Egypt's public diplomacy and international trade approach in the Nile basin

¶ … Egypt is going to take in order to secure its interest in the Nile waters and in the Nile Basin countries, especially after the change of regime and the uprising of the Arab nations. Following the January 2011 uprisings in Egypt, the government attempted to resolve the longstanding issues through various mechanisms that failed and the political leadership was replaced by the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate. Other recent developments in the Nile Basin Initiative have included Egypt's efforts to abrogate previous agreements and improve others, all the while balancing the diplomatic agenda that has emerged in the new Egypt. An examination of the secondary literature is combined with primary research including interviews with Egyptian principals and a convenience survey of Egyptian consumers concerning the distribution of Nile River waters. A summary of the research and important findings are presented in the study's concluding chapter.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Introduction

Statement of the Problem

Research Aims

Research Questions

Overview of the Study

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Chapter 3: Methodology

Chapter 4: Data Analysis

Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions

Development of Public Diplomacy and International Trade: Egypt's New Approach to Secure Its Interests in the Nile Basin Countries

It's a 4,160-mile lifeline for the countries that border it but intense disagreements over the use of the Nile River between the 10 African countries that share it and its tributaries threaten to destabilize this already volatile region. -- Tim Cocks, 2009

Introduction

The River Nile is the longest river in the world and represents a major source of water for millions of African people through its course and tributaries. In addition, the Nile basin that is formed by the Nile River is an enormous region that includes almost 2 million square miles of equatorial and north-east Africa accounting for fully 10% of the African continent (Mohamoda 2003). During recent decades, the usage of the waters that are derived from international rivers such as the Nile (e.g., those that run across and separate between two or more countries), has varied from time to time and from place to place, but have increasingly included purposes other than navigation, i.e., irrigation, electricity generation and industrial and household usages (Mohamoda 2003). These types of variations in water use have exacerbated existing shortages of potable water, and have contributed to the conflicts and disputes over the right of each state in benefiting from the river water in non-navigational purposes. This matter had raised certain questions over the right and obligations of each riparian state, in addition to the priority of usages; whether water is used in a certain activity such as irrigation and electricity generation, and the priority of beneficiaries; i.e. whether a country like Egypt which, since ancient times, had mainly flourished thanks to the river Nile, should enjoy acquired rights due to the fact that Egypt is considered the first and top beneficent from the Nile. In this respect, questions had been imposed on researchers in the fields of international political relations over the existence of certain approach that can peacefully solve any disputes in a manner that would ensure the minimum level of applying the principle of good neighborliness, and at the same time, preserve the legitimate rights of each riparian country as discussed further below.

Statement of the Problem

There have been some signs of progress and commitment to the shared vision of the Nile Basin Initiatives. The research that follows clearly demonstrates the regional commitment to the sustainable management of the waters of the Nile River. In fact, most recently, on February 16, 2012, a Tripartite Agreement was signed by the ministers in charge of electricity affairs on behalf of the Riparian governments to initiate the implementation of the Nile Basic Initiative and to reaffirm their intention to continue pursuing its financing and implementation (Nile Basin Parliamentarians call on Riparian governments to increase their country contribution to the NBI, 2012). Despite this call to action, some constraints to progress remain, including the extent to which each member country should exert its diplomatic influence in prosecuting its respective claims to the Nile waters. For example, Swain (2004) suggests that, "Joint water management of the Nile should focus on the most important sub-basin, namely the lower basin comprising Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia [because] the importance of the Nile water is not the same for all ten basin countries" (p. 108). Given the disparateness of water usage, it is not surprising that the affected countries have different perspectives on how the Nile Basin Initiative should proceed. In this regard, Swain emphasizes that, "Because their share of water resources is minimal, some riparian countries are less interested in cooperating on Nile water allocation and are therefore less committed towards basin-wide initiatives" (2004, p. 108). Indeed, currently, just two member states, Egypt and Sudan, account for most of the water usage from the Nile River, and the lower basin riparian countries only (with the possible exception of Eritrea) continue to press for more water from the basin (Swain, 2004). This disparity in usage and demand is due to the presence of another large source of fresh water for these member states, Lake Victoria. According to Swain, "The remaining riparian states are dependent primarily on Lake Victoria as a source of fresh water. For them, the issue is how to manage the lake, which is threatened by depletion and pollution. As a result, these countries contribute a relatively small share to the Nile flow and their dependence on the river for fresh water is not as significant. Thus, any basin-wide initiative faces the problem of co-opting a large number of uninterested parties" (2004, p. 108). Since the construction of the Aswan Dam in the latter half of the 20th century, there have been some other events that have affected the distribution and access to Nile waters that are becoming especially important today. According to With control of the Nile, Egypt's agriculture has expanded fivefold in the ensuing years.

It also marks the effective border between downstream development and upstream poverty. Today, Egypt is approximately 10 times wealthier than Ethiopia. Militarily and economically it dwarfs every state on the banks of the river. Without the water all this could change rapidly. "Egypt's historic rights to Nile waters are a matter of life and death. We will not compromise them," said Moufid Shehab, the Egyptian Minister of Legal Affairs (Howden, 2010, p. 2). Because Egypt is the major actor in this setting, the nation's leadership recently changed hands, and there is a very real potential for outright war over these water-related issues, identifying opportunities to promote this nation's interests in the Nile Basin Initiative represents a timely and valuable enterprise as set forth below.

