Post-Mortem on Gulf War I

Iraq War Summary While the second Iraq War was extremely mixed in its results, outcomes and process, the first one was much more successful. Indeed, it made presiding General Norman Schwarzkopf a national hero. This report will cover the buildup of the forces, the ground force surge, the air campaign, an assessment of the battle overall and a conclusion that ties up all of the above.

While everything could always be done better, the way in which the Coalition Air Campaign paralyzed the Iraqi forces and thus made it much easier for the ground forces to then win the war was done exquisitely well and it is the ground forces that truly won the day. Buildup of Forces The first war in Iraq, commonly referred to as the Gulf War, occurred in 1990 and 1991. The war was in response to the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Indeed, Iraq was seeking roughly $10 billion in damages and Kuwait countered with an offer of $9 billion. Rather than accept or counteroffer, Iraq's response was to invade Kuwait. This led to a coalition response and buildup of services led by the United Nations. After first demanding verbally that Iraq withdraw, an actual buildup of forces began to coalesce in the greater Iraq area. The forces came from a total of nearly three dozen countries with the United States being the dominant country of those three dozen.

Indeed, countries from Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Americas were all represented. As noted in the introduction, it is the air campaign that first set the tone and thus allowed ground forces to be extremely effective. Air Campaign The bombing campaign started in January 1991 after the deadline for Iraqis to vacate Kuwait lapsed. There were more than one hundred thousand bombing runs and missions levied against the Iraqis. Nearly that many tons of bombs were dropped during those bombing raids.

About seventy to eighty planes were lost but roughly half of that was due to Iraqis fighting back with surface to air missiles and other means. Iraq warned in advance that they would target Israel and Saudi Arabia if they were attacked and they made an effort to follow through on that threat by using their infamous Scud missiles. The United States augmented its air campaign by neutralizing the Scud missiles via the use of protecting Patriot missile batteries.

The Patriot missiles were deployed with the idea and aim of protecting civilian targets (Head, 2013). A huge part of the air campaign for the United States and coalition forces was the use of the AC-130 gunship. On the first night of hostilities, they were called into action in the area near Al-Khafji. However, the Iraqis did not always lie down and just take it. Indeed, AC-130's engaged in a very precise "dance of death" and they were exceedingly efficient at executing their job.

Even so, they eventually approached with their proverbial tail tucked in the form of their turrets being turned in reverse, a sign of surrender. Further, the air and ground campaigns were obviously not mutually exclusive as one would support the other and the same is obviously true in reverse. Commonly, Marines on the ground would call in air support from attack planes, bombers and helicopter gunships or other choppers. The aforementioned Al-Khafji was a sticking point of exception because it was a Saudi town that was temporarily caught by Iraqis.

General Khaled made it a point to reach out to General Norman Schwarzkopf and implore him for assistance. The coalition general leader responded by sending an Arab regiment that was supported by air cover (Head, 2013). The air campaigns and ground campaigns were ultimately successful but not before the tragedy of the Spirit '03. The Spirit was shot down by Iraqi surface to air (SAM) missiles, one of the few examples of the Iraqi Army successfully combating the air power of the United States.

The American response was, at least to many, to engage in the need for revenge and bloodlust which lead to perhaps even more possibility of tragedy. Despite the setback of the Spirit going down, which led to the death of more than a dozen crew members, the air campaign was ultimately a huge success and accomplished what it was supposed to do (Head, 2013). The air campaign was only forty-three days in total and did not even make up half of the roughly hundred-day war.

As described by Kelly (2002) in an essay, it was stated "Operation Desert Storm was primarily a sustained 43-day air campaign by the United States and its allies against Iraq between January 17th, 1991 and February 28th, 1991 (Kelly, 2002).

Kelly continues by saying that "the accuracy of the bombing was extraordinary." General Michael Dugan was on record as saying that the F-16 and F/A-18 fighters were "able to place fifty percent of their bombs within thirty feet of their aim points; but even 30-foot accuracy is no longer interesting." Smart bombs were even better as those bombs "routinely hit within three feet of their targets.

