US Air Force National Strategic Capabilities Toward 2030

Introduction

National strategy is the art and science of developing and applying informational, diplomatic, and economic powers of a country in conjunction with its armed forces, for the purpose of securing national objectives during both war and peacetime. National strategies serve as a key delivery mechanism for both new and established nations. Troops in the Air Force have become exceptionally experienced at applying space, air, and cyber power to achieve operational and tactical objectives (Bush, 2002). The Air Force plays a significant role in national security.

Some of the critical capabilities that determine what the Air Force is able to provide for a nation include: freedom of action in air, space, and cyberspace; power projection; air diplomacy; global situational awareness; and military support to civil authorities. These capabilities are divided into three analytical parts: one that defines each capability, one that develops a national strategic vision for it, and one that identifies its potential shocks — highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each (Gates, 2009).

Certain recommendations have been made to help the Air Force achieve its national strategic vision. The Air Force has strong ties to technological developments; therefore, failure to anticipate the future proves more detrimental than inaccurate predictions. The technological advancements between now and Vision 2030 could cause the Air Force to evolve gradually from an air, space, and cyber force to a cyber, space, and air force (Bush, 2002).

Air Force Capabilities Overview

Analyzing the capabilities of the Air Force involves examining its potential and what the nation will require of it by 2030. A scenario-planning approach has been used to describe the national strategic challenges that some of the most powerful countries in the world are likely to face as they approach 2030. Defending a nation's interests can double the physical distances the Air Force needs to fly to reach a particular region; therefore, new approaches and innovative ideas become a necessity. Five critical capabilities are derived from the analysis of the current Air Force: power projection; freedom of action in air, space, and cyberspace; air diplomacy; global situational awareness; and military support to civil authorities (Gates, 2009).

Power Projection and Freedom of Action

Power Projection

Power projection is the ability of a nation to apply its economic, political, military, or informational elements of national power to effectively and rapidly deploy forces in response to a crisis, thereby enhancing regional stability. Since some countries are likely to face terrorism, humanitarian disasters, and resource, peer, and small-scale conventional conflicts in the near future, success can be critically proven only with flexible power projection (Crane, 2000). It most commonly occurs in instances where certain countries operate at greater distances from targets, increasing demand for the power projection options the Air Force provides. Air, space, and cyber are key elements of power projection; therefore, the success of a mission can be enhanced through the deployment of air, space, and cyber force capabilities on a single integrated system (Bush, 2002).

Visionary changes in the structure and development programs of the Air Force are necessary as it moves toward the future. These changes emphasize the integration of space, cyber, and both manned and unmanned power projection capabilities, indicating that forces should develop proposals that fully integrate air, space, and cyber capabilities. The Air Force must present operational and strategic options together with the capability to operate in environments designed to deny access to striking forces. This approach can play a major role in the success of Air Force operations (Bush, 2009).

If the Air Force adopts this vision, the implementation process would remain exposed to potential shocks — high-impact or low-probability events that are usually difficult to predict. Three major potential shocks threaten the future of power projection. First, aerial refueling, nuclear deterrence, and long-range strike platforms must be recapitalized. Second, changes in the security, political, and economic circumstances of nations — largely due to increasing costs — must be anticipated. Third, a dramatic increase in the cost of petroleum-based fuel, combined with declining fuel availability and peak oil prices, is expected by 2030 (Barnett et al., 1984).

The Air Force must begin to fuse air, space, and cyber capabilities into existing and future systems. The service must refine a power projection capability that is flexible and adaptable to any situation. Defensive and offensive cyber capabilities must also be fused into air and space platforms to help address projected future challenges (Bush, 2002).

Freedom of Action in Air

Freedom of action in air is the degree of dominance over the air medium, allowing air, land, and naval forces to operate at a given place and time without enemy interference, while simultaneously denying the enemy that same freedom. All five capabilities are complementary to one another. Access to air, space, and cyber is critical to national security, and the objective is to limit adversary access to the air domain in any way that could place a nation at the mercy of its enemies (Sokolovskii et al., 1963). Air superiority serves two main roles: it provides access to the air domain for friendly forces and restricts access for adversaries.

Visionary advances in air superiority are significant, particularly in the areas of human performance and autonomous systems augmentation. Augmenting human performance through increased efficiency and reduced manpower requirements can foster cost savings and improve capabilities — especially as weapons grow increasingly complex and dependent on advanced human-machine interfaces. Improvements in these interfaces enhance performance, speed, range, decision-making, information processing, and sensor capabilities (Bush, 2002). Two potential shocks, however, are likely to pose challenges for air superiority. First, the proliferation of airborne and surface-based directed-energy weapons (DEWs). Second, holding targets using hypersonic and maneuverable space delivery techniques poses significant risks. For high-speed and high-altitude systems, surface-based DEWs could serve as an effective point-defense measure. Reduction in procurement is recommended to help counter these projected problems (Graham, 1982).

