Varnava (2012) Commented on the Multifaceted Intelligence

Varnava (2012) commented on the multifaceted intelligence attributes that went into making the construct of British Intelligence gathering in Cyprus, a successful vocation in World War II. This review aims to explore the implications of the role played by local, civil populace in thwarting attempts by military in allowing intelligence inputs through counter-espionage on British and Middle East territories. The review revisits some work on the First World War British efforts on counter espionage measures in Cyprus after 1916.

The work will add to the literature on intelligence activities, attempted during the WW1 (Varnava, 2012). According to Constantinou's (2013) paper, the role played by diplomatic strategies that extrapolates intelligence-gathering process makes it successful. Diplomacy is a means of making skilled, persistent advocacy towards obtaining solutions of complex situations. It fails to make most of its capabilities. The epistemology (of diplomacy) in the context of humanism, above the dimension of intelligence construct is explored in this paper in the backdrop of history and its functionalities.

Diplomacy can be more than mere covenants of adopted policies and conveyances of strategies. Diplomacy can instead, be more proactive (by assimilating the currents and thoughts from the populace up to the echelons and making a case for the larger percepts that matter more immediately to the concerns of the common understanding) (Constantinou, 2013). Giglio (2013) points out how America's CIA could be adopting self-defeating methods in their pursuit of intelligence gathering. He emphasizes on their folly of deploying only men in their ventures.

In the article, he has brought out the fact that the rebels against Assad had started questioning the integrity of CIA to their cause. Similar to what had happened in Iraq, those putting their faith in American support felt betrayed. The meetings like those in Gaziantep do not go farther than using the rebels as tools for information. The turn of events in the intensified campaign against Assad needed the international community to help the rebels by supplying them with arms and ammunitions and no-fly zones.

However, according to an article that appeared in The New York Times, the undeclared intention of the American government was to keep them (the rebels) out of the American Army's way in their fight against Assad. That posture was underlined by CIA's preference to help some selected rebel groups. Such posturing was in contradiction to the public stance taken by the U.S.- that of helping the rebels dethrone Assad's regime (Giglio, 2013). Sepper (2010), opines that intelligence gathering requires efficient network formation as well as committed interpersonal relationship.

According to him, mutual faith and trust play an important role in the process of gathering intelligence inputs. The article goes on to explain the building up of effective networks based on personal relationship with allies living in other nations in the construct of intelligence-gathering. The workings of the networks and inputs from counterparts and informants have been studied in this article. The factors and impact of such intelligence measures in the democratic societies can be understood only by studying the methodology adopted by such jointly operated networks amongst countries.

The intelligence networks are informal and flexible, in addition to being secretive about their existence and actions. The networks are guided by unwritten codes of conduct and follow ethics of their own. Professionalism is the hallmark of such ethos. There are instances when such ethics are overridden by ruthless overtures and professionalism suffers. Such instances, where certain intelligence services act on their own, often put serious constraints on the liberty of an individual.

In democracies that most of the world lives in today, such autonomous behavior can put a question mark on personal liberty. The author suggests certain legal enactments to control and make the intelligence services more accountable. That would make the functioning of the democracy more meaningful for the individuals in the intelligence network (Sepper, 2010). Svendsen (2011) observes that nowadays intelligence gathering is using technology increasingly in contemporary times and that increasing number of women are taking to education.

Intelligence gathering could hence deploy more women in the construct of intelligence services to make it more efficient. The campaigning for NATO is seen as a success of intelligence gathering process in Libya to gain functional and strategic success. The events and functions by intelligence agencies in these endeavors need to be analyzed to the subject of deployment of women and technology mix, and this forms the basis of the present work.

To take the work forward in intelligence structure, this work in Libya, engaged by co-operation of intelligence services, makes for an important study. Such a study becomes all the more relevant as the variety of problems and parameters (present in the context of Libya) have been overcome to ensure the success of the well-coordinated intelligence operation amongst different agencies. Libya intelligence operation consists of both human (HUMINT) as well as technological (TECHINT) dimensions and the author analyses both these percepts in this article (Svendsen, 2011).

Mulley (2014) has provided information about the adventures of eight British spies (all females) in World War ll. They are not incognito anymore. The biographies of women (Pearl Witherington, Violette Szabo, Christine Granville and Eileen and Jacqueline Nearne, the sisters), in these activities, jointly the roles of British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and OSS, are available for public consumption. The work and life of Granville, Noor Inayat Khan have also been documented in the last few years.

