination and communication, Holden continues (p. 5). The SOD also works hand in glove with the U.S. Coast Guard "…in observing and surveying potential targets" like tunnels in New York City, like air vents in buildings that open up to water sites and all marinas and of course a close eye must be kept on all of New York City's bridges. If the worst case scenarios should ever unfold and terrorists have released materials into the air that are radioactive, the SOD works with the New York City's Department of Health so that officers have proper training in the use of air-monitoring "meters" (Holden, p. 5).

New York City's Department of Health has in place a program called "Biowatch" that is designed to alert the SOD when any calls come in reporting the presence of a biological substance. As mentioned previously in this paper, during the crisis of September 11, 2001, one of the major obstacles to effective first responder action was the breakdown in communication technologies and in lines of authority. However the NYPD's Operations Division (OD) is now trained to be the communications link between the executive command and the police officer on the street. The OD coordinates all personnel specifics and directions; in fact the OD is referred to as the division that "acts as the information hub of the NYPD" during an emergency, Holden explains on page 6 of the report.

Holden goes on to point to the responsibilities of the OD: a) the OD offers 24-hour-a-day monitoring of any and all "major incidents" in the city, like major crimes and building collapses; b) the OD follows and records all "officer-related information" that is pertinent to the incident; c) all personnel assignments related to events in the city are coordinated through the OD; d) if there are requests for additional police presence "during scheduled and unscheduled events" the OD makes the decision as to how to respond; and e) the OD coordinates the movements of all on-duty personnel throughout the eight borough task forces (Holden, p. 6).

In addition to the new alignments and policies and strategies in the NYPD subsequent to 9-11, police commissioner Kelly has worked hard to "incorporate a counterterrorism philosophy throughout the department," Holden explains on page 7 of the report. Kelly's post-9-11 philosophy is "…thinking about the unthinkable -- what a few years ago was the unthinkable." Kelly also emphasizes the fact that counterterrorism police work is "the same as crime policing"; he makes this point because terrorist groups often fund their activities through the commission of "traditional crimes" and hence, "good police work will uncover terrorist groups and their plans" (Holden, p. 7).

New First Responder Policies / Arlington County, Virginia

Arlington County, Virginia is the smallest county in area (26 square miles) in the U.S., and yet its safety is vitally important to the nation because it is "directly across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C." And many key U.S. government offices are in Arlington County. The Pentagon is located in Arlington County of course, and was severely damaged on September 11, 2001; there was also a significant loss of life during the attack on the Pentagon. The Arlington County Police Department (ACPD) has subsequently upgraded its police and fire services and has identified "120 targets" that are considered likely "targets for a terrorist attack" (Holden, p. 12). Among those targets are "numerous government agencies and installations" like Reagan National Airport, subway stations, bridges into Washington, offices of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the U.S. Marshals Service and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Holden explains (p. 12).

Following the attacks of 9-11 the ACPD has been teaching "the incident command philosophy" at all levels of the department; that philosophy is basically "…anyone who responds may have to take charge of an incident," according to Holden p. 12). Certainly a call for help must go out immediately when an officer in the ACPD witnesses a crisis-level event, or any suspicious event that could be related to terrorism. However, there are immediate steps that must be taken by any officer of the ACPD, and those steps including seizing control of authority prior to help arriving. Those steps are specifically spelled out on a card that all officers carry with them that has been produced by the ACPD Incident Command System (ICS). The steps have been reviewed over and over during terrorist training exercises; among the steps that are most important is the requirement that the officer on the scene notify the hospitals in the region if there is any indication that a potential biological or chemical attack has been launched (Holden, p. 13).

In addition, because communication systems tend to get overloaded during an emergency, ACPD officers have been trained to punch in a specific security code on their telephones that assures "seamless communication in an attack or other critical incident" (Holden, p. 13). And even though federal security officials have ultimate jurisdiction over the Pentagon, since September 11, 2001 ACPD officials have forged new and closer ties with federal agencies, notably the FBI. Indeed, since 9-11, an updated agreement between the FBI and the ACPD "…allows the ACPD to have concurrent jurisdiction on Pentagon grounds (outside the building) for criminal and traffic concerns, if necessary" (Holden, p. 14).

Police and Security Upgrades Since 9-11 in Colorado

According to an article in the Denver Post (Finley, 2005), security preparedness (and equipment needed to provide security for citizens) has been upgraded in Colorado since 9-11. In fact Colorado received $136 million of federal money after 9-11, money that has been used to purchase "radios, respirators and night-vision goggles," Finley explains. The funds from the federal government have also been used to support "multi-agency training drills that many security experts believe are most useful in developing sustainable public protection against terrorism" (Finley, p. 1). The drills that Finley mentions in his article include urban rooftop "hostage-rescue work" involving the use of helicopters and exercises that respond to potential "hazardous-materials" exposure in the "hinterlands" of Colorado.

Moreover, greater coordination between law enforcement agencies has taken place in Colorado, Finley writes; for example, the U.S. attorney's office and the regional FBI headquarters (located in Colorado) have been conducting training and information sessions with local authorities "more frequently." FBI spokesperson Monique Kelso told reporter Finley, "We are a lot more snapped into local agencies"; meanwhile Bill Leone, acting U.S. attorney for Colorado, told Finley, "I really do believe our readiness level is much higher now than it was prior to 9-11" (p. 1).