1995 Chicago Heat Wave: Causes, Government Failures & Deaths

Introduction: The Heat Wave as Disaster

It was July 1995 in Chicago. The entire city felt tropical — almost like Fiji or Guam — and to add to the discomfort of the heat, an additional layer of pollution hovered above the city. On July 13, the first day of the heat wave, temperatures reached a high of 106 degrees Fahrenheit. The heat index — a measure combining heat and humidity that reflects what a typical person actually feels — climbed above 120 degrees. Nighttime brought little relief: temperatures ranged from the low to mid 80s, and Chicago's residents were slowly and steadily being baked in an intensity of heat they had never experienced before. Energy became an emergency requirement, and as more and more residents switched on air conditioners and fans, power grids began to fail. In more than 49,000 households, power went out entirely (Dying alone: An interview with Eric Klinenberg).

People took to the beaches, while others used fire hydrants to douse themselves with water. This was not a wise idea, as it drove water pressure down and left several households without water as well as electricity. Emergency crews were dispatched to close more than 3,000 fire hydrants across Chicago, but residents pelted them with rocks and stones, forcing them back. Gradually, the entire city was turning into a disaster area. The intense and unprecedented heat buckled roadways and warped railway tracks, causing long commuter and freight delays. City workers were deployed to water down bridges so they would not expand and lock. Schoolchildren traveling in buses in the intense heat suffered symptoms of dehydration and had to be hosed down by the Fire Department. Meanwhile, many hundreds of young people had begun to suffer heat-related symptoms, but it was the elderly and the infirm — especially those who lived alone — who were the most vulnerable (Dying alone: An interview with Eric Klinenberg).

By July 14, thousands of Chicagoans had developed severe heat reactions and most had to be hospitalized. Hospitals were under severe strain and unable to cope with the heavy influx of patients. Some hospitals closed their doors to new admissions, and some ambulances had to drive for miles to find an open bed. The Cook County Medical Examiner's Office was the worst affected: police were transporting hundreds of bodies there for autopsies. Just three days into the heat wave, hundreds of bodies had arrived, and police were waiting three hours or more for someone to receive each body they had brought. The entire scene was gruesome and beyond belief. For such a thing to be happening in the middle of a modern American city was simply inconceivable. This was a disaster (Dying alone: An interview with Eric Klinenberg).

References

Angel, Jim. The 1995 Heat Wave in Chicago, Illinois. Illinois State Water Survey. 2007.

Buchanan, John M. Being Church, Becoming Community. Westminster John Knox Press.

Dying Alone: An Interview with Eric Klinenberg. University of Chicago Press.

Hooke, William H.; Rogers, Paul G. Public Health Risks of Disasters, Communication, and Infrastructure. National Academies Press. 2005.

Kenitzer, Stephanie. Many of the 1995 Heat Wave Deaths Were Preventable According to NOAA Report. April 1996.

Klinenberg, Eric. Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago. University of Chicago Press. 2003.

Klinenberg, Eric. "Natural Disaster, Self-Neglect, or Social Problem?" Adult Abuse Review, vol. 1, no. 2, November 2002, pp. 16–18.

Klinenberg, Eric. "When Chicago Baked." Slate, 2 September 2005.