Balance of Power and the Origins of World War I

Introduction

The origins of the First World War are now a matter of historical record, but even prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, most observers in positions of authority readily recognized that it was not a question of whether there would be a war, but rather of when and where it would begin (Fromkin 259). Because the "War to End All Wars" failed to do so, it is important to better understand its origins, and the balance of power concept can facilitate that process. This paper reviews the relevant literature to explain how the balance of power can help modern observers better understand the origins of World War I, followed by a summary of the research and important findings in the conclusion.

Balance of Power in Pre-World War I Europe

What is a "balance of power"? According to the definition provided by Black's Law Dictionary, in international law, balance of power refers to "a distribution and an opposition of forces, forming one system, so that no nation or country shall be in a position, either alone or united with others, to impose its will on any other nation or country or interfere with its independence" (142). In reality, the fragile balance of power that existed prior to World War I was tenuous at best and virtually nonexistent at worst, with some authorities arguing that a wide array of external factors were the precipitating causes of the war. For example, van de Haar emphasizes that "the balance of power between states has been seen as a major cause of war and destruction" (101). Moreover, the balance of power that existed in pre-World War I Europe was heavily influenced by internal strife within the major actors as well. In this regard, Fromkin notes that "as its political and military elite recognized, Europe was in the grip of an unprecedented arms race [and] internally the powers were victims of violent social, industrial, and political strife" (259).

Besides external and internal strife, the major powers of pre-World War I Europe were confronted with a tangle of longstanding treaties and alliances that further fueled the powder keg, with each side believing it could prevail in a war, especially one of relatively short duration (Magagna 2015). This point is also made by De Balla who, writing in 1932, notes that "the fundamental obstacle to reconciliation between France and Germany was the system of alliances devised to bolster up French hegemony on the Continent of Europe" (66). Both France and Germany had much at stake, but each country also had legitimate concerns about the true intentions of the other based on centuries of conflict, with each side viewing the other with growing suspicion in the years leading up to the outbreak of hostilities. As Horn notes, in the years prior to World War I, "there was a preoccupation with the realities of power based on the French experience in the centuries before 1914. French security rested on a combination of alliances, military force, and economic might [and] the balance of power was at the core of French security policy" (166).

Likewise, the ambitions of Russia and Great Britain in pre-World War I Europe made the balance of power even more unstable. British policymakers viewed German hegemony with alarm, while Russian policymakers viewed both the territorial ambitions of Germany and the growing naval power of Great Britain with concern (McDaniel 42). Notwithstanding the fragility of the existing balance of power, efforts were made by policymakers to sustain it as long as possible to prevent the outbreak of armed hostilities. McDaniel notes that "the fear of Germany's growing power motivated British statesmen to conclude an agreement with the Russians. Though the agreement encompassed Central Asian affairs, the statesmen conceived of the agreement as a means to complete a series of accords aimed at maintaining the European balance of power" (42).

Alliance Systems and the Breakdown of Equilibrium

Despite some historians' argument that, given the complexity and strategic significance of the issues contributing to the outbreak of armed hostilities in 1914, World War I was inevitable, some authorities counter that it was a breakdown in the balance of power that led the belligerents into the war. Fahey maintains that "World War I was not inevitable, but instead a unique breakdown of the usual restraints against war" (95). While there was sufficient blame to go around for the bloody carnage that followed, Fahey places the majority of the blame on Austria-Hungary: "In 1914, Vienna placed Austria's position in the Balkans above the general opinion of Europe and the general balance of power" (96).

Indeed, because the major actors in World War I were inextricably committed to binding alliances, these commitments became the overarching factors that contributed to the outbreak of war rather than the isolated assassination of a minor archduke. As Fahey emphasizes, "The key flaw in 1914 was that the preservation of a military alliance had become an end in itself. Germany did not go to war to assist Austria-Hungary. Germany went to war simply to preserve its alliance. The same could be said of France" (97). Notwithstanding these assertions, Wilkinson suggests that the same could also be said of Great Britain, which he views as the most powerful actor in the conflict. Wilkinson writes, "Of all the great powers, [Great Britain's] involvement seems the most unnecessary. After all, she had kept out of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. Why not in 1914?" (22).

Conclusion

The balance of power refers to a situation in which nations, either unilaterally or in alliance with others, maintain a status quo in which other nations are unable to violate their sovereignty. Therefore, the balance of power can help modern observers better understand the origins of World War I by highlighting where that balance broke down and the enormous consequences of those breakdowns in international relations. The research showed that many authorities believe the balance of power in pre-World War I Europe was not only weakened by collective security agreements but was effectively doomed by their existence. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the First World War was precipitated by the assassination of a minor archduke — an event that would otherwise have gone largely unnoticed by the international community.

Although the world of the 21st century is far different from that of the fin de siècle, and many of the actors today are non-state entities, the current balance of power is also characterized by many of the same constraints that resulted in breakdowns in international relations before World War I. It is reasonable to conclude that future historians will be analyzing the current international balance of power to determine where things went right — or wrong.

Works Cited

Black's Law Dictionary. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1990.

De Balla, Valentine. The New Balance of Power in Europe. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932.

Fahey, John E. "The Origins of the First World War." Military Review 91.5 (2011): 95–101.

Fromkin, David. Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War of 1914? New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.

Horn, Martin. "Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War." International Journal 70.1 (2015): 165–170.

Magagna, Victor. Politics and Warfare. University of California, San Diego. Lecture, 10 August 2015.

McDaniel, Cadra P. "Crossroads of Conflict: Central Asia and the European Continental Balance of Power." The Historian 73.1 (2011): 41–44.

van de Haar, Edwin. "Hayekian Spontaneous Order and the International Balance of Power." Independent Review 16.1: 101–110.