Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Origins, Ideology, and Influence

Introduction

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, many observers in the West lamented the passing of the "good old days" of the Cold War, when the enemy was clearly known and its geographic borders clearly delineated. By sharp contrast, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the threats against the United States from within and without are largely from non-state actors that can wreak havoc against America and its allies with apparent impunity. One group that has received a growing amount of attention from policymakers and analysts in recent years is the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which is suspected of sponsoring terrorist activities. This paper provides a review of the relevant literature to determine what conditions in Egypt allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to succeed, presents a history of the organization and its founder Hasan al-Banna, and assesses whether the Muslim Brotherhood is in reality a terrorist organization. A summary of the research and salient findings is presented in the conclusion.

Background and founding of the Muslim Brotherhood

Despite what many Western observers might believe today, the fundamentalist Islamic ideology directed against the West and its culture did not first emerge in February 1998, when Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri articulated what they termed "the global Islamic front against Jews and Crusaders" (quoted in Baruch 2005, p. 8). According to Baruch, "This one-sided conflict has deep roots that go back to 1928 when Hassan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in order to fight against Western influence in the Islamic community" (p. 8). In this regard, Sharp (2006), an analyst with the U.S. Department of State, notes that the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 to shift Egypt away from secularism and toward an Islamic government based on Sharia (religious) law and fundamental Muslim principles. Today, Sharp advises, "The Muslim Brotherhood operates as a religious charitable and educational institution, having been banned as a political party in 1954; however, many Muslim Brotherhood members run for parliament as independents" (p. 10). During the parliamentary elections in Egypt in 2000, for example, 17 independent candidates widely regarded as Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers were elected, and in 2005, Brotherhood-affiliated candidates won 88 seats in the Egyptian parliament (Sharp, p. 10).

Over the years, the Egyptian government has alternated between tolerating and suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood; in some cases its members have been arrested and imprisoned, while during other periods the government has allowed the group to operate with virtual impunity (Sharp, p. 10). The formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the late 1920s — various authorities cite 1927, 1928, and 1929 as the founding date — represented the beginnings of the radical Islamic movements being witnessed in the Middle East and elsewhere today (Hovsepian, p. 5). Chickering and Haley (2007) report that "Most of the new threats to U.S. and international security are arising in countries with weak or illegitimate governments and strong societies, presenting very different challenges from those of the strong states that were adversaries in the past" (p. 59).

As noted in the introduction, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt represents a nebulous threat to the United States and its interests abroad because of its non-state status. As Chickering and Haley emphasize, "The United States and its allies face growing hostility and instability in a region in which the U.S. has few strong relationships or none at all with many of the principal actors. Some of these are states and leaders of states (Iran, Hamas, Syria); others are nonstate