This performance was "a vindication of the old concept of precision bombing; the technology had finally caught up with the doctrine." There was heavy use of still-famous fighter planes including the F-16, the F/A-18, the F-117 Stealth Fighter, the A-10 Warthog and the AC130 gunships. The "Spirit" casualty even was extremely notable given that it comprised very close to ten percent of all United States personnel deaths in the Gulf War as only 146 people total died in the entire 100 days of war (Kelly, 2002).

One interesting effect of the Iraqi actions and efforts that did occur was rendered when the oil wells were lit on fire. Indeed, there came a point where the sky was so black and hard to see through that aircraft flights by planes like the F/A-18 were ultimately suspended ("The ground war," 1992). Ground Forces Surge About a month after the air campaign was allowed to take effect, there was a bit of deception used by the United States sources.

Through the use of ostensible cover fire, the United States forces portended that the American ground forces would travel into the center of Kuwait to liberate the country. However, it was the forces from other countries that ended up doing liberating Kuwait and the resistance to that liberation was stunningly light. Further, there were fortifications such as barb wire and bunkers but there were not properly defended or constructed and those areas fell quite quickly.

Indeed, the United States primary acted under the name of Desert Saber when they moved into Iraq itself. The units that did this were Bravo One Zero, Bravo Two Zero and Bravo Three Zero. Forces from the other countries in the coalition followed suit in late February 1991. One primary area of focus was the area of Iraq that was bordering Kuwait. There was a general pattern of not attacking fleeing Iraqi troops but an exception was clearly made for Iraqis that were leaving after setting many oil wells on fire.

This road that the troops tried (yet many failed) to use became known as the Highway of Death. In total, the entire ground campaign was roughly 100 hours. Rather than continue into Iraq, Kuwait was declared liberated and the hostilities were ended (Ahmed, 1991). The ground war surge revealed some things that were not revealed all that much in the pressed, at least not to the extent that they should have been.

First of all, there is the story of the 2nd Marine Division and how they intentionally took on the toughest part of the Iraqi ground forces, thinking that no one would expect that. Had that not gone as well as the United States and coalition forces thought it would, the war probably could have ended a bit differently or at least lasted a bit longer. The images that were witnesses and photographed were quite stark, in most cases.

It was told this way in a book showcased in 1992: "The images nearly all suggest a rout, and they linger. Starved Iraqi soldiers, crawling from holes, begging for food, unwilling to fight. Prisoners of war, pathetic, too numerous to count. In fact, some Iraqi units fought and fought hard. A few were well led. Despite the images, the truth is that a good number of the allied soldiers who engaged Saddam Hussein's army during the 100-hour ground war found themselves fighting for their lives" ("The ground war," 1992).

However, surrender and destitution was not the norm in all cases. An example of a vivid firefight is told in this stanza from the same book and article: "All hell breaks loose. Quickly, the battle was joined. In the Iron Brigade's 4-70 Armor Battalion, Pfc. Michael Riley was driving Tank C-21, which its crew had named the Four Horsemen. "I pull out from behind the commanding officer's tank," Riley said, "and I see about 10 or 11 burning [Iraqi] vehicles on the horizon.

All I hear is all hell breaking loose." Not far from Riley, Spc. Shannon Boldman was in TankC-24. His loader slammed a shell into the breech of the M1A1's big gun. "My loader, he's yelling, 'You're up, man, shoot it, shoot it,' " Boldman said. "He's hyper, he's ready to kill something. OK, so I squeeze the trigger. I see the turret [of an Iraqi tank] fly 20 feet up in the air. You can see it with the daylight scope.

