China as Status Quo or Aggressive Power: Foreign Policy Analysis

China as Status Quo or Aggressive Power

Johnston (2013) argues that China's allegedly new assertiveness is nothing of the sort. He makes the case that this view underestimates the aggressiveness of past Chinese foreign policy, and that the country has not really changed its level of assertiveness. This aligns with the explanations that Fravel (2007) offers of past hard power that China has used in border disputes, which also highlights that there has been aggression in the past. Johnston further argues that the assertiveness level of Chinese foreign policy since 2010 has been overstated. The crux of his argument is that China was always assertive in certain contexts with respect to foreign policy, and it remains assertive in those same contexts. The level of assertiveness has not actually changed much — he literally presents a graph of news articles about Chinese foreign policy using the word "assertive," showing how coverage spiked after 2009, suggesting that people are simply noticing it more rather than responding to a genuine change in behavior.

A contrasting view is provided by Matsuda (2014), who argues that not only has China been more assertive since 2008, but that this assertiveness is reactive in nature. He views Japan as a status quo nation, whereas China is "the biggest rising revisionist state in the region." China, he argues, engages in strategic framing with respect to its neighbors, following only a single line of discourse when dealing with those nations — something that stands diametrically opposed to the free speech and wealth of arguments that democracies like Japan generate on Asian security issues. Matsuda suggests three hypotheses for China's assertiveness: the rising trend hypothesis, the deterioration and amelioration hypothesis, and the redefinition of strategic rivals hypothesis. Each rests on the underlying assumption that China has become more assertive since 2008, and the author never really challenges that assumption.

Ikenberry (2008) characterizes China as a rising power, while Schweller (2011) argues that it should be, but is not. Schweller's point is that while China should be setting the tone for itself in the twenty-first century, the country is more oriented toward older, status quo models of behavior. Its "aggressiveness" is, in Schweller's view, mostly the same behavior it has long exhibited.

What Ikenberry notes, however, is that China as a rising power will be significantly different from other rising powers. He argues that previous powers rose in a different world order, whereas today there is a much greater emphasis on international norms, and the nuclear deterrent reduces warfare as a means of gaining strength. His case is more that China is not particularly aggressive, nor does it need to be.

Johnston (2003) addresses the question directly, though the article is now somewhat dated. He argues that China is a status quo power, and that commentators expressing concern about China as a source of instability are overstating the issue. China has worked within the international system for as long as it has been involved in that system. There may be instances where it has sought to exercise hard power, but these have not been out of line with international norms — indeed, China was more out of line with those norms prior to 1980, during some of its earlier conflicts. In this work, Johnston specifically examines what other commentators have written and evaluates their arguments.

Johnston argues that on the issue of sovereignty — where China may be the greatest perceived source of instability — China is applying a traditional absolutist doctrine. It is "fighting as a conservative power to reaffirm sovereignty and internal autonomy against challenges from evolving concepts of human rights, domestic governance and humanitarian intervention." In other words, Johnston takes the view that where China is seen as out of step with international norms, this mostly reflects the pace of changing norms rather than a change within China itself. The norms are changing faster than China is adapting to them. As an autocratic state, China is simply less flexible in responding to the changing power structures those emerging issues create.

Johnston further notes that with respect to other critical foreign policy issues — such as non-proliferation and arms control — China is more in line with international norms than, say, the United States. There are instances where China specifically challenges U.S. interests, but these must be distinguished from actions that challenge international norms, as the two are not the same thing. China is much more likely to challenge U.S. interests than to challenge international norms more broadly. In that sense, China functions more as a balance-of-power actor than a rule-breaker. It is generally a status quo power, and alleged aggression is mainly a Western narrative for instances in which China stands up to U.S. interests, especially in East Asia.

China as Norm-Maker, Rule-Breaker, or Norm-Taker

Matsuda (2014) views China as a rule-breaker more than anything else. His arguments in favor of a more assertive China juxtapose Chinese foreign policy — especially in the maritime sphere — against the status quo represented by Japan. China, in contrast, lashes out in a reactive manner, making it a rule-breaker.