Research Aims

The overarching aim of this study was to determine the new approach that Egypt is taking regarding the Nile water crisis. It also takes into account the mutual cooperation that Egypt might take with the African Union and the riparian Nile Basin states. Last but not the least the aim of the research was to determine how the Egyptians are going to secure the Nile water and how Egypt is going to balance its security through the means of diplomacy. These aims are congruent with numerous researchers who cite the disparate interests that are involved in adjudicating riparian rights in the modern age. For instance, Boon and Davies (2000, p. 19) emphasize that, "Rivers and their associated riparian and floodplain zones attract the interest of disparate societal segments seeking an advantage in using those areas." By providing a snapshot of current views among Egyptian stakeholders in these areas, this study establishes some important benchmarks for future researchers to use in assessing the effect of the Arab Spring uprisings on Egyptian diplomacy and policymaking in the future as delineated by the study's guiding research questions which are set forth below.

Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions with respect to Egypt's approach to the Nile basin countries:

1. What is the current Egyptian approach to the Nile crisis compared to its previous position?

2. How many institutions are dealing with the Nile case?

3. Which institution (foreign affairs, intelligence) should get priority in Egypt to deal with the Nile basin countries?

4. How mutual cooperation could be increased?

5. What are the dimensions and effects of political and economic crisis of water in the Nile Basin?

In addition, the study was guided by the following research questions with respect to Egypt's use of trade:

1. How can Egypt use trade and investments to its benefit?

2. Will mutual trade and investment bring about political engagement or not?

Finally, the study was guided by the following research questions with respect to Egypt's use of public diplomacy:

1. How do officials use the Arab Spring to their advantage?

2. What are the development of public diplomacy and its effect on the Nile Crisis?

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Background and Overview

Although the international agreements concerning the distribution and management of the Nile River waters date back a hundred years or more, there have been some interesting -- and potentially troubling -- developments in region in recent years that have significant implications for the future. The source of the current crisis can be traced to 1998 when an initial agreement was reached on a plan of action and policy guidelines to establish the Nile Basin Initiative at the 2nd Nile Technical Advisory Committee meeting held in Arusha. A few months later, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was officially launched at an extraordinary meeting of the Nile Basin Council of Ministers, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Mohamoda 2003). According to Swain (2004), "In March 1998, the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin States reached a broad agreement at Arusha, Tanzania, over sharing and managing the Nile water, and endorsed a new program of action. This led to the formal launching of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in February 1999, of which all but Eritrea are members" (p. 106).

During the period between 1993 and 1999, further preparatory steps were taken in furtherance of the Nile River Basin Action Plan, including obtaining the support of donor agencies as well as drafting the relevant policy guidelines that would define the Shared Vision Program that would guide the initiative in the years to come (Mohamoda 2003). In this regard, Haggai (2003) reports that, "In February 1999, the ministers of water affairs of nine countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Congo, Kenya, and Uganda, with Eritrea as an observer) stated jointly that 'for the first time in history, all Nile basin countries have expressed a serious concern about the need for serious discourse' and they declared that their 'shared vision' was to 'achieve sustainable socioeconomic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile basin water resources'" (p. 213).

Other efforts during this period included the formation of several adjunct agencies to facilitate the implementation and administration of the Nile Basin Initiative. For instance, in 1997, upon request by the Nile Council of Ministers, Nile-COM, an organization comprised of the respective ministers of water affairs of the Nile Basin Riparian Countries, requested the World Bank to serve as the coordinating agency of the Nile River Basin Action Plan which it accepted in partnership with the United Nations Development Program and the Canadian International Development Agency (Mohamoda 2003). At this juncture, a definition of the terms involved is in order. According to Black's Law Dictionary, riparian rights are "belonging or relating to the bank of a river or stream; of or on the bank. Land lying beyond the natural watershed of a stream is not riparian. This term is sometimes used as relating to the shore of the sea or other title water, or of a lake or other considerable body of water not having the character of a water course. This is not accurate. The proper word to be employed in such connection is 'littoral'" (p. 1327).

These three organizations, then, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program and the Canadian International Development Agency make up what has been termed the "Nile-Team" which is concerned with the riparian rights involved in the adjudication of the Nile River waters, forged an additional partnership with the Nile Basin Initiative to support their efforts in achieving the shared vision for these valuable resources (Mohamoda 2003). The initiative has also enjoyed widespread support from numerous other multinational and bilateral donors (Mohamada 2003). Six of the riparian countries (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda) created the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE) and the four remaining riparian states served in the capacity of observers (Boon & Davies, 2009). It is within this framework that the Nile River Basin Action Plan (NRBAP) was developed with support from the Canadian International Development Agency and other Nile Team members (Boon & Davies, 2009).