With the thermal, you just see a great big hot spot blowing off. My driver is looking at it. He says, 'Goddamn, is that the one you shot?' I say, 'I got it.'He says, 'Goddamn, man, wow!' " Battle Assessment An assessment of the battles that raged within Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War reveals a number of consequences, questions and "what ifs" about the war and how things ended up.

One should ask the strain of questions that includes the way the war came to be named and the true motives for entering the war to begin with. For one thing, the intervention and perceptions of Israelis were constantly assessed and looked at. Rather than treating Israel as a full-fledged ally, they were actually treated as an aggravating circumstance in a lot of instances. Indeed, when looking at the other conflicts in the greater Middle East area over the recent years, decades and centuries, some trends become clear.

Indeed, Israel's came into existence in the mid-1900's but debates about its status, actions and rights occur often. The other crises that occurred in the area include the Iran-Iraq War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the question of Palestine and their statehood, the Lebanese problem, the Intifada and so forth. It is quite obvious that many of the other conflagrations centered on Arabs vs. Israel or country vs. country.

With the Gulf War, there was not specific country named, no Jew/Arab conflict mentioned and so forth even though the countries and parties involved obviously involved all of the above. Even so, Israel obviously had an axe to grind in the conflict because Iraq was specifically using Scuds to target the Israelis, surely with the idea of stirring the pot and making it harder for the United Nations coalition to remain in sync (Ahmed, 1991).

Something else that becomes fairly clear is the idea of why the United Nations and the United States got involved. Indeed, the main reason that is cited by many was not the sovereignty and restoration of Kuwait, but rather that of the threat to Saudi Arabia. In the end, Kuwait was indeed liberated and the prior borders were restored. However, it begs the question as to what would have been done and why had Saudi Arabia not been in such jeopardy.

What is even more striking is the war that Iraq and Iran waged against each other from 1980 to 1988 and how the United States was largely supporting the same country it attacked a scant two years later as a member of the coalition. Perhaps the point is that friends can become enemies and vice versa quite quickly depending on who attacks when, where, why and how.

Even so, the decision to attack Iraq was not hard to justify given that they had used chemical weapons against their own people (the Kurds) as well as Iranians and they were clearly enemies of American ally Israel. There is one big accusation that has to be assessed when looking at whether the Gulf War was worth it and whether the United States entered it for the right reasons.

This would be the fact that Kuwait was in its pre-war bidding volley due in large part to them siphoning off oil that was not their own. Even so, Iraq doing what it did in response cannot be justified (Ahmed, 1991).

Regardless of all of the strange bedfellows before, during and after the Gulf War, regardless of how the 2003-present conflagration in Iraq is going and regardless of the national security questions that have been posed about the Gulf War, it is clear that even with a few spots on their record (e.g.

The Spirit), the air and ground campaigns that the United States and coalition forces wage was a bloody work of art and is perhaps the best example of warfare in the United States other than the obvious World War II. What makes the 1990-1991 Gulf War so enamoring was the quick one-two punch that was the air and ground campaigns and how it led to a very quick end to the hostilities that were created (at least in terms of actual warfare) by Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait.

However, there could be a very viable explanation as to why the Iraq forces seem so unprepared and so unable to put up a stiff fight. In a phrase, it would seem that the Iraq forces where heavily expecting coalition forces to use nuclear weapons to stomp out the Iraq invasion. Of course, this never happened but it might explain at least some of the tepidness that existed, or perhaps unpreparedness (Cigar, 2014).

Of course, that could have a huge effect on how the war was and was not conducted from an Iraqi point-of-view. There is the mindset that you portend that nothing is off the table but just about anyone would not presume automatically that the United States or any other coalition forces would use chemical or nuclear weapons clearly did not fit with the desired outcome of the war. Even so, the Iraqis of the day were clearly no different than the war preparers of other times and situations.

To be sure, all war-time decision makers "formulate paradigms or models, whether consciously or unconsciously, in order to make sense of problems and to organize and interpret relevant information to enable them to make decisions" (Cigar, 2014). To be clear, not all of this theory is.