This is an eleven page report answering for questions about information management systems. It deals with the FBI's attempt at converting information sharing into digital data and its subsequent failure. Furthermore the report addresses how the VCF program failed and the scope surrounding it that caused it to fail. Many times people do not understand that money and power does not make a successful venture.
Zalmai Azmi, the FBI's chief information officer for the last year realized the need for change, even if it would garner political heat, and decided to implement changes to the organization known as the FBI. The change was related to the growing innovation behind technology and the September 11th attacks. The FBI's technological upgrade has been seen by some as lacking efficacy and reliability. Software dilemmas appear to be piling up. The FBI effectively abandoned its custom-built Internet surveillance technology, code name, Carnivore. This software was designed to read e-mails and other online communications in relation to suspected criminals, terrorists and spies, according to bureau oversight reports submitted to Congress.
To remedy the failure of the software, the FBI decided to switch gears and use an unspecified commercial software to eavesdrop on computer traffic where they would pay ISPs to monitor and wiretap their customers, the customers the FBI believes are criminals. As 2002 and 2003 rolled to a close, a toals of thirteen wiretaps were performed without the use of Carnivore which was later renamed: the DCS-1000. Ironically the FBI once said Carnivore outperformed commercial software when in reality, the use of commercial software put Carnivore out of use. From 1998-2000, Carnivore was only used twenty five times.
Each time the FBI makes a mistake with their software inventions, the amount used to pay for it became disclosed. Experts outside of the field suggested the amount per failed experiment was $6-$15 million. Acts like the U.S. Freedom of Information Act allowed groups like the Washington-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, a civil liberties group, to obtain information on the flunked sofware since it was first known in 2000. Bresson, the director of the FBI defended the FBI's decision to use commercial software to wiretap by stating the need for the government to reduce spending and the commercial software becoming unnoticeable by its subscribers.
The backlash from the public from the new information prompted the FBI to revisit a once hoped for solution to data collection and criminal case management, and resurrect the $'170 million dollar baby. Some experts sympathized with the FBI's inability to match the technological growth of the private sector stating the FBI's at first assumed the private sector technology was subpar. Realizing the technology expanded and evolved beyond its scope is what made the descend all the more difficult said Henry H. Perritt Jr., who led an oversight study of Carnivore in 2000.
One of the reasons the FBI was so disinterested in the technolgy the private sector had intially was the possiblity of having their staff not fufill their orders effectively because of lack of communication through some glitch in the system due to faulty private sector sofware. Donald Kerr, who later became CIA's chief gadget-maker said with enthusiasm that Carnivore was ar better than any private sector software. Ironically private sector software took Carnivore's place. So underestimation of private sector software and overestimation of Carnivore's abilities led to the decline of the overall use of FBI generated software.
FBI Virtual Case File = Total Disaster
2.
Background
Due to the attacks of 9/11, the 9/11 commission felt the need to modernize the FBI information network. The modernization failed due to the need for workers to sign, write, and scan by hand the documents into the system daily. Director Robert Mueller of the FBI himself declared the inefficacy of the system upgrade implementation.Another major contributor to the dissatisfaction was the delay in deploying the system to 100%. Only 10% was used y 2004, a far cry from the initial promise of progress. Along with lack of full deployment, lay the hundred of millions of dollars spent on implementing the upgrade (or lack there of).
People like Mueller expressed the country's need for an upgraded system in comparison to the CIA and the NSA, but saw the inherent futility in the flawed system. A major flaw in the FBI's Trilogy technology upgrade program was its utter lack of security and efficacy. A system needs to be secure for it to possess the ability to allow users to share terrorist related information. The program or Virtual Case File system not only was the lackluster centerpiece of the installment, but also cost a whopping $170 million. After the 9/11 attacks, information sharing became priority. Because of the FBI's IT systems outdated nature, people declared a need for improvement leading to a rush to modernize the netowork and create the flawed Virtual Case File.