The Strategic Action Program that emerged from these early efforts consists of the basin-wide Shared Vision Program (which covers seven projects), as well as two subsidiary action programs: (a) the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (which will benefit the Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt), and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (consisting of the six Equatorial Lakes Countries, as well as Egypt and the Sudan (Mohamoda 2003). In sum, the Nile Basin Initiative is guided by the shared vision "to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile basin water resources." Pursuant to this shared vision, two Subsidiary Action programs are being implemented in order to leverage the shared vision into real-world achievements as follows:

1. The Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program;

2. The Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (Mohamoda 2003, p. 23).

This shared vision, though, may not be shared by all of the stakeholders that are being affected by these ongoing efforts by the riparian countries to secure more than their fair share of the Nile waters based on agreements that were negotiated by the previous administration. For example, there are clear indications that the Arab Spring uprisings that have rocked Arab world have been especially pronounced Egypt where young people and opposition groups, fueled by recent events in Tunisia which resulted in the overthrow of the Tunisian government, staged a "Day of Rage" protest on January 25, 2011 to coincide with the national "Police Day" that included nationwide demonstrations and labor strikes (Egypt, 2012).

Although a war hero in his former days, Egypt's President Mubarak had become the target of a growing number of Egyptians who were frustrated by a lack of progress in the provision of employment opportunities, as well as the nepotism and corruption that were rampant throughout the country. Many Egyptian young people were being forced to delay marriage and having a family because there were not enough jobs, and even many highly educated Egyptians were under- or unemployed. According to U.S. analysts, "Protester grievances focused on police brutality, state emergency laws, lack of free speech and elections, high unemployment, rising food prices, inflation, and low minimum wages" (Egypt, 2012 p. 2). Moreover, President Mubarak enjoyed the support of the country's well-entrenched military cabal of old school generals. Nevertheless, Mubarak clearly saw the handwriting on the wall as thousands of his young countrymen joined together to protest his regime and its cozy relationship with the United States. The impassioned pleas he made to all of Egypt to give him more time fell on deaf ears, and the half-measures Mubarak implemented in response to the Arab Spring uprising in his own backyard were ineffective as well. For instance, analysts with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report that, "Within several days of the onset of protests, President Mubarak addressed the nation pledging the formation of a new government, and in a second address he offered additional concessions, which failed to assuage protesters and resulted in an escalation of the number and intensity of demonstrations and clashes with police" (Egypt, 2012, p. 3).

Following Mubarak's resignation of February 11, 2011, the country's leadership was assumed by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces which dissolved the Egyptian parliament, suspended the nation's constitution, and forged a committee with a mandate to recommend constitutional changes to facilitate a political transition through democratic elections (Egypt, 2012). Despite some challenges along the way, elections for a new parliament were conducted between November 2011 and January 2012 and presidential elections were conducted in May and June which resulted in the election of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohammed Mursi, over the country's former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq (Egypt, 2012). It is against this dynamic political backdrop that the current debate over the administration of the riparian rights for Nile River waters is taking place as discussed further below.

What is the Egyptian approach to the Nile crisis?

Although negotiations have varied in content, scope and amicability in recent years, the "Egyptian approach" to managing the Nile crisis can best be characterized as unflinching in placing a high priority on not only protecting its historic and current riparian rights, but expanding these in ways that are detrimental to downstream and littoral stakeholders. In this regard, Boon and Davies (2000, p. 19) emphasize that, "Unlike national legislation defining water quality goals, laws regulating access to surface water vary regionally. In most of the East, where water is historically abundant, water use is governed by the doctrine of riparian rights. Individuals who own land adjacent to flowing water have the right to use that water as long as some is left for downstream landowners." Therefore, by enforcing its current levels and prosecuting its case for expanded rights in the future, Egypt is positioning itself as a hegemonic force in an already volatile region where water has been the source of war in the past and where many experts caution such conflicts may well recur if steps are not taken today to ensure all stakeholders are afforded their fair share of the Nile waters. The question concerning whether this approach represents a diversion from past efforts or a sea change in diplomatic priorities or not is discussed further below.

Traditional Approach vs. New/Renewed Approach

In many ways, the "Egyptian approach" can be understood as a continuation rather than a revision of past efforts to secure the nation's riparian rights with respect to the Nile waters. In this regard, Boon and Davies (2000) reports that in recent years, "The establishment and collaboration, for example, of training programs such as those carried out in Egypt and Morocco has improved on-farm management skills. Introduced through farmers' organizations they have resulted in improved irrigation efficiencies of up to 10 -- 15% overall and as much as 30% in productivity" (p. 37). These recent initiatives have been focused on assisting neighboring countries make more efficient use of the water that is available, an issue that represents part of the core problem in this region of the world where rainfall levels can vary dramatically from year to year, all while the populations of the countries in this region continue to expand significantly. According to Boon and Davies, "North Africa represents dryland regions faced with burgeoning population growth and incumbent pressures, and both could benefit greatly from mutual cooperation in developing scientific principles upon which to base management and conservation policies" (2000, p. 37).

