Hurricane Maria: Puerto Rico's Emergency Response Analyzed

Introduction

Hurricane Maria was the strongest hurricane to strike Puerto Rico in nearly a hundred years when it made landfall on the island in September 2017 (Amnesty International, 2018). Maria followed on the heels of Hurricane Irma, which had struck only weeks before. Nearly 3,000 people died as a result, according to Puerto Rico's governor, and tens of thousands were displaced and forced into temporary shelter that gradually took on the character of permanence as the island struggled to cope with the devastation of the Category 4 hurricane (Amnesty International, 2018). Losses were estimated at some $90 billion.

The fact that Puerto Rico was still reeling from the damage caused by Irma, which hit on September 6th, meant that local organizations were ill-prepared to cope with a second, larger hurricane on September 20th. Irma had already "caused the collapse of the electric power system and significant infrastructure damage in the northeast region of Puerto Rico"—and power had not yet been fully restored when Maria landed (de Arzola, 2018, p. 477). While Irma had spared the southwestern part of the island, Maria left no stretch of land unscathed: the devastation was total.

Winds of 150 mph slammed into the island and tore across it completely. Radar, weather stations, cell phone towers, and electrical power were all wiped out (de Arzola, 2018). Only a single radio tower remained, but in order to use it, individuals had to travel to the tower itself. Drinking water was in scarce supply, roads were obstructed by debris, flooding made other areas inaccessible, and hospitals were overwhelmed (de Arzola, 2018). It was in this environment that Puerto Rico's Emergency Management had to act. This paper discusses the preparation, planning, and execution of Puerto Rico's response and examines where the island failed and where it succeeded.

Preparedness

The Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency had in place only a very general emergency response plan for hurricanes. This general plan essentially served as a guide for various organizations and agencies in terms of what they needed to do in the event of a hurricane. It did not list specific steps or detailed instructions on action items, how responses should proceed, in what order, who should lead, or how the overall response should be organized. It was a plan that was essentially not a plan (Florido, 2018).

Hospitals in Puerto Rico, for example, were accustomed to responding to hurricanes—just not ones the size and force of Maria. Though they struggled in terms of resources, hospital personnel were trained in what to do and how to proceed. The Southwestern Regional Academic Medical Center (SW-RAMC), a nonprofit organization created in 2006 under Puerto Rico state law, had been training hospital staff, medical students, and residents in emergency responsiveness. As de Arzola (2018) notes, "before Hurricane Maria, hospitals and their residency programs followed emergency preparedness protocols that included reducing the number of patients, ensuring adequacy of supplies, and formulating contingency plans for staff to cover hospital services during the storm" (p. 478). Hospitals were prepared with generators and personnel who understood what to do in the wake of the hurricane. Most residents were able to reach their facilities to work after the storm, though some had completely lost their homes. A leadership team monitored the recovery through meetings held every six hours until electricity was restored, after which meetings were held daily (de Arzola, 2018). Members of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Guard, and nongovernmental organizations met with the health coalition that was established, which "enhanced communication among agencies, allowed prioritization of areas of need, and ensured that southwest Puerto Rico was adequately served by all agencies" (de Arzola, 2018, p. 479). This is one example of how Puerto Rico was prepared and followed its plan accordingly.

Another example is the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (PHEP) Program, which had been in place since 2001. This program was designed to place a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) agent on-site to help respond to emergencies and prevent the outbreak of infectious diseases. In response to Maria, the plan was implemented and followed: "The CDC field scientist, alongside local staff, inspected potential vaccination sites, assessed their power needs, and worked to make them operational. As a result, more than 25 additional vaccination sites could provide services, saving countless lives" (CDC, 2019). Thanks to the planning of the CDC and local staff in Puerto Rico, the spread of disease in the wake of Maria was addressed in accordance with prior preparations.

Internal and External Reactions

At the governmental level, emergency planning and preparation were largely inadequate and poorly formed. Internal reactions to the hurricane were unhelpful, as political squabbling produced poor leadership and an ineffective response. It was generally left up to individual agencies and organizations to prepare and act on their own plans. In individual spheres—such as health care—there was some organization, but beyond that the internal response was hampered by disorganization at the upper levels of governance. There was little coordination among local politicians, and even the external assistance from the United States drew criticism. FEMA, for instance, was criticized for its response to Maria, even though it had been present ahead of time and had been working to provide as much help as possible to an island still suffering from a hurricane just two weeks earlier. FEMA argued in its defense that local politicians were ineffective at leading and cooperating because they were unwilling to collaborate with other parties and rivals (Achenbach & Hernandez, 2017).

Another significant obstacle was the Jones Act, a century-old law that made it illegal for ships departing a U.S. port to dock at another U.S. port without stopping elsewhere in between, unless those ships were American-crewed, American-built, and sailing under the American flag (McMahon, 2018). Ships that could have quickly reached Puerto Rico and relieved its resource shortage were legally barred from making the journey because most modern vessels are not American-made, American-crewed, or flying an American flag. Resources were therefore severely limited because of outdated legislation, which only worsened the impact of the hurricane on Puerto Rico and restricted the volume of supplies that could reach the island. This was an example of poor legislative planning: hundreds of ships could have helped, but under the Jones Act they were powerless to do so.

The U.S. Marines and Coast Guard did arrive to help open ports, while the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers worked to restore the power grid—though after three months, still half of Puerto Rico was without power. Meals, tarps, and water were all delivered by the U.S. government, underscoring the extent to which Puerto Rico was reliant on external assistance. Its infrastructure had been almost totally destroyed, and fewer than 10 percent of its roads were navigable (Achenbach & Hernandez, 2017; Amnesty International, 2018).

Conclusion

When Hurricane Maria struck Puerto Rico in 2017, it essentially destroyed the island's ability to function in any structural way. Homes, agriculture, power, roads, water—all of it was gone, and there was no plan in place to help the people begin climbing out of the very deep hole that Maria put them in. The island had to rely heavily on the United States for assistance, while the Puerto Rican government made many promises about being better prepared next time. The problem is that unless the spirit and culture of the government fundamentally changes, the same lack of preparation will prove to be an issue again and again. Those agencies and organizations that did have plans in place—the hospitals, the CDC partners—demonstrated what is possible when preparation and a spirit of mission are genuinely in place. The contrast with the governmental response could not be more stark, and it is that contrast that most clearly defines both the failure and the limited success of Puerto Rico's response to Hurricane Maria.

References

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Achenbach, J., & Hernandez, A. (2017). FEMA administrator: Puerto Rico's politics, lack of unity, hindering hurricane response. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fema-administrator-puerto-ricos-politics-lack-of-unity-hindering-hurricane-response/2017/10/09/f1711996-ad10-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html

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