Background on the building of the Virtual Case File show the agency commision a government contractor, Science Applications International Corp., to build Virtual Case File. They also hired Aerospace Corp. To advise on tweeking and fixing any problems the project may have and if it could be salvaged. The major issues surrounding the beginning stages of the project was the step implementation process. They used "less-risky, incremental, phased-in" deployment rather than all at once. The FBI also had too many managers on the project, which started in 2001 allowing for control of the program to dilute between to much staff. The lac of focus and communication between the large number of managers allowed for the project to lack proper setting of system requirements.
Another reason why they say the Virtual Case File system became so flawed is because the FBI and its contractors could not keep up with the speed of new technology. Trilogy began at a point where certain technologies later on didn't exist. Aerospace Corp, the company sent to advise about the project, determine whether or not to shelf the project or bring in other software that would make the job of information sharing easier for the FBI. Congress, determined to update the FBI's system, allowed for the allocation of billions of dollars in additional funding. The upgrade cost them as of late $581 million. The software problems are expected to begin debates whether or not the FBI is using the additional funding responsibly or not. In order to determine whether the project could be salvaged, they began a series of independent studies knowing it would be a waste and cost more money if they went with new software.
3. Description of the use of existing information systems
"It was late 2003, and a contractor, Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), had spent months writing 730,000 lines of computer code for the Virtual Case File (VCF), a networked system for tracking criminal cases that was designed to replace the bureau's antiquated paper files and, finally, shove J. Edgar Hoover's FBI into the 21st century. "(Eggen, D. And Witte, G. 2006) The FBI in the past admitted the Virtual Case File technology was a complete loss because it had failed to meet the bureau's requirements. They confessed the time and money put into the project was wasted.. SAIC and Mueller shared the blame. The reason for the loss, in regards to the inefficacy of the project, was in part due to the tremendous pressure placed upon the FBI after the attacks made on September 11, 2001. "This was both SAIC and the FBI all going to the sounds of the gun with our heads down on a very ambitious, high risk, highly concurrent project,"(Frieden, T. 2005) SAIC Executive Vice President Arnold Punaro told reporters.
In order to see if the VCF had anything that could be of use or be salvaged, the FBI established a short-term project in its New Orleans office. To continue performing their duties, the FBI chose to explore and possibly buy commercially available software or private sector software. A couple of the reasons for the problems began with the change in the FBI's prime mission from criminal investigations to preventing terrorism, inadequate management choices early in the project, and poor oversight for the budget. The FBI's poor performance in commuication regarding counterterrorism and data sharing and analyzing in general led to the many tecnological shortcomings viewed by the country.
Mueller's testimony showed the frustration the bureau had with itself and the documented waste of taxpayer money. The Fbi did attempt to alleviate the situation by stating their efforts in sharing information with the Investigative Data Warehouse program. The program provides "agents, intelligence analysts, and members of Joint Terrorism Task Forces with access to 47 sources of counterterrorism data, including information from FBI files, other government agencies and open-source news feeds."(Frieden, T. 2005) Although the program made some progress in the FBI's need to share data effectively, the inspector general states it was not enough to fufill full capability. The reasons behind this are the program's inability to manage case workflow and it being a poor substitute for effective case management.
The program deals and sorts through information by assigning priority: "Counterterrorism information collected by agents gets top priority and is entered into the warehouse system within 24 hours. Information dealing with such matters as violent crime, organized crime, fraud and other white-collar crime may take days to be shared throughout the law enforcement community, according to an FBI official." The program in essence was meant to give access to agents a wealth of data concerning criminal activities in real time. "The FBI's VCF (Virtual Case File) project was kicked off as an automated, online mechanism for handling all the typical paper-based forms currently in use for routine case reports." (Jorvigconsulting.com 2005) Trilogy, the project that shows all of the FBI's progress in regards to its technological upgrade, deals with the case-management system as well as infrastructure components consisting of computer hardware and high-speed network. All this came too late as more taxpayer money, roughly $78 million was put to use later on.