Institutions and Organizations Involved with the Nile Case

While the waters of Nile River have accumulated and been distributed according to the whims of nature for thousands of years, the history of contemporary agreements concerning these issues dates to the late 19th century and negotiations with respect to many of the more recent agreements have come under increasing scrutiny by signatory states. In sum, these agreements include:

1. Protocol between Britain and Italy in 1891;

2. Treaty between Britain and Ethiopia in 1902;

3. Agreement between Britain and Congo in 1906 (Modifying the Agreement of Brussels signed in 1894);

4. Agreement between Britain, Italy and Ethiopia in 1906;

5. Exchange of notes between Britain and Italy in 1925;

6. Nile water agreement in 1929;

7. Convention between Britain and Belgium in 1934;

8. Exchange of memoranda between Egypt and Great Britain (on behalf of Uganda) in 1949 -- 1953;

9. Egypt and the Sudan Nile Agreement in 1959;

10. Exchange of memoranda between Egypt and Uganda in 1991;

11. Framework for General Cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia in 1993; and,

1) Agreement between Egypt and Uganda for controlling water hyacinth in 1998 (Metawie 2000).

Beyond these formal bilateral and multinational agreements, there are numerous national, international and nongovernmental organizations actively involved in the management of the Nile Basin waters, including those set forth in Table 1 below.

Table 1

Organizations Involved with Nile Basin Water Management

Institution(s)

Role/Responsibility

Comments

World Bank's Nile Basin Authority

The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is an inter-governmental organization dedicated to equitable and sustainable management and development of the shared water resources of the Nile Basin.

NBI Member States include Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Eritrea is as an observer.

Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE)

This agency consists of six of the riparian countries (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda).

The four remaining riparian states served in the capacity of observers (Boon & Davies, 2009).

Nile River Basin Action Plan (NRBAP) and Institutional Strengthening Project (ISP)

The NRBAP was developed with support from the Canadian International Development Agency and other Nile Team members (Boon & Davies, 2009). The Nile Basin Initiative Institutional Strengthening Project (ISP) aims to strengthen institutional sustainability, enhance capacity and harmonize corporate management across the three Nile Basin institutions: the Nile Secretariat, the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO) and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program Coordinating Unit (Nel-SAP). The vision of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is to achieve sustainable socio-economic development among the countries of the Nile Basin through the equitable use of, and benefits from, common Nile River Basin water resources.

Support through this multi-donor trust fund was designed to help the NBI develop into an effective and strong organization to facilitate the establishment of a future Nile Basin Commission. The project provides financing for forward-looking studies on options for institutional function and structure, for human resources management, and for basin-wide policies and guidelines. The ISP provides substantial technical support aiming at strengthening the NBI's capacity to deliver quality projects through improved administrative systems, information management and governance structures (Project profile for Nile Basin Initiative Institutional Strengthening, 2008).

The Permanent Joint Technical Commission for Nile Waters (PJTC)

In November 1959, Sudan and Egypt signed an Agreement for the utilization of the shared waters of the Nile River. The 1959 Agreement was meant to regulate the River waters and control its flow into the Mediterranean Sea. The Agreement is also considering the rights of other riparian countries in the Nile waters (Metawie, 2000). PJTC also cooperates with various international and regional organizations such as WWC, IWRA, WMO, IHP and participates in most regional and international conferences and workshops dealing with international waters (Metawie, 2000).

Technical co-operation in various fields are being performed under the umbrella of the PJTC. One important issue is to increase the Nile yield through the utilization of lost waters. Both countries have agreed to jointly study and implement projects. The net yield of these projects shall be divided equally between the two countries and each of them shall also contribute equally in the cost. Projects to increase the yield of the Nile River receive high priority and the first project, Jonglei phase one has started, however, stopped due to security problems (Metawie, 2000).

Agreement Between Egypt and Uganda for Controlling the Water Hyacinth, 1998

In the framework of the interest of both Egypt and Uganda to reinforce and enhance the ties of friendship and fraternity of the Nile Riparian and properly manage the Upper Nile water catchments, the two countries agreed in Cairo on 22 March 1998 that Egypt makes available an amount of $13.9 million to support Uganda on a grant basis (Metawie, 2000).

The grant is allocated to combating and controlling the aquatic weeds, specially the water hyacinth in the outlets and inlets of lakes Victoria, Kyoga, Albert and in the Nile, through purchasing and delivering suitable equipment and machinery to the sites of concern (Metawie, 2000).

Egypt's grant to Kenya to excavate groundwater wells in arid and semi-arid zone

In the framework of bilateral cooperation between Egypt and Kenya, a grant of $4.2 million has made available to Kenya in 1996 for the purpose of excavating a hundred groundwater wells in different arid and semi-arid regions in Kenya. An Egyptian company, RIGWA, has accomplished the work by 2001 (Metawie, 2000).

Due to the great success of the first phase of the project, an extension to implement another phase of the project is underway (Metawie, 2000).

The International Post-graduate Diploma on Shared Water Resources

The Shared Water Resources Diploma is held at the department of Irrigation and Hydraulics of the Faculty of Engineering of Cairo University. The main objective of the Diploma is to train water resources professionals in the Nile Basin Countries in the development and management of international rivers and their basins. It covers the relevant engineering, political, geographical, socio-economic, and environmental aspects of the subject (Metawie, 2000).

Other Egyptian institutions also carry out training courses for trainees from the Nile Basin countries (Metawie, 2000).

The HYDROMET Project

The Hydrometeorological Survey of the Catchments of Lakes Victoria, Kyoga and Albert is a highly successful example of technical cooperation between eight different countries assisted by two United Nations agencies (Metawie, 2000).

