American presidential policy toward communist Vietnam and Indochina

Vietnam

Every American president basically regarded the enemy in Vietnam, whether the Vietminh, the National Liberation Front in the 60s and the government of Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam as agents of global communism (Rotter 1999). U.S. policymakers and most Americans conceived of communism as the opposite of what they stood for. Communists opposed democracy, violated human rights, conducted military attacks and formed closed-state economies, which did not trade with capitalist countries. They loathed communism like a contagious disease. When the Communist Party rose to power in China in 1949, the U.S. government in Washington feared that Vietnam would fall into the hands of communists (Rotter).

President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953)

This was the reason why the administration of U.S. President Harry Truman decided to send aid to the French who were then fighting the Vietminh in 1950 (Smitha 2005). Earlier in May, 1945, the Truman administration approved the resumption of France's colonial authority in Indochina in the hope that France would fight communism in Vietnam. The Viet Minh, a movement led by Ho Chi Minh, a veteran communist, resisted the French regime in Vietnam. At the end of the war, the Viet Minh announced Vietnam's independence of foreign rule. But the Truman administration and the Allied powers did not want the Vietnamese to be independent. The war between the French and the Viet Minh then began in December 1946. The U.S. sided with the French in Vietnam for the sake of fighting communism in Europe and Indochina and sent financial and material support to the French to overthrow Ho Chi Minh's government in Vietnam (Rotter, Smitha).

President Truman supported the French also in the hope of helping them build and reinforce non-Communist nations whose fate depended to a large extent on the preservation of Vietnam (Rotter 2005, Smitha 1999). He saw that a free world in the region would open markets for Japan, the involvement of the U.S. In Vietnam likewise assured the British of the revival of the rubber and tin industries in Malaya, a neighbor of Vietnam. With U.S. help, the French could move on with efforts at economic recovery at home and ultimately retrieve their military forces from Indochina to oversee the rearmament of West Germany. These were the perceived deep-seated motivations of U.S. involvement in Vietnam (Rotter, Smitha).

After the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson convinced President Truman to increase U.S. assistance to the French (Smitha 2005). The U.S. also recognized France's pupper king, Bao Dai, in Vietnam (Smitha).

President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963)

As congressman from Massachusetts, Kennedy first set out for an extensive fact-finding mission to the Middle and the Far East in 1951 and, on its return, he re-stated his support for all Western efforts for freedom in the regions (Bostdorff an 1994). He stated that if the West did not promptly and appropriately realize their ideal, especially in Southeast Asia, the Chinese Communists could and would dominate the region. He also disagreed to the Frenchs anachronistic colonialist mentality and nationalistic ideals. Instead, he called attention to complex realities in Southeast Asia and that these complexities required particular and concrete policies. He found the French and U.S. policy in the region as lacking in practicality, while he continued to express support for the principle of freedom behind the policy. In 1956, he said that Vietnam was the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia and the "keystone to the arch (Bostdorff and)."

Throughout his term, President Kennedy roused Americans with the use of idealistic terms to incline them to view Vietnam as the symbol of the very struggle between freedom and communism itself (Bostdorff and 1994). He kept reminding them that the U.S. must do what was necessary to defend and preserve the freedom of Vietnam. He interpreted the Vietnam situation as very unique and complicated on account of the country's history, government, logistics and legal relationship with the U.S. He thus believed that the U.S. must establish pragmatic policies in fulfilling its mission in Vietnam. His pragmatic method consisted of a kind of "technocratic realism" in addressing complexities and expertise. It typically alternated between public problem-solving and pragmatic discourse and emphasized the effectiveness of the practicability of policies. Idealistic arguments established a particular class of things according to principles they held in common or applied to existing classifications. Rhetoric emphasized principles of definition while pragmatic discourse consisted of arguments from cause and effect or consequence. In simple terms, idealistic discourse dealt with enduring principles or defined ideas, while pragmatic discourse dealt with practicalities. President Kennedy raised the concept of Vietnam in a higher moral ground by citing it as just a battleground in the conflict between freedom and communism. He described it as extending beyond "the clash of armies or even nuclear armaments." In a magazine interview in 1963, he visualized nations as actors playing respective roles either on the principle of freedom or that of communism. He said that new nations too would have to make a choice between these two ideological extremes. He insisted that Vietnam was the challenge faced by free nations against the "Communist conspiracy," "the Communist tide," "Communist efforts" and "the Communist advance." He also assessed nations according to those principles they held in common with the U.S. He made persistent and insistent idealistic appeals on the importance of U.S. efforts and intervention in Vietnam and unrelentingly urged all Americans to support its cherished fight for freedom in that country. In New Orleans, he called on citizens to bear the burden of helping freedom defend itself in Vietnam. At the General Assembly of the United Nations, he likewise urged the members to join the fight as free men by standing up to their responsibilities towards freedom. He said they could do so by preserving that country's freedom and by defending freedom as a whole. As for the U.S., Kennedy committed to whatever must be done to succeed in this commitment to freedom (Bostdorff and Goldzwig).

At a news conference on the steel crisis, President Kennedy contrasted those Americans fighting for freedom in Vietnam with executives who pursued private power and profits beyond a sense of public responsibility (Bostdorff and 1994). While recognizing the importance of the steel controversy, he re-emphasized the value of the U.S. mission in Vietnam. Whenever he had the chance, he restated the nation's moral commitment. His morally-grounded idealistic rhetoric gained him definite advantages. His arguments made him sound tough and pleased those with an equally hard-line position against communism in Southeast Asia. He could also use these arguments to justify and support his policies, such as when Congress threatened to reduce foreign aid. He insisted that foreign aid was an all-or-nothing proposition because principles were at stake. He pressed that Congress could provide all the aid he believed should be given or Congress must assume the responsibility and culpability in the event of a victory of Communism and the defeat of freedom in those nations at risk. He maintained that representatives and senators must make policy decision in the light of the larger moral consequences to which these policies would inevitably lead. At the Economic Club of New York in 1962, he commented that Vietnam would instantaneously collapse if the U.S. did not assist it. He consistently presented and idealistically argued that Vietnam as the conflict or a battle of principles and urged all citizens to commit themselves to an all-out support to that commitment. If they did not, they would then have to prepare for a communist victory, which would negate and destroy the cause of freedom all over the world (Bostdorff and Goldzwig). #

Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy all gave their word and best to the commitment to freedom in South Vietnam (Bostdorff and Goldzwig 1994). Their individual experience, personality and temperament played a role in this commitment. It was a commitment they and other U.S. Presidents could not abandon or neglect, as it put U.S. credibility at stake (Bostdorff and Goldzwig).