Mueller himself explains: "Despite these significant improvements, the Virtual Case File -- a case management application for improving efficiency and records management -- is not yet available to our personnel." (Mueller 2005) Mueller's emphasis on safeguarding the country helped to alleviate the burden placed by the failed VCF project.He explained the bureau underwent hardware and IT upgrades along with deployment of the Information Data Warehouse and the FBI Intelligence Reports Dissemination System. Going more in depth for the failure of the VCF project, there were several reasons the VCF project went down. These included:
" - VCF design modifications made as a result of the bureau's shift from criminal investigations to preventing terrorism, following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks
- Poor management decisions early in the project
- Inadequate project oversight
- A lack of sound IT investment practices." (Frieden, T. 2005)
To save what was left of VCF and gain back some control over the poor performance in the bureau, they developed the FICMS project. This project will involve several agencies to create a multi-agency case management system. The FBI would act as executive agent. The basics of this program are to communicate and work with other agencies such as Homeland Security etc. Commercial technology is intended to be used for the project. Sadly the money invested in VCF will not go into FICMS meaning more money will be used to fund the new project. Several sources state the inability of the FBI in regards to the VCF project. Goldstein states: "In a devastating 81-page audit, released in 2005, Glenn A. Fine, the U.S. Department of Justice's inspector general, described eight factors that contributed to the VCF's failure. Among them: poorly defined and slowly evolving design requirements; overly ambitious schedules; and the lack of a plan to guide hardware purchases, network deployments, and software development for the bureau." (Goldstein 2005)
It was not the intention of the bureau to lie to the public or persuade the public to waste taxpayer money on a shelved program like VCF. The FBI needed to create a program quickly to allow for data sharing to take place in real time. At the time that was just not achievable in a short time table. The added pressure from the September 11th attacks worsened the situation as strategic ppm states: "But the political climate created by the September 11 attacks and reports into the Oklahoma City bombings in March 2002 increased pressure on the project to produce results faster (regardless of what was feasible). In addition, the Hanssen espionage case, one of the most significant in the FBI's history as portrayed in the movie Breach, raised the bar for security requirements for the Virtual Case File system." (strategicppm 2010)
4.
Discussion of the Project Objectives and its Scope
With the VCF on long-term leave, the FBI decided it was time to launch the Sentinel project. As Dizard states: "The FBI is poised to launch what it calls the Sentinel project, a procurement that will build, among other things, a case management system to replace the defunct Virtual Case File project, officials said." (Dizard, W. 2005) Bureau officials used the Sentinel moniker for the service-oriented architecture project as of the month before during the period of construction. The only way they would cofirm the existence of Sentinel is if their names were used and credit was granted to them. Sentinel was meant to follow the structure and design of the Federal Investigative Case Management Solution. The Federal Investigative Case Management Solution provided a blueprint for federal law enforcement case management systems. Officials said they expect to issue an RFP in the summer of 2005 much like with the VCF and its supposd release. Using the name Sentinel "helps remove any confusion about what FICMS is and what the actual solution for the FBI will be," (Dizard, W. 2005) Unlike its predecessor Sentinel will be readily available to a multitude of agencies.
In regards to the former VCF and its scope, one must first address and analyze the problems present during and towards the end of the project and stated by Mochal: "If problems occur toward the end of the project, you may have no choice but to do whatever is required to push the project to completion. "(Mochal, T. 2005) The scope of the VCF project was not entirely vivid. It kept altering uncontrollably alongside the development of the project. The initial stage of the project began with a web based application as strategic goal. Later on the strategic goal changed and shifted to enabling a case file system to replace the five most commonly used investigation applications.
Goals became unidentifiable amd cased the project scope to change so many times it caused great burden, not to mention cost, time, and in the end, failure. The waste of taxpayer money, the embarassment and the stress could have been avoided and would have not occurred had the FBI along with its vendors, enforced the project management approach in terms of defining and controlling the scope. Futhermore, IT project management follows certain guidelines and methods for setting a schedule, deadlines and dependencies. These kinds of methods include: "activities definition, sequencing activities, time estimates, critical path, calculating slack time and schedule control." (Mochal, T. 2005)
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