Since the potential control and regulation of the Nile has a direct bearing on the economic development of all the riparian countries, it was evident to these countries that a high priority must be placed on the collection of hydrometeoroloic data and the investigation of the meteorology, hydrology and hydraulics of the Upper Nile Basin (Metawie, 2000).

Which Institutions (foreign affairs, intelligence) should Receive Priority in Egypt to Deal with the Nile Basin Countries?

At the international level, Egypt water minister, in his or her capacity as representative to the Nile Basin Initiative, should receive priority; at the national level, Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin will facilitate cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, the Permanent Joint Technical Commission for Nile Waters will facilitate future negotiations with Sudan and the International Post-graduate Diploma on Shared Water Resources initiative will help provide a knowledgeable cadre of water management professionals in the future.

How Mutual Cooperation Can Be Increased

In order to create solutions to conflicts concerning water scarcity, distribution, and use, economic growth traditionally has been seen as the principal means for achieving broad development objectives. By utilizing industrial modernity, economic development enables new environment and economics aware resource managing options to be contemplated and implemented. Development now has the potential to be both economically feasible and environmentally sustainable, and the two interests can complement each other in development options. Thus, these theorists claim that "resource reconstructing practices replace resource-degrading practices." (Foulds, 2002, p. 3). While many scholars maintain that water scarcity has the greatest potential for instability in the political sphere, others insist that social inequalities in water distribution, use, and development create a much greater problem in establishing cooperation and avoiding local, state, regional, and international tensions and conflicts.(Foulds 2002).

Dimensions and Effects of the Political and Economic Water Crisis in the Nile Basin

Complex problems require complex solutions, but there are few crises that can match the sheer complexity of the issues that are involved in adjudicating a fair and equitable settlement of the countless disparate interests that are involved. These complexities add to the already volatile nature of the political situation that exists in many of the Nile Basin countries, including Egypt. According to a recent report from the Cape Times (South Africa) emphasizes that, "A tremendous potential for intra-African conflict has been ripening in north-east Africa for more than a decade, largely neglected by continental authorities and the wider global community. It is the Nile Basin Initiative, launched more than 10 years ago among nine of the 10 countries that lie within the watershed of the world's longest river, to decide who may use its waters and how" (Nile Basin Countries Square off over Their Rights to Tap Africa's Largest River 2010, p. 10). The Cape Times report also noted that as recently as May 2010, five of the nine "upstream" countries involved formalized the Nile Basin Co-operative Framework in spite of significant opposition presented by the of the two affected "downstream" countries, Sudan and Egypt. According to the report, "The framework, once signed and ratified by a sixth country, would allow all the watershed countries to use the waters of the Nile and its tributaries according to their own lights, limited only by a general undertaking not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State" (Nile Basin Countries Square off 2010, p. 10). Rather than this agreement, Sudan and Egypt both sought to maintain the essential status quo that was based on the 1959 agreement in which the two dry countries agreed to divide the Nile waters between them no others. The report states that, "Not surprisingly, none of the other Nile basin states recognizes the 1959 agreement and so launched the Nile Basin Initiative in 1999 to negotiate a fairer deal. Egypt and Sudan have reason to be concerned about upstream states tapping the Nile. Egypt depends on it for 97% of its fresh water, Sudan for 75%. The upstream states are far less dependent on it" (Nile Basin Countries Square off 2010, p. 10). Nevertheless, the other stakeholder countries involved the initiative, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, maintain that their countries provide the water to the Nile and they have a corresponding right to extract water from the Nile (Nile Basin Countries Square off, 2010). Besides their traditional needs, these emerging economies also need additional water resources for other purposes, including power generation and agricultural irrigation (Nile Basin Countries Square off, 2010). According to this report, "Before the signing of the new framework, Egypt was threatening to persuade financiers such as the World Bank not to put up the money for dams and irrigation in the upstream states, at least according to government officials in some of those states" (Nile Basin Countries Square off 2010, p. 10). The implications of these recent developments for diplomatic initiatives in the future are profound. In this regard, the report goes on to describe the traditional approach thusly: "Those threats failed and now Egypt has launched a flurry of diplomacy in a last-ditch effort to stall implementation of the framework or perhaps to ameliorate it. In 2010, DRC President Joseph Kabila and Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga visited Cairo for separate meetings with President Hosni Mubarak. There was no indication that either side had budged from their uncompromising positions" (Nile Basin Countries Square off 2010, p. 10).

To its credit, Egypt has sweetened the negotiating pot by offering to assist affected upstream countries through investments for hydroelectric projects and programs provided these initiatives do not adversely affect Egypt's flow of water. The potential for military hostilities is also made clear by this analysis: "There is no telling where this stand-off may lead. Mubarak's predecessor, the late Anwar Sadat, once warned that Egypt would do whatever it took to defend its absolute right to the Nile, not excluding warfare" (Nile Basin Countries Square off 2010, p. 10). An examination of these issues also contained the dire prediction that if water wars do break out in response to these recent events, the implications for the world community would also be severe. In this regard, the report states, "Critics blame the U.S. For failing to see the Nile crisis brewing, warning that the geopolitical damage that U.S. interests would suffer should three of America's most important partners in Africa - Egypt, Ethiopia, and Uganda - come to blows is incalculable" (Nile Basin Countries Square off 2010, p. 10).