SOE Noreen Riols, a veteran, questioned the secondary status given to women agents in intelligence services. The observation was made in light of the fact that the male and female agents undergo same training in this field as opposed to any other profession. She stated that such discrimination is uncalled for, at the RAF, Tempsford memorial unveiling ceremony. In the treatise, there is bemusement about the agents chosen to introduce the world of women intelligence agents.

Though the assorted collection of women in the espionage and intelligence domain is eclectic (ranging from famed Odette Sansom and Violette Szabo to the largely unknown Diana Rowden and Sonya Butt), the role of more recent women spies is not included (Mulley, 2014). Zabecki (2008) has written an article exclusively to highlight the contribution of one of the most notable American women spies, Virginia Hall.

Two women spies find special mention in the American spy history- Virginia Hall and Mary Edwards Walker, the latter decorated with the Medal of Honor, serving in her capacity as medical surgeon in the civil war and more widely known than the former. Though Virginia Hall was conferred with much more highly rated DSC (Distinguished Service Cross), it is not a household name.

She served as an undercover agent in two capacities- first as an agent under SOE (the British Special Operations Executive, in France) and followed it up by working under OSS (U.S. Office of Strategic Services). An interesting article by war veterans documents the effectiveness of women as spies during the WWII. The American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (attached to the 36th Infantry division) was tasked with recruiting spies, with actually an open invitation to all who sought to volunteer as spies.

There was no specific training that turned common citizenry into spies in those days. The adaptability and presence of mind was trusted to deal with the situation to extract information that would be useful to the army. The women volunteers were recruited, briefed, and expected to infiltrate enemy ranks. Most women came from the FFI (Free French Intelligence) as the Frenchmen were courageous and spirited. Their hate for the enemy made them take enormous risks. Also, women attracted less suspicion and, as such made excellent spies (Nelson, 1997).

Lake (2012), in an article writes about many woman spies that worked in WWII in different capacities, times and zones. In a first, "Jen" a 'revelation' by Mark Owen, one of the 'seals' that exterminated Osama bin Laden states that the intelligence analyst of the mission that undertook the whole operation was a woman. This article dwells on some of the female spies and their contributions (Lake, 2012). Lownie (2013) revisits the remarkable life of Christine Granville.

The passionate woman chose to forsake the safety and luxury afforded by being a diplomat's wife for trying to stop the advance of the Nazi army in Europe. The article traces her life right from a wild childhood to her violent execution. It is vivid in its details of the many paramours in her life, daring exploits, and its culmination in being stalked, discovered and murdered eventually. She was an SOE recruit and it is only recently that all her adventures have been made public (Lownie, 2013).

STEP 6: Organization of Evaluated Research The post-9/11 counterterrorism methodology was driven by intelligence, and governed and supervised by networks of intelligence agencies. Such offices had always partnered with organizations across borders and the networking would only grow with many surprising elements in their quest. The range and mode of intelligence gathering has only increased, if anything. Even after a decade, the networking keeps growing its reach and influence. With relevance to information, intelligence gathering is being made public with increasing regularity.

Those who are not a part of the intelligence agencies and networks have no idea about the interactive mechanisms, methodologies and factors that go into this construct. The players involved in the set-up, their role and the criteria that make them a part of the completely secretive working is enigmatic. No specific information is ever made public about such contributions (Sepper, 2010). Intelligence during World War I & II The infamous Gestapo of Germany knew about the existence of famous American female spy Virginia Hall.

There was a concerted effort to find and eliminate her by the Gestapo. Hall had a wooden leg, which made her limp and earn her the nickname "limping lady." That should have made her easy to detect, but she evaded the spies for almost a year and half. During this time, she helped the Allies by reporting the movement of the German army. She helped the airmen from the British RAF escape to safety when their planes and vehicles were shot down.

In this association with the French resistance, she also helped the French training and supplies movement in southern France. It is noted that her coordination activities of three battalions of Interior units of French army led to the destruction of four bridges that helped the supply of arms and ammunition along with other necessities to the enemy army, put several enemy supply trains off tracks, captured about 500 German soldiers and killed 150 of them (Fox, 2013; Zabecki, 2008).

HUMINT (Human intelligence) is the network of humans that supplies the intelligence as opposed to the TECHINT (Technical intelligence) components comprising of IMINT (imagery intelligence) and SIGINT (signal intelligence) according to Blair (2011). Although Florence Nightingale was glorified as the revolutionary change that brought the women into the war scene, it was not by any means the first instance when women had roles to play in wars. They have always been seen to wield weapons, helped armies in important support roles and borne the brunt of invading, conquering armies.