Schweller (2011) argues that China should be a norm-maker, given that it and the United States will be the dominant powers of the twenty-first century. However, China has not yet assumed that role. It is not a norm-taker so much as a status quo power.

Medeiros and Fravel (2003) would argue that China is a norm-taker above all else. The country has become increasingly engaged internationally since the 1990s, which means it is not a rule-breaker. It has signed a wide range of bilateral trade agreements and joined the World Trade Organization. This engagement, however, has increased China's bargaining power, and the result is that China now has sufficient leverage to make rules. Its diplomatic approach has changed noticeably since the early 1990s.

Medeiros and Fravel argue that China currently operates within the framework of international rules and has become quite adept at doing so. They note that at the UN Human Rights Commission, China has enjoyed repeated success. The country works within international rules and norms to pursue its interests. The authors acknowledge that China has some reservations about aspects of this system, but suggest that China's skill in working within it will likely be focused over the coming decades on its numerous domestic challenges — particularly the large number of people living in poverty, as well as more recent concerns such as climate change and water security.

Pan (2013) argues that while people in the West speak of "the Chinese century," the view from within China can be quite different and significantly nuanced. Beijing generally adopts a low profile, but this "belies its ambition to dominate the twenty-first century when its time comes," thus furthering the argument that while China has the potential to be a norm-maker, it is for the time being a norm-taker. This is supported by Johnston's (2007) book on China's policymaking from 1980 to 2000, in which he argues that China became socialized to international relations, learning how the world works and how to operate within those frameworks. That makes China a norm-taker through that period, though the implication remains that China intends to move beyond that posture at some point.

An interesting argument is put forth by Callahan (2012). He sees China as a norm-taker on the surface, looking to the world's systems as a means to build its power — a posture he characterizes as a "harmonious world" narrative. What Callahan notes, however, is that there are differences between this official approach and the ways in which China promotes certain individual actions. He states that "foreign policy has unintentionally created opportunities for citizen intellectuals to challenge elite discussions of foreign policy." Where perhaps many within China prefer to be norm-takers and work within that context, there are clearly others who see China's increasing power as an opportunity to move beyond that paradigm and become rule-makers.

In envisioning a century of Chinese leadership, Callahan (2012) notes that China's intellectuals are looking to Western norms anyway — liberalism, idealism, and realism — as their models for behavior. Thus, even should China seek to become a rule-maker, it will not hold a strictly non-Western view of international relations and behavioral norms, but may simply adapt Western concepts to the Chinese context. He argues that homegrown concepts like "harmonious world," "Tianxia," and "the China dream" are far too vague to be operationalized. China's strategic future therefore remains uncertain, given its lack of any viable replacement for the core Western norms that drive the current world order.

Johnston (2003) notes that in general China works within international law. There are instances where it specifically stands against U.S. interests, but that is not the same thing as violating international law. Thus, where China is characterized as a "rule-breaker," this is mainly due to its need to push back against U.S. interests, or its effort to set different norms from those the U.S. has promoted. Where norms are established on a genuinely international basis, China is more likely to be a norm-taker. It is seldom a rule-breaker to the extent that some Western observers characterize it, largely because those observers frame China's behavior in relation to the U.S. rather than to the international community at large.

Johnston (2003) also examines norms of international self-determination. China is particularly criticized for its treatment of minorities within its borders, but Johnston argues that this is to "misconstrue the intentional norm of self-determination." He points out that there is no international law or practice that will "recognize the absolute right of any social, political or ethnic groups to sovereign independence." Johnston is technically correct, but this does not invalidate criticism of China for its policies toward minorities — his reasoning involves a logical fallacy. China can be criticized for its behavior without being accused of violating international norms. Furthermore, he conflates the status of the Uyghurs with that of Taiwan, when the two situations are entirely different. Arguably, China's position on Taiwan does stand outside of international norms. Even opponents of North Korea accept that it is a distinct nation capable of sitting at the United Nations, with a central government separate from that of South Korea. The differential treatment of the Korean and Chinese civil wars illustrates that China does, in fact, violate international norms with respect to its position on Taiwan.