Diplomacy, of course, will only go so far in ameliorating these issues, and the potential for a breakdown at any point along the line could derail all of the others. In this regard, according to Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2004), "Sharing the Nile waters continues to be a sensitive issue for historical and political reasons as both Sudan and Egypt depend on its water for their well-being, and this has long been a source of tension in Sudan-Egyptian relations with reflection on the domestic arena. It was among the factors that led to the first coup of 1958. However, Egypt and Sudan concluded their 1959 agreement in the absence of other countries, a factor which made it a constant source of tension in relations with other Nile Basin countries, especially Ethiopia" (p. 81).

As shown in Figure __ below, an estimated 1,600 billion cubic metres of water is believed to fall in the Nile's catchment area every year.

Figure __. Nile Catchment Area

Source: http://www.capewatersolutions.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Nile-river-water-catchment-area.gif

Based on an Egyptian quota of 55 billion cubic meters and Sudan's 18.5 billion cubic meters, almost 95% of the Nile water derived from this catchment area is not utilized (Sidahmed & Sidahmed, 2004). According to Sidahmed and Sidahmed, "Ethiopia seems the first target for damming and irrigation works given its mountainous terrain. Such projects could initially cost up to $800 million, improve water management, increase its availability and reduce silting problems in Sudan and Egypt" (2004, p. 81). In reality, the Nile Basin is comprised of a group of successive basins spreading in a fairly regular fashion from south to north and these basins are interconnected via the Nile's major tributaries; consequently, there are a wide range of different climatic zones, such as areas of rain and humidity, hot areas and areas of severe drought and heat north of al-Khartoum to Cairo which experiences scarcity of rain that amount to less than 18 mm annually, but temperate zones have about 130 mm of rain on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, against 1259 mm in Addis Ababa, and 1524 mm in the Great Lakes Plateau (Monsef, 2010).

Any analysis of the Nile Basin Initiative therefore requires an understanding of each country's respective contribution in the area of the basin and its share of rainfall. The information set forth in Table __ below shows the average of rainfall over all countries of the basin and the variation in rainfall within each Nile Basin country and the change from one year to another (Monsef, 2010).

Table

The respective amounts of rainfall over the Nile Basin countries

Country name

Area of state (km2)

Area of the basin in each state (km2)

% of the basin of the state area (km2)

% of the state's contribution

Average Rainfall (in mm)

Lowest

Highest

Avg

Highest Rate

Avg

Ethiopia

1100010

365117

33.2

11.7

2010

2010

Sudan

2505810

1978506

79

63.6

0

1 610

Congo

2344860

22143

.9

.7

1915

1915

Uganda

231366

98.1

7.4

2060

2060

Burundi

27 834

13260

47.6

4.

Tanzania

84200

8.9

2.7

Rwanda

26 340

19876

75.5

.6

1935

1935

Kenya

46229

8

1.5

Egypt

1001450

326751

32.6

10.5

0

15

15

Total

8889534

3112369

35

0

2060

2060

Figure __. Percentage of Nile Basin states' contribution to the Nile Waters

Source: Based on tabular data from Monsef (2010)

The recent survey of Sudan's foreign relations clearly indicates that the country's geographical position has significantly influenced its foreign diplomacy efforts as well as the country's domestic policy (Sidahmed & Sidahed, 2004). According to these authorities, "A non-aligned stand serves the country's interest given its nine neighbors and border problems. However, the worsening economic situation, flare-up of civil war and continued need for oil, arms and hard currency, pushed successive governments of the day to adopt certain foreign policy practices many of which did not necessarily serve the overall national interest of Sudan" (Sidahmed & Sidahmed, 2004, p. 81). In the past, diplomatic efforts to resolve these issues have largely excluded Sudanese national interests to the exclusion of Egypt and other actors (Sidahmed & Sidahmed, 2004). According to Sidahmed and Sidahmed, "Experience has shown that in most cases, foreign policy was not conducted for the sake of the Sudanese people, except for brief periods. It either followed partisan, sectarian trends during parliamentary periods, or swung between ideological and somewhat pragmatic (1969-72 and 1989-present) or Cold War alliances (1978-85). Unless a solution is found to issues pertaining to the establishment of a viable political system in the country that guarantees a peaceful transfer of power, foreign relations will continue to be a factor in the domestic political struggle" (2004, p. 81).

Likewise, other authorities have weighted in on the diplomatic issues involved by emphasizing that the potential for numerous mutually beneficial solutions could have been negotiated if the United States and other important actors had paid sufficient attention to these issues (Nile Basin Countries Square off, 2010). As an example, this South African newspaper report points out that, "A suggestion by the Israeli water expert Nurit Kliot that just the water lost to evaporation from Egypt's immense Lake Nasser, below the Aswan Dam, would be enough to quadruple Ethiopia's irrigated farmland. The African Union has also not been conspicuous in trying to head off a showdown among nine of its members" (Nile Basin Countries Square off 2010, p. 10). These types of multilateral diplomatic interventions are what is required to achieve a neutral-based approach to these divisive issues, but there is far to much at stake for guessing games and "what-if" scenarios. Nevertheless, some indication of how progress may be achieved in the future where is has eluded policymakers in the past can be discerned from the observation that, "Such outside intervention might have helped persuade Egypt and Sudan that although they are justified in being anxious about any threat to their lifeblood, an earlier recognition of the claims of the upstream states might have led to a reasonable compromise with fair water quotas for all. Perhaps it is not yet too late" (Nile Basin Countries Square off 2010, p. 10). Clearly, time is of the essence in formulating reasoned and equitable decisions concerning the Nile Basin Initiative and trade may play an important role in this enterprise as discussed further below.

