Von Clausewitz, Vegetius, and Machiavelli on War and Power

Introduction: Common Threads in Military Philosophy

The military philosophies of von Clausewitz, Vegetius, and Machiavelli reveal common threads of pragmatism and political realism. Vegetius focuses less on philosophy and theory and more on the practical details and logistics of military campaigns. Yet in so doing, Vegetius does evolve a foundational political strategy that remains relevant almost two thousand years later, even as technology and the dictates of foreign affairs have changed. Likewise, the tenets embodied by Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli are still studied in the twenty-first century, long after they were written. Machiavelli is not as focused on the minutiae of military formations on the battlefield as his predecessor Vegetius, but he is far more focused on the ways political leaders need to conduct themselves in times of war and peace. Machiavelli is likewise concerned with the ramifications of political power and how leaders can retain and wield their power to achieve self-serving ends.

Just as Vegetius and Machiavelli presume self-interest as a primary objective in politics and military decision-making, Carl von Clausewitz avoids undue idealism. Vegetius, Machiavelli, and von Clausewitz treat war plainly and honestly in their writings. All three believe in war's inevitability, in the necessity of foresight and planning, and in the importance of strong and decisive — if not outright authoritarian — leadership.

Defining War: Violence, Human Nature, and the Duel Analogy

Vegetius, Machiavelli, and von Clausewitz do not shy away from the realities of war, but it is von Clausewitz who provides the coldest definition. Von Clausewitz defines war as "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will" (14), and also as an "act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds" (15). The violent nature of war is a subject treated frankly and honestly by all three military philosophers. Furthermore, the philosophies of Vegetius, Machiavelli, and von Clausewitz are all grounded in a similar view of human nature. Each of these theorists presumes an innate tendency toward conflict and a predilection for resorting to violence as a means of resolving disputes.

Von Clausewitz claims that "war is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale" (14). Although the view of war as nothing more than a large-scale duel seems simplistic, the author merely suggests that violent methods of conflict resolution are universal and widespread. War is certainly more complex than a large-scale duel, however. Whereas a duel involves only two parties and their personal supporters, war is by definition a state of conflict between at least two different societies or groups of people. None of these authors had lived through the First or Second World War, but each had either experienced or heard of massive multi-party conflicts.

Preparing for War to Preserve Peace

Each of these theorists advocates the necessity of continually preparing for war and maintaining a common defense. "He who desires peace, let him prepare for war. He who wants victory, let him train soldiers diligently. He who wishes a successful outcome, let him fight with strategy, not at random," (Vegetius 63). The irony of preparing for war in order to achieve peace is a common thread among military strategists, who presume the worst in human nature and in political dealings. Machiavelli frequently indicates the need for leaders to use political and psychological manipulation, which implies that deceit and treachery are underlying political strategies that preclude any reliable state of peace.

Von Clausewitz, like Machiavelli, argues against a "spirit of benevolence," which would be construed either as weakness or folly (14). Conflicts simply cannot be resolved through diplomatic methods at all times. Given that someone, somewhere, will always be watching for opportunistic moments to exploit weakness, it is always necessary to be prepared to fight. If there is anything different about modern warfare compared to ancient strategies, it is only that some modern approaches are more "controlled and modified" — but not by much (von Clausewitz 14). In other words, a modern politician might be willing to explore other options before resorting to war, but war is always on the table as a viable option. Machiavelli summarily agreed, long before the modern technological advancements that could lead to mass destruction on a scale none of these writers could have foreseen.

Conclusion: Enduring Lessons of Realist Military Thought

The military strategies of Vegetius, Machiavelli, and von Clausewitz are surprisingly similar considering the vast differences of time and culture distinguishing them from one another. Each of these authors stresses the importance of political and military leadership, of being prepared psychologically as well as materially, and of being opportunistic with regard to war. Taking advantage of enemy weakness is something that adversaries will be calculating regardless of whether open conflict has broken out, necessitating a constant state of readiness. As sobering and dispiriting as these realities may seem, war does remain an unfortunate inevitability and has been since the dawn of civilization.