Ikenberry (2008) discusses China's rise and how it affects the West and the international order. In his characterization, China is a norm-taker in the sense that it operates within an already-established international system. This distinguishes China from other global powers, which rose to prominence without such a clearly articulated international system in place. The result is that China is essentially the first modern power to achieve its global status as a norm-taker rather than as a norm-maker or rule-breaker.

Hard Power and Soft Power in Chinese Foreign Policy

As background, Johnston (2007) argues that soft power was the predominant instrument in China's rise during the period 1980–2000. It was during this period that China became socialized into international relations, learning to use its soft power to achieve its objectives within the framework of international rules — a skill at which it became substantially more adept over time.

Fravel (2007) discusses China's use of force in territorial disputes. Although the paper was written before the most recent flashpoints, it examines historical instances in which China has used violence. The author notes that while the use of hard power is not unusual for China, force was employed in only six of twenty-three territorial conflicts prior to 2007. Disputes with India and Vietnam were especially violent. The dispute with the U.S.S.R., Fravel notes, was not, in part because both countries were nuclear powers. Fravel also observes that China's use of hard power has generally been limited to the use of force rather than territorial seizure — though the invasion and occupation of Tibet stands as an exception the author appears to overlook. Fravel further notes that China has not been as belligerent as one might predict given its level of power and the structure of its state: it has strong military capabilities and no internal checks on the use of force, conditions that would normally predict a much higher rate of force deployment.

A large part of Fravel's paper centers on the Senkaku Islands dispute. This dispute is a source of potential conflict with the United States, which influences whether China is likely to use force in that particular context. China has used force to defend its territorial claims, and there is some support for preventative war theory, as China has been willing to demonstrate its power as a deterrent against actions that threaten those claims.

Fravel notes, however, that China tends to use force against stronger opponents while avoiding force against weaker countries on its land borders. With respect to maritime disputes, China has been more belligerent, initiating disputes on multiple occasions with Taiwan as well as with Vietnam — both of which are, in different ways, considered stronger powers, particularly as Taiwan's military posture is closely tied to U.S. support.

Fravel also argues that China's use of hard power is related to its relative bargaining position. When it perceives that its bargaining power has weakened, it is more likely to use force — perhaps to improve or restore that position. This is the one area where recent shows of force are not well predicted by past behavior, since China currently possesses considerably more soft bargaining power than it did during earlier episodes of hard power use. These historical conflicts provide context for more recent events, in which China has again sought to demonstrate its capabilities — without engaging in outright violence — in response to perceived pressure from stronger nations. This is consistent with its historical pattern regarding disputed islands in particular.

Huang and Ding (2006) argue that China uses both hard and soft power in its "rise," but consider soft power the more important of the two. China has made extensive efforts to cultivate soft power, particularly in the areas of economics and trade. It has also made a point of becoming more involved in global affairs, even if only as an observer. The use of hard power is more narrowly concentrated in East Asia and specific disputes. Soft power, by contrast, operates on a global scale, and its international effects can in turn shape how foreign powers define their engagement in the East Asian political sphere.

Ikenberry (2008) essentially frames China as a practitioner of soft power. In the modern world, the nuclear deterrent has greatly diminished warfare as a means of improving a nation's power. China has therefore had to develop greater skill in the use of soft power. Its economic strength has been the primary source of its rising international influence. Military actions in the context of maritime disputes may have a long history, but soft power is what has grown most substantially over time.

Conclusion

Overall, the literature makes it fairly clear that most observers regard China as a conservative, traditional nation in terms of its exercise of power. It has mainly used hard power to defend its territorial claims, while soft power has been the primary source of its rising global influence. This pattern holds even in the recent maritime disputes, where China has historically preferred to demonstrate hard power when confronting stronger opponents, while refraining from outright conflict. The use of hard power in maritime disputes is consistent with historical behavior and is not strictly attributable to China's rising economic strength. The country is largely a norm-taker rather than a rule-breaker and has worked within that framework to defend its maritime territorial interests.

References

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