How can Egypt use Trade and Investments to its Benefit?

Increased commerce between Sudan and Egypt in particular holds significant promise to solidify the relationship between these two Nile Basin countries in the future, but other actors are not similarly situated. Following the domestic unrest that took place in January 2011, the Egyptian government increased social spending dramatically in an effort to resolve growing public dissatisfaction; however, the political uncertainty that existed at juncture in Egypt's recent history suggests that increased trade will only go so far in ameliorating the potential civil unrest that lurks just under the surface of an otherwise-placid civil society. In this regard, analysts with the U.S. government report that, "Tourism, manufacturing, and construction are among the hardest hit sectors of the Egyptian economy, and economic growth is likely to remain slow at least through 2012. The government is utilizing foreign exchange reserves to support the Egyptian pound and Egypt may seek a loan from the International Monetary Fund" (Egypt economy, 2012, p. 3).

What are the Development of Public Diplomacy and Its Effect on the Nile Crisis?

Recent diplomatic initiatives have focused on Sudan's claims and Egypt's administration of the security and economic developmental issues related to the Halaib region north of the 22nd parallel boundary; however, Egypt no longer depicts the administration of the Bir Tawil trapezoid in Sudan on Egyptian maps (Transnational issues, 2012). Likewise, in January 2008, Gazan breaches in the security wall with Egypt focused renewed interest in identifying diplomatic alternatives concerning this Sinai border region (Transnational issues, 2012).

Chapter 3: Methodology

Study Approach

The aim and objective of this research paper's questions need an in depth analysis which is going to be the core element of the proposal. The analysis needs to be in structural format to find out the traditional approach that Egypt took and the new approaches that they are going to take regarding the Nile water and the riparian Nile basin state. The key element of this research proposal was to focus on "Public Diplomacy" and the approaches that Egypt is going to take to "Secure" its national interest on the Nile water and the Nile basin countries. Therefore, secondary data analysis, content analysis would play a crucial role to find out an outcome of this proposal. Interviewing diplomats from Egypt would also give an extensive overview of the current scenario of Egypt's position to secure its own interest along with its neighboring countries. Moreover, for the content analysis, articles, documents, books, internet resources were used in its own area of activity. This methodology is highly congruent with numerous social researchers who emphasize the need to review the peer-reviewed, scholarly and mainstream literature in order to formulate informed opinions and develop fresh insights into a given topic (Neuman, 2003).

Data Collection

Collection of data would be conducted by questionnaire survey and the comprehensive interviews would carry out the real scenario of Egypt's policy and objectives to secure its own national interest with the use of diplomacy and bilateral/multilateral trade with the other countries.

Chapter 4: Data Analysis

Section One: Interviews with Principals

The results of an interview with Professor Nader Noordin Mohammad, Professor of Soil and Water Resources, Faculty of Agriculture, Cairo University, who is also a member of the Division of Agriculture and Irrigation specialized national councils, provided some valuable insights concerning Egypt's current priorities in resolving the disparate interests in the Nile Basin Initiative. When asked what Egypt's most pressing concerns are in the diplomatic arena, Professor Mohammad suggested that Sudan is the 800-pound gorilla in the room that no one wants to talk about but which must be acknowledged in order to ensure that all stakeholders are included in the shared vision of the Nile Basin Initiative. Based on recent climate conditions and the potential for disruptions of water supplies in the future, Egyptian authorities recently continued a longstanding agreement between Egypt and Sudan that includes initiatives to improve the efficiency of wheat production practices in ways that reduce water needs and increase output in Northern Sudan. These initiatives, the professor indicated, would help propel Africa into an agricultural export region for growing demand for food products in Egypt.

Likewise, an interview with Ayman Abou Hadid, chairman of the Egyptian government's Agricultural Research Center emphasized that properly managed and supported, the agreement with Sudan stands to become a mutually advantageous operation for the region as well as the consumers in Arab nations. According to Chairman Hadid, "We are facing a shortage of agricultural commodities internationally." Pursuant to the agreement with Sudan, the Egyptian government furnishes private investors with incentives for irrigation and infrastructure; however, Chairman Hadid added that "production is left up to the private companies [and] the [Egyptian] government is not going to participate." The newly negotiated arrangement with Sudan also has some significant benefits for Egypt. In this regard, Chairman Hadid added that while Egypt continues to rehash longstanding agreements and new ones with some of the other Nile Basin countries, the arrangement with Sudan helps to establish a precedent while still minimizing the impact on Egypt's water supplies. According to the chairman, "Water used to irrigate wheat crops in Sudan would come from that nation's allotment, not Egypt's." In fact, the increased wheat production from this agreement is believed to be sufficient to satisfy Egypt's increased future demand, while also providing Sudan with some sorely needed revenues. In this regard, the chairman added that, "Sudan has a huge potential. There are so many positive aspects as long as some code of conduct is respected." Professor Nader Noureddin, a soil and water expert at Cairo University's College of Agriculture, though, emphasized that Sudanese wheat production in the northern desert would require enormous amounts of water and would do little to supplement Sudan's own domestics needs. According to Professor Noureddin, "They need [wheat] much more than Egypt. This is their own land." In addition, the professor cautioned that private investments from Egypt will not benefit average Sudanese farmers, because joint venturers will be more interested in profits than assisting local producers. Notwithstanding these constraints, Chairman Hadid also emphasized that, "Any African country that can afford to grow more food, that is better for everyone.

