The Moral Dilemma of Abortion: A Secular Ethical Analysis

General Moral Principles

In general, moral principles arise in human life because the behavioral choices and actions of individuals can affect others. Religious beliefs also suggest that morality in human life encompasses strictly private conduct and a supposed relationship between human beings and their gods, but by definition those issues lie wholly outside the realm of objective logic and reason, because belief in gods is a matter of blind faith rather than evidence.

In principle, the basis of all morality in human life derives from the simple moral imperative do no harm — the same ethical obligation to which the medical field has subscribed since the era of Hippocrates. The Judeo-Christian Bible recognizes the same idea within the "do unto others" concept, except that the religious version grounds human morality in its supposed divine origin. However, the religious perspective relies on a very wide range of specific moral rules based only on the a priori and unproven belief in divine authority.

By contrast, the secular logical ethical perspective presupposes nothing besides the very general notion that human society is "better" for the individuals it comprises when nobody harms anybody else. Admittedly, it is not possible to prove analytically that human moral conduct must conform to those ideals beyond suggesting that it is simply much better for human beings to conduct themselves morally, because that is most beneficial to all of us equally. Assuming only that human morality is consistent with whatever is most beneficial to the individual, virtually any conceivable moral issue is capable of objective analysis. Unlike the largely arbitrary rules of religious morality, the rules of objective secular morality can be precisely defined, and any moral issues that arise can be analyzed in specific terms and principles that pertain to the facts in a manner that yields consistent, logically understandable results.

Identifying the Moral Issues in Connection with Abortion

Abortion raises moral issues to the extent that the unborn fetus can be considered a human being. While some religious definitions suggest that a human life exists from the instant of fertilization, that view is largely irrelevant to secular moral analysis. Secular moral concern for the unborn zygote shortly after conception is very difficult to justify, simply because a zygote is not yet biologically developed enough to perceive physical pain, and is also insufficiently developed to maintain any conscious awareness.

Beyond the zygote stage of human gestation, sentience becomes a legitimate moral concern only at the fetal stage where physiological development allows the fetus to become sensitive to physical discomfort or pain. In that respect, the mere fact that a fetus is capable of suffering by virtue of the actions of others gives rise to the same moral responsibility not to cause pain that also prohibits inflicting pain on an adult human being without his or her consent.

The infliction of physical pain is not the only moral issue raised by abortion; it also raises moral issues in the realm of personal autonomy. At some point of fetal physiological development, the fetus becomes entitled to the same personal autonomy rights as any other human being. While it may be difficult to identify precisely what developmental criteria correspond to the stage where a fetus can be assumed to have personal rights — aside from any issue of sentience or awareness — there is certainly no logical basis for protecting an infant a few minutes after birth without affording the same protection to that infant in its final hours of gestation. The fact that modern obstetrics allows physicians to schedule births by the calendar further illustrates the impossibility of cleanly distinguishing the pre-moral-rights stage of humanity from the moral-rights stage that begins at birth.

In the United States, abortion raises fundamental legal issues that formally embody moral respect for the autonomous rights of an unborn human being — mainly through the concepts of fundamental rights, equal protection, and due process that emanate from the U.S. Constitution. Prior to the landmark Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade in 1973, the moral question of "personhood" was believed to be linked to the stage of gestation at which major fetal movements first became perceptible outside the womb — a threshold the courts referred to as fetal "quickening."

In principle, the moral obligation to avoid inflicting physical pain on a developing fetus is relatively easily achievable through modern anesthetics, completely irrespective of the moral issues arising from personal autonomy or American constitutional law. However, it is much more conceptually complex to define objective criteria that distinguish the pre-moral-rights stage of gestation from the moral rights entitlement that all human beings enjoy equally under any basic respect for moral concerns.

One argument supporting the fetal "quickening" analysis is that major fetal movement is evidence that a fetus has reached the stage where it is capable of independent survival outside the womb. In the decades since Roe v. Wade, medical science has developed tremendously, to the extent that survivability outside the womb has been pushed back to much earlier stages of fetal development. It is not particularly difficult to identify when the fetus first becomes capable of independent survival outside the womb, and to distinguish that stage from the point where the fetus is still wholly dependent on acute medical intervention. What is much more difficult is distinguishing the moral obligation to use modern medical interventions to sustain the life of adult human beings in medical distress from the analogous moral concern for the developing fetus.

Finally, to the extent the moral issue is framed in terms of secular American law, the determination of where autonomous human life begins must be defined by objective scientific principles. The fundamental separation of church and state embedded in the First Amendment absolutely prohibits any reliance on religious beliefs or principles in defining where life — and therefore personhood with moral rights — begins.

Conclusion

A comprehensive analytical system designed to respect every conceivable moral concern arising in connection with abortion must also incorporate the autonomous rights of the mother, the comparative consequences to the fetus and to the mother, and the question of where personhood can fairly be said to first occur. Religious principles are inappropriate for this purpose, and even the most precise secular criteria must acknowledge certain limitations and ambiguities. Ultimately, it may be impossible to respect every conceivable moral concern equally. However, a large part of the endeavor involves simply isolating the relevant issues and proposing objective principles designed to produce the most moral outcome possible under imperfect circumstances.