Freedom of Action in Space

Freedom of action in space is the degree of control useful in engaging, maneuvering, and employing space forces, while denying the same to adversaries. Space offers significant benefits to national forces; however, it also creates vulnerability. Some nations employ a variety of measures to enable the use of space for all responsible parties, consistent with the right of self-defense, in order to protect their space systems. Achieving space superiority is therefore a national priority. Operationally, responsive space is a concept of great importance — defined as the means of creating a more affordable, reliable, and responsive lift capability able to fulfill both current and future requirements (Bush, 2002).

In the coming years, space will no longer function solely as a medium through which kinetic effects are delivered. However, toward the end of the next decade, emerging challenges may drive weaponization of space, altering the existing paradigm. Denying access to nations that are dependent on space capability could cause degradation of both military and civil operations, and thus act as a deterrent in other domains. In the future, the Air Force is projected to make significant advances in four areas: maintaining increased watch over space; achieving lower operational and production costs for space operations; expanding partnerships to drive cost-effectiveness; and developing technologies to improve space resilience. Progress in these four areas can help develop the responsive space capability nations require (Builder, 1989).

Space remains susceptible to unpredictable shocks with striking effects. A space elevator, for example, has remained a theoretical possibility whose deployment within the next two decades is unlikely, yet it illustrates space's sensitivity to cost — potentially enabling nations to significantly reduce the expense of placing assets into orbit. As a recommendation, the Air Force must improve the surveillance of space, mitigate space vulnerabilities, and guarantee access to the space domain in order to achieve low operational and production costs (Bush, 2002).

Freedom of Action in Cyber

Freedom of action in cyber refers to operations within a global domain existing in the information environment. This domain consists of interdependent information network technology infrastructures, including computer systems, the internet, telecommunication networks, and processors. Cyber capabilities have recently been acknowledged as essential to military operations. However, for several decades, the government, the private sector, and academia have struggled to secure cyberspace. Cyber capabilities will be increasingly difficult to maintain and achieve in the near future; therefore, the Air Force must prepare today for future cyber threats. Cyber superiority must be attained to ensure the reliability of all information used to control decision-making (Graham, 1982).

The cyberspace of 2030 will differ dramatically from that of earlier years. Increased computing power and a growing focus on cyber attacks can make cyberspace a hostile and challenging environment. Cyber is anticipated to evolve into a weapon domain; and due to the expanding nature of cyber technology, it is inevitable that adversaries will use the platform to make major leaps in capability. Potential shocks include: decryption of encrypted data, development of penetration-proof operating systems, blocking a country's access to the internet to isolate it from the rest of the world, and implanting malware into an aircraft through its radar system. These shocks are expected to occur unexpectedly and rapidly. Operationalizing cyberspace is recommended as the key approach to addressing these projected issues (Barnett et al., 1984).

Conclusion

Examining the most important functions of Air Forces across various scenarios in the coming decades is essential. The Air Force capabilities include military support to civil authorities, air diplomacy, global situational awareness, and freedom of action in air, space, and cyber. Speed and range are the two principal features that distinguish the Air Force from other military services. In the world today, globalization has led to the geographic diffusion of nations' interests and a strategic shift in security concerns toward the roles of air, space, and cyber. As the world grows more interconnected, speed and range have become ever more critical aspects of Air Force capabilities.

Limited funds, manpower, and service capabilities threaten the Air Force's ability to provide distinct strategic options. The Air Force must focus on defeating adversaries in the most dangerous scenarios it could face. Increasing challenges and their complexity require forces to develop integrated and comprehensive air, space, and cyber capability concepts. The Air Force is tied to technological advancement more than any other service; it is therefore essential to monitor the trends driving changes in the security environment. Given current trajectories, Air Force service might evolve from primarily an air, space, and cyber capability to a cyber, space, and air capability by 2030.

Rapid technological change requires the Air Force to prepare for a future in which competitors may find themselves in conflict within the space and cyber domains. By 2030, certain powerful nations may discount the potential for conflict with other great powers, and non-state actors and rogue regimes will become the primary adversaries to defeat and deter. In order to prepare the Air Force for this future, it must remain focused on the five capabilities discussed throughout this paper.

References

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Bush, G. W. (2009). The national security strategy of the United States of America. Wordclay.

Gates, R. M. (2009). A balanced strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a new age. Foreign Affairs, 88, 28.

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Barnett, F. R., Tovar, B. H., & Shultz, R. H. (Eds.). (1984). Special operations in US strategy. National Defense University Press in cooperation with National Strategy Information Center.

Sokolovskii, V. D., Dinerstein, H. S., Goure, L., & Wolfe, T. W. (1963). Soviet military strategy.

Builder, C. H. (1989). The masks of war: American military styles in strategy and analysis. Johns Hopkins University Press.