Section Two: Survey of Egyptian Consumers

A convenience survey consisting of a series of Likert-scaled statements of Egyptian consumers concerning the ongoing Nile Basin Initiative was conducted next, and nineteen respondents completed the paper-and-pencil survey in time for inclusion in the data analysis which is presented in Tables __ through __ and depicted in Figures __ through __ below.

Key:

1

Strongly Agree

2

Agree

3

Not Sure

4

Disagree

5

Strongly Disagree

Table

Responses to the statement, "Egypt should abide by past agreements for sharing Nile water"

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid

1.00

10

52.6

52.6

52.6

2.00

4

21.1

21.1

73.7

3.00

2

10.5

10.5

84.2

4.00

3

15.8

15.8

Total

19

Figure __. Responses to the statement, "Egypt should abide by past agreement for sharing Nile water."

Table

Responses to the statement, "Egypt should share more of its water with its neighbors in the future."

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid

1.00

2

10.5

10.5

10.5

2.00

2

10.5

10.5

21.1

3.00

4

21.1

21.1

42.1

4.00

8

42.1

42.1

84.2

5.00

3

15.8

15.8

Total

19

Figure __. Responses to the statement, "Egypt should share more of its water with its neighbors in the future."

Table

Responses to the statement, "Current agreements for sharing Nile waters are fair."

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid

1.00

4

21.1

21.1

21.1

2.00

2

10.5

10.5

31.6

3.00

10

52.6

52.6

84.2

4.00

2

10.5

10.5

94.7

5.00

1

5.3

5.3

Total

19

Figure __. Responses to the statement, "Current agreements for sharing Nile waters are fair."

Table

Responses to the statement, "Egypt should go to war to protect its interests in the Nile Basin if necessary."

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid

1.00

8

42.1

42.1

42.1

2.00

4

21.1

21.1

63.2

3.00

2

10.5

10.5

73.7

4.00

2

10.5

10.5

84.2

5.00

3

15.8

15.8

Total

19

Table

Responses to the statement, "Most Egyptian citizens know enough about what is involved in the Nile Basin Initiative to have an informed opinion."

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid

1.00

3

15.8

15.8

15.8

2.00

4

21.1

21.1

36.8

3.00

5

26.3

26.3

63.2

4.00

4

21.1

21.1

84.2

5.00

3

15.8

15.8

Total

19

Table

Responses to the statement, "Public awareness campaigns could help improve the fair settlement of the Nile crisis."

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid

1.00

4

21.1

21.1

21.1

2.00

7

36.8

36.8

57.9

3.00

3

15.8

15.8

73.7

4.00

3

15.8

15.8

89.5

5.00

2

10.5

10.5

Total

19

Section Three: Summary of Recent Media Articles concerning the Nile Basin Initiative

Finally, a recapitulation and summary of recent media articles concerning the Nile Basin Initiatives is set forth in Table __ below.

Table

Recapitulation and Summary of Recent Media Articles Concerning the Nile Basin Initiative

Source

Summary

Comments/Implications

Davidson (2011)

In early 2011, Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi announced plans to build Africa's largest hydropower plant along the Blue Nile river. The project is popular, but lack of transparency is a concern. In the western fringe of Ethiopia on the banks of the Blue Nile river, the nation's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi thundered that the country would overcome all obstacles to complete Africa's largest hydropower plant. "No matter how poor we are, in the Ethiopian traditions of resolve, the Ethiopian people will pay any sacrifice," he said. "I have no doubt they will, with one voice, say: 'Build the Dam!'" Secrecy has shrouded the 5,250-megawatt plant, nearly 20 miles from the Sudanese border. Although the site was identified in 1964, the decision to go ahead with what had been known as Project X became public less than a month before construction began on April 2. Its unveiling shocked a host of interested parties. At a launch in Addis Ababa, the Egyptian embassy's spokesman was astonished to learn a reservoir more than twice the size of Singapore would be created by a barrage Cairo had not been consulted on. Over four-fifths of the water for the Nile, Egypt's lifeblood, comes from Ethiopia's highlands, leading to historic tensions over usage. Also uninformed was the Eastern Africa Power Pool, which was just putting the finishing touches on a regional integration study that leans heavily on exported Ethiopian hydropower. "We look forward to getting more information so we can factor it into our master plan," Jasper Oduor, its Executive Secretary, said.