The presence of women in armed invasions, wars have been very important, and they were called as "camp followers." Their role in gathering and disseminating information (of enemy camps) were either of informal nature (mundane gossiping and neighborhood talks) or through proper espionage methods employed through political structures. The role of women has also been used to leverage their influence through kinship to gain political or financial leanings.

There are many examples in the history (e.g., medieval and Tudor / Stuart periods), where in the aristocracy, women have proved useful as tools to gain advantage for their military and political masters (Secret Agents in Hoop Skirts: Women Spies of the Civil War, 2013). There is enough evidence to prove the decisive, if behind -- the scene roles played by specially the elite, aristocratic women in obtaining vital information that moved in the upper echelons of the society and be a natural, unsuspecting part of social and diplomatic gatherings. (Proctor, 2003).

In times of wars, the women were used to gather sensitive, information through various means as they were above suspicion and their movement was rarely under military surveillance. The range of women varied depending upon the situation and young, unmarried, middle aged matrons as well as widows are known to have figured in intelligence gathering activities, in different capacities. The women spies were chosen from various ethnicities and nationalities. In the 19th century, there is little record of women acting as decoys possibly, as there was minimal warfare, too.

In these times, the male dominance in the freshly created intelligence and police departments as arms of law was very apparent. Yet, the role of women in espionage activities continued and the importance was never diminished (Proctor, 2003; Sundaraj-Keun, 2014). The natural capacity of women to act as seducers to extract secrets from those enamored by them has been used most proficiently through times as means of information gathering. Women appear more coy and defenseless, and hence less threatening, and hence make better spies according to a senior intelligence officer.

In contrast to the highly attractive and even desirous characters like Mata Hari, the natural emotional characteristics of females make them useful in the pursuit of intelligence gathering and espionage (Proctor, 2003). Diplomacy There are many explanations given on the act and functions of diplomacy in the 21st century, yet they do not address the notions about the knowledge required to understand the diplomatic environment within which it operates. Exact definitions and information about the elements (actors, processes, and issues) that make up the diplomacy construct is still not supplied.

The same query also means that the additional and supplementary requirement for completing the diplomacy role and function should also be clear (Neumann 2012). Diplomatic channels are made up of two distinct channels as far as area of operation is concerned. One, which works in the field, often with, and in different countries and locations and people, mainly to collect and disseminate information. Second, the one that works from the home office.

The home office part of diplomatic construct, sifts through the information gathered in the field to process the information and create the paperwork required in diplomatic pursuits (Constantinou, 2013). In Iraq and Afghanistan, women have been used in the wars by the U.S. military in capacities restricted to intelligence gathering through engaging in talks with local women and assisting in local policing of women suspects. They were not deployed in combative zones.

The House of Representatives has passed a bill that disallows use of women in actual warfare and front lines of army in 2005. The reasons given for the said amendment revolved around three main contentions. The first was that there was no immediate compulsion (military or demographic), that required the deployment of young women to dangerous zones in war. The biological and anatomical difference between males and females was the natural reason given- the overall physical capabilities of a unit may be jeopardized owing to the obvious differences.

The sexuality brought in by presence of females could hinder the male bonding in a unit and affect discipline was the second reason offered in favor of the bill (Carreiras, 2006). Thirdly, the ethics and morals of a civilized Judeo-Christian society could not permit sending its mothers and daughters into known dangers of war. Under the pretext of this posture, it was argued that captured females could be subjected to sexual torture and excesses that was unwarranted (Alfonso, 2010; Helms, 1993).

The intelligence networks are informal and flexible, in addition to being secretive about their existence and actions. The networks are guided by unwritten codes of conduct and follow ethics of their own. Autonomy of intelligence networks can cause a lot of unwarranted discomfiture in the liberal times and democratic set up of contemporary times. The main function of intelligence networks is to act in the best interests of the nations they serve. They could well exceed their brief if not supervised, controlled, and regulated by the independent democratic authorities.

The operations of intelligence measures are secretive and the elected representatives of a democracy do not usually know much about their machinations, elements, and processes. The chances of such secretive and often harsh measures could transcend public and democratic ethos, often to the detriment of own states. That is a threatening prospect; as such autonomy could easily cause uncontrolled actions and become a cause for concern for the home state (Sepper, 2010).

