China as Status Quo or Aggressive Power: Foreign Policy Analysis

China as Status Quo or Aggressive Power

Johnston (2013) argues that China's allegedly new assertiveness is nothing of the sort. He makes the case that this view underestimates the aggressiveness of past Chinese foreign policy, and that the country has not really changed its level of assertiveness. This aligns with the explanations that Fravel (2007) offers of past hard power that China has used in border disputes, which also highlights that there has been aggression in the past. Johnston further argues that the assertiveness level of Chinese foreign policy since 2010 has been overstated. The crux of his argument is that China was always assertive in certain contexts with respect to foreign policy, and it remains assertive in those same contexts. The level of assertiveness has not actually changed much — he literally presents a graph of news articles about Chinese foreign policy using the word "assertive," showing how coverage spiked after 2009, suggesting that people are simply noticing it more rather than responding to a genuine change in behavior.

A contrasting view is provided by Matsuda (2014), who argues that not only has China been more assertive since 2008, but that this assertiveness is reactive in nature. He views Japan as a status quo nation, whereas China is "the biggest rising revisionist state in the region." China, he argues, engages in strategic framing with respect to its neighbors, following only a single line of discourse when dealing with those nations — something that stands diametrically opposed to the free speech and wealth of arguments that democracies like Japan generate on Asian security issues. Matsuda suggests three hypotheses for China's assertiveness: the rising trend hypothesis, the deterioration and amelioration hypothesis, and the redefinition of strategic rivals hypothesis. Each rests on the underlying assumption that China has become more assertive since 2008, and the author never really challenges that assumption.

Ikenberry (2008) characterizes China as a rising power, while Schweller (2011) argues that it should be, but is not. Schweller's point is that while China should be setting the tone for itself in the twenty-first century, the country is more oriented toward older, status quo models of behavior. Its "aggressiveness" is, in Schweller's view, mostly the same behavior it has long exhibited.

What Ikenberry notes, however, is that China as a rising power will be significantly different from other rising powers. He argues that previous powers rose in a different world order, whereas today there is a much greater emphasis on international norms, and the nuclear deterrent reduces warfare as a means of gaining strength. His case is more that China is not particularly aggressive, nor does it need to be.

Johnston (2003) addresses the question directly, though the article is now somewhat dated. He argues that China is a status quo power, and that commentators expressing concern about China as a source of instability are overstating the issue. China has worked within the international system for as long as it has been involved in that system. There may be instances where it has sought to exercise hard power, but these have not been out of line with international norms — indeed, China was more out of line with those norms prior to 1980, during some of its earlier conflicts. In this work, Johnston specifically examines what other commentators have written and evaluates their arguments.

Johnston argues that on the issue of sovereignty — where China may be the greatest perceived source of instability — China is applying a traditional absolutist doctrine. It is "fighting as a conservative power to reaffirm sovereignty and internal autonomy against challenges from evolving concepts of human rights, domestic governance and humanitarian intervention." In other words, Johnston takes the view that where China is seen as out of step with international norms, this mostly reflects the pace of changing norms rather than a change within China itself. The norms are changing faster than China is adapting to them. As an autocratic state, China is simply less flexible in responding to the changing power structures those emerging issues create.

Johnston further notes that with respect to other critical foreign policy issues — such as non-proliferation and arms control — China is more in line with international norms than, say, the United States. There are instances where China specifically challenges U.S. interests, but these must be distinguished from actions that challenge international norms, as the two are not the same thing. China is much more likely to challenge U.S. interests than to challenge international norms more broadly. In that sense, China functions more as a balance-of-power actor than a rule-breaker. It is generally a status quo power, and alleged aggression is mainly a Western narrative for instances in which China stands up to U.S. interests, especially in East Asia.

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