However, when Obama gave that speech, he could not have anticipated how events would unfold in Iran, Egypt, and other nations in which the young people he had addressed as part of the Islamic world would begin to demand their rights. Obama and the mainstream representatives of the Democratic Party were criticized by many on both the right and the left for an insufficiently aggressive response to the demands for democratic enfranchisement. "For decades, the United States has prioritized a now clearly illusory stability over American ideals" (Hamid 2010). The U.S. had exerted relatively little pressure upon the de facto dictator of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, to ensure a stable regime in the nation with a reasonably pro-American leader. However, the Obama Administration's response can be read less as an endorsement of decades of previous administrations' complacency regarding right-wing dictators as it was a fear of seeming to endorse the actions of the democratic demonstrators. Indications of U.S. support could have been read as direct control over the movement, and worked against the establishment of a more participatory government.
Obama's position during the Iran demonstrations was similarly criticized by both the right and the left for its moderation -- once again, the President was cautious about openly expressing U.S. support for protestors against the government, who were alleging election fraud. "The last thing that I want to do is to have the United States be a foil for those forces inside Iran who would love nothing better than to make this an argument about the United States…That's what they do. That's what we're already seeing. We shouldn't be playing into that," he said, drawing anger from his Republican opponents in Congress (Kelly 2009).
Eventually, Obama was forced to take military action against Libya, when the world's supply of oil. Yet when necessary, Obama has also been willing to back the U.S. government's support of democratic movements with force, so long as it does not compromise the state's autonomy. A critical aspect of Obama's support for the democratic protestors was the organic nature of the protest, and the support of the international community. The U.S. remains true to its values, but no longer strives to 'go it alone' in this complicated and fractious region.
Hamid, S. (2011, January). How Obama got Egypt wrong. The Brookings Institute.
Retrieved July 8, 2011 at http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0128_egypt_obama_hamid.aspx
Kelly, Mary Louise. (2009). Obama draws criticism for Iran response. NPR.
Retrieved July 8, 2011 at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105764497
Klein, Joe. (May 26, 2011). What Bibi gains by misrepresenting Obama's Middle East policy
Time Magazine. Retrieved July 8, 2011 at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2074015,00.html#ixzz1RZDGPo10
Obama, Barak. (2009). Remarks by the President: A new beginning. The White House.
Retrieved July 8, 2011 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09
S. backed elitist regime refuses to follow the established rules (Jenson, 2004). Chavez won his Presidency by majority vote of the people. U.S. meddling in Venezuelan affairs represent a source of outrage for many of the citizens. Venezuela represents the most obvious example where the U.S. has backed elitist regimes that support its own interests, while ignoring the democratic process that is the right of the people. Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia with
Foreign Policy Nixon's Detente Description Detente was a cooling down, or thaw, among America, Russia and China's arms' race (Detente). The United States and Russia could either slow their weapons production or continue the arms race, which, people feared could end in a devastating war (Detente, CNN). Nixon and Henry Kissinger worked secretly on Detente at summit meetings in Beijing and Moscow. President Gerald Ford signed on to Detente in Helsinki in 1975.
Foreign Policy of President Reagan Before the disastrous Vietnam War, the U.S. held an undisputed dominant position worldwide, recognized locally as well as by other nations. The nation's historic actions towards defending freedom, by restraining the fascist faction during the Second World War, followed by organizing a large free-state coalition for combating communism, were supported by profound and sweeping domestic consensus. This consensus was destroyed by America's decision to wage war
Foreign Policy of China (Beijing consensus) Structure of Chinese Foreign Policy The "Chinese Model" of Investment The "Beijing Consensus" as a Competing Framework Operational Views The U.S.-China (Beijing consensus) Trade Agreement and Beijing Consensus Trading with the Enemy Act Export Control Act. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act Category B Category C The 1974 Trade Act. The Operational Consequences of Chinese Foreign Policy The World Views and China (Beijing consensus) Expatriates The Managerial Practices Self Sufficiency of China (Beijing consensus) China and western world: A comparison The China (Beijing
In that year, when the unification of Italy was achieved, the Papal Kingdom was confiscated by the Italian Kingdom, so the Pope refused to recognize the Italian Kingdom, or to step outside the Vatican City. Mussolini entered into negotiations with the Pope, aimed at healing that rift. In 1929, the Pope and Mussolini entered into the Lateran Agreements, which consisted of a Treaty, a Concordat, and a Financial Convention. At
A second lesson was found in Kennedy's management of the crisis. The basic lesson learned was that, in the midst of such a crisis, leaders need time away from the glare of the media to resolve their own thinking and communications, and they need the self-confidence to limit their objectives to only what is needed to resolve the crisis, not "win" it. It is believed that the Soviet's lesson was that