Intelligence co-operation An important measure of the combined effects of TECHINT and HUMINT can be revisited appropriately now in the aftermath of infamous Col. Gaddafi (20 October 2011). The unfolding of intelligence activities came about in the period of March to October 2011. The TECHINT deployment is noted for the use of ISTAR capabilities while the most notable HUMINT event was that of the intelligence chief of Libya Moussa Koussa leaving Libya for Britain towards the ending of March. The intelligence construct is very demanding in being secure, secretive, and reliable.

The act of exchange of high-value information puts all the elements involved to a lot of risk- risk in the immediate sense to the carrier and the one holding the information as well as losing the source or process of gaining recurring information. As such, the codes under which intelligence is carried out follow strict guidelines. All the factors, technical (communication and storage) or human covenants need adequate security.

Two main rules that govern such information are that the secrecy of the information is maintained at all costs and secondly it will not be disseminated without express consent of the owner state.

The main guiding rule states that for a piece of information or intelligence to be had, there should be justifiable "need to know." The second important rule that covers intelligence structures is that all information, even after being shared is the property of the first one extracting that information, also called "user control." Under this rule, redistribution of information is strictly through permission of originator and the receiver is obliged to follow this rule strictly.

The provider of classified information rates the intelligence inputs according to his priorities and is supposed to be honored by the receiver (Duke, 2006). The redistribution, is thus under the control of the originator and may dictate his terms (set up priori rules on his information or allow ad hoc dissemination based on request). In security parlance, such measures as discussed in preceding paragraph is aimed at avoiding the "Trojan Horse" effect- intelligence facts being shared with a third party breaching 'originator control'.

Even though informal, there may be agreements put in place between intelligence sharing agencies to share all information gathered by independent agencies. SIGINT is one such intelligence information category. There may also be an understanding to intrude on each other's devices and human covenants between nations that share information (especially- confidential corporate information). Agencies that respect these unspoken rules carry a reputation that others value and share their own inputs more readily with, thus increasing their own productivity.

Wherever mutual confidence levels between nations and intelligence levels are high, the correspondence is instantaneous and of high quality, deploying sophisticated technology at work (Sepper, 2010). Loss of confidence in counterparts can lead to loss of communication from both ends, as happened twice between Mossad (Israeli intelligence) and the CIA. Mossad used CIA intelligence input to bomb Iraqi nuclear stations (1981) and then again the Mossad was found to have infiltrated the U.S. Navy Investigative Service (Kahana, 2001).

Similar inconsistencies within intelligence frameworks was discovered by Australian agencies that were at the receiving end of unsubstantiated inputs from the British and American agencies while embarking on the Iraq war. Those actions made the Australian agency rely on its own resources for gathering vital inputs and stop depending on partners. Security and intelligence agencies have the wherewithal to check the competency and veracity of intelligence partners and inputs from various sources, thus requiring stricter adherence to agreements and codes of the construct.

That alone makes external control an unimportant prospect. The internal control is strong enough to cause far-reaching effects and reprimand is swift and implemented immediately and more feared than punishments of those applied by legal structures outside their frameworks. Female HUMINT Intel collectors Mary Margaret Graham, was amongst the first women to be involved in action-oriented (espionage, sabotage, and paramilitary) side of intelligence work of CIA instead of the regular work assigned to women recruits- that of data analysis.

This vocation, also known as 'targeter' allowed her to engage in important anti-terrorism activities staying in Washington. The capability of women to be more diligent in attending to details- a prime requisite for such work is why more women get recruited as 'targeters' as opposed to men, she clarified. That inherent, natural ability makes them better performers in the measures to be taken against male counterparts. They are more skilled at connecting the dots between isolated vents and circumstances via. phone calls, credit calls, passports and towns or visits.

This comes as a revelation because CIA did not recognize women for their particular abilities, for example only one woman, Virginia Hill was decorated for her services to the organization. She served in OSS, predecessor to the now CIA. Even with an easily recognizable wooden leg she posed as a farmhand and penetrated Germany occupied French territory and helped the training of three battalions of the French army. Stories circulate about her packing her peg leg when she was dropped off behind enemy lines.

In the aftermath of the war, when CIA was formed, she was relegated to anonymity behind a desk-job. CIA indeed had no place for the experienced and field- compatible agents who had been exemplary in the field-espionage activities (Lake, 2012; Clandestine Women: Spies in American History, 2014). STEP 7: Synthesis of Evaluated Research Though Reese (2008) laments lack of literature and record about women in the field of espionage and intelligence gathering in general,.