Are Boot Camps Effective Juvenile Justice Methods?

The Problem: Juvenile Crime and the Limits of Existing Justice Strategies

The problem that boot camp strategies for juvenile justice attempt to address is juvenile crime itself — and, more broadly, how to best provide punishment, rehabilitation, and prevention within the juvenile justice system. According to the Executive Summary of Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice (JCJJ, 2001), published by the Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, the juvenile arrest rate for violent crimes — which had soared in the late 1980s and early 1990s — "began decreasing in 1994," yet by 1999 it had returned to the rate of the late 1980s.

The report was a cooperative effort of the U.S. Department of Justice (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention), the U.S. Department of Education (Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program), the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. One encouraging finding was that, although a large proportion of adolescents are arrested, only a small proportion commits serious crimes.

The initial problem, then, is the extent of juvenile crime in America. The second problem is that society has not handled the punishment, rehabilitation, or prevention of juvenile crime very effectively. The JCJJ report notes that "juvenile crime legislation and policy have become more punitive" and have blurred the lines between juvenile and adult criminal proceedings. This trend continues, the report indicates, even though "research on recidivism and deterrence" shows clearly that it may be "more counterproductive to treat juveniles as adults."

Regarding at what stage an offender enters a boot camp and who authorizes that placement, the JCJJ report notes that "the United States has at least 51 different juvenile justice systems" and that "there has never been a single dominant vision of how to deal with delinquent children in law or in practice." Moreover, "research to date shows that juveniles placed in secure detention or incarceration" — including boot camps — "suffer a wide range of negative effects," and those transferred to adult court may be more likely to re-offend than those who remain under juvenile court jurisdiction. Youths who are incarcerated have higher rates of physical injury and mental health problems, and they have poorer educational outcomes.

What Are Juvenile Boot Camps and How Do They Operate?

The growth of juvenile justice boot camps has been significant. From the time the very first boot camp — in Orleans Parish, Louisiana — was established in 1985, to the mid-2000s, nearly every state in the U.S. implemented some form of boot camp, though the style and focus of programs vary dramatically. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) (MacKenzie, 2001) reported that in 1996 there were 48 residential boot camps "for adjudicated juveniles" in 27 states, and an article in the Social Science Journal (Tyler et al., 2001) reported that all 50 states had boot camps for youthful offenders.

Boot camps are modeled after military basic training programs and are designed, according to MacKenzie's research, to target "offenders who are at risk of recidivism." Beyond punishment, they aim to instill discipline and structure into young people's lives. Tyler identifies three types of boot camps: the military drilling style that focuses on strict discipline; the rehabilitative approach; and the educational/vocational model. Most programs, though employing elements of the latter two styles, "still concentrate on the military drill as their central theme."

In Arizona, for example, a joint program between county juvenile authorities and the U.S. Marine Corps is called "Juvenile All Weekend Supervision" (JAWS). Offenders spend one full weekend with Marine volunteer instructors from the Yuma Marine Corps Air Station, learning obedience to orders and discipline. They then spend another month in JAWS II, an aftercare boot camp environment.

According to an article in the IRE Journal (Richissin, 2000), boot camps are "portrayed to the public as tough-love programs that both punish and rehabilitate delinquents." However, investigative reporting on a boot camp at Big Savage Mountain in western Maryland — where 14 boys were halfway through a 20-week sentence — revealed that guards were routinely assaulting juveniles. Guards were reported to be "slamming" detainees "to the ground without provocation, often while the kids were handcuffed and shackled." In full view of a reporter and a photographer, as a busload of new boys arrived, guards began roughing them up before they even exited the bus.

According to NIJ research across 49 participating correctional facilities — both boot camps and traditional juvenile incarceration facilities — reasons for assignment to a boot camp include alcohol abuse and arrest for burglary, theft, or drug offenses. On average, MacKenzie writes, these youths were 13 years old when first arrested and had been institutionalized 2.5 to 3 times prior to boot camp.

Assessing Boot Camp Effectiveness and Recidivism Rates

The NIJ report states that proponents of boot camps believe the programs' structure "creates a safe environment in which the youths are less likely to fight with or be victimized by other youths" — as they reportedly would be in traditional correctional facilities. Opponents, however, argue that the camps' "confrontational environment" is the opposite of the "positive interpersonal relationships and supportive atmosphere" that youths need in order to develop constructively. Certain components of boot camps, the NIJ report continues, make it "more difficult for juveniles to make the transition back to the community," and "juveniles may revert to their old ways of surviving in and relating to the community."

Recidivism rates following boot camp participation are discouraging. Tyler reports that Florida's Department of Juvenile Justice experienced recidivism rates of up to 63% and 74% following offenders' release from boot camp — meaning that as many as 7 out of 10 youths released re-offended after completing the program. "The U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention admits," Tyler writes, "that juvenile boot camps have not affected a decline in the recidivism rate." An NIJ research paper found that boot camp programs in Texas, Oklahoma, Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina "failed to reduce recidivism." Even the U.S. Department of Justice "voiced even greater pessimism after a year-long investigation of three juvenile boot camp programs in Georgia by stating that they are ineffective."

The Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights under President George W. Bush stated that not only are boot camps ineffective, "but can be harmful to some youths." Tyler's overall conclusion is that "juvenile boot camps are likely to be ineffective both in terms of costs and recidivism unless they incorporate a program to give the delinquent the skills, the motivation, and the resources" to cope with the dangerous urban environment he will return to — the same environment that contributed to his delinquency in the first place.

References

Bush, Carol. (2001). Youth at risk — in facilities that are supposed to help! Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Nursing, 14(4), 200.

Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. (2001). Juvenile crime, juvenile justice: Executive summary. National Academies Press.

MacKenzie, Doris Layton, Gover, Angela R., Armstrong, Gaylene Styve, & Mitchell, Ojmarrh. (2001). A national study comparing the environments of boot camps with traditional facilities for juvenile offenders. National Institute of Justice: Research in Brief. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.

Richissin, Todd. (2000). Juvenile boot camps. IRE Journal, 32(5), 10–12.

Tyler, Jerry, Darville, Ray, & Stalnaker, Kathi. (2001). Juvenile boot camps: A descriptive analysis of program diversity and effectiveness. Social Science Journal.