Recurring Strategic Themes in the History of U.S. Intelligence

U.S. Intelligence Strategy History

The United States has always been a country that prided itself on the excellence of its military excellenc and precision. The defense and national forces have been at the heart of military intelligence throughout the years starting with 2001, in September. Many government agencies, for example, have joined forces with more traditional military forces to help combat both minor crime forces with those of a more sophisticated body of crime throughtout the United States and the world. A historical examination of the various elements related to U.S. intelligence during military intense times reveal that more attention to social or human concerns during the times involved might have created a greater drive towards caring for those left destitute by a focus on military or social concerns during World War II, the military inquiries of the 1970s, and the invasion of Iraq started in 2003. When examining the events associated with these three paradigms, it becomes clear that all involved perceived little choice in the actions they perpetrated, regardless of how heinous and unnecessary they may appear to the modern eye. However, many of the acts that are currently considered as unacceptable were viewed in a different light for the times in which they occurred. .

During World War II, for example, Military Intelligence had a somewhat paradoxical aspect, as indicated by Finnigan (2001). However, this was hardly a perfect system, as the Admiaral Ernest King pointed out that there was a large amount of wasted effort to achieve similar results, as shown in the graphic displays of the time. To ensure that the United States had a competitive edge, it was therefore determined that wasted time and effort were to be implemented in such a way as to ensure that lessons were learned from historic events such as World War II, the 1970s investigations, and the reponse to 9/11 in order to create a society whose future was secured while the basic rights determined at the start of the 20th century remained guaranteed.

World War II

During World War II, there were rapid changes not only in society, but also in the military itself (Finnigan, 2006). After Pearl Harbor, a Joint Intelligence Committee was created to ensure the cooperation of all military units in the United States and to prevent future disaster and especialy terrorist difficulties. When joint Chiefs of Staff were apointed, other entities, s uch as the JIC and ONI were implemented to ensure the highest level of secrity after the Pearl Harbor event. What is interesting at this time is that the British intelligence played an important part in the dissemination of classified information to the United States' intelligence forces.

A joint structure was then formed within the United States to ensre that interervice cooperation was achived. Interrogation facilities were, for example, set up to ensure the uniform extraction of information from prisoners of war. This expanded in 1942 to form a joint Amry-Navy Intelligence service in order to acquire nontactical information that could be used in Washington.

Finnigan (2006) also pointed to the various traditions at the time that created a barrier to evolution in the military services. Even within the various defense forces, for example, intelligence was not shared universally, even among intelligence sources. According to Finnigan (2006), for example, the Navy did not share all its information with the Army. Indeed, there were significant discrepancies among armed services in the intelligence field, as well as between the Nave and other intelligence agencies within the field. Indeed, there are significant amounts of distrust among the various intelligence agenices, inlcuding the military, as well as the general public regarding the ways in which the country can be usefully regulated and ruled.

The beginning of this was the creation of a new intelligence agency that cultivated the minimal amout of public trust. Indeed, Finigan (2006) implies that various aspects of inteligence software were used to influence the public opinion on the guilt or innocence of varios members of the intelligene community. TORCH, for example, was credited for the invasion of North Africa, while the Joint Inbtelligence Committee was left out of any mention that could affec its reputation in terms of human rights focus points. Rather than displaying a unified frond by the military and its related agencies, a joint image was provided by intelligence support to the Joint Seurity Control group where representatives from the Army and Navy were carefully selected to provide the necessary information.

One of the most important aspects of this was that intelligence collaboration was finding its start during this time. At this time, during 1942, Army staff were cut back by the hief of Staff General Georg C. Marshall, and the operations in the War Department Operations Division were also centralaized. Duties that were historically handled by administartive personnel were now handled by new subordinate commands, while the staff were to handle planning and supervision exclusively.

The Army was not to be divided into the Army ground Forcdes, the Army Air forces, and the Services of Supply, and a major impact was felt bye th structure of Military Intelligence. In other words, the way in which the Army conducted its business was significantly affected. Like all other businesses, World War II created a platform of change for the United States Army, which would ultimately have significant effects on the future of army operations within the country.

In 1941 J. Donovan borrowed heavily from the British Intelligence model to create a similar model for the United States. In other words, classified information was analyzed in order to determine an appropriate course of action for the future of the United States. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, it became abundantly clear that the Japanese forces were grossly underestimated. The question was, however, whether this would create a useful lesson for the future, or whether the past would simply repeat itself in an endless loop of mistakes.

In recent years, for example, congress has accumulated evidenc that there may be an effect of interanational threat and new technologies on the effectiveness of the National Security Agency (NSA). Resources have been significantly reduced,, for exmaple, along with a basic lack of technological infrastructer and human resources to maintain status quo and to meet challenges emerging from the new situations faced by military personnel. This can be viewed as parallel to a basic lack of understanding the Japanese capability during Pearl Harbor. One wonders, however, whether this lack of understanding is truly the result of information simply not being available, or whether it is the result of human error, where information was indeed available but simply ignored by overcharged and overloaded military personnel.

This has become clear during both the congressional investigations curing the 1970s and the response to 9/11. While both these paradigms were created as a result of attacks against the United States and its professed way of life, they were also the result of hasty decision making and a lack of clearly thought out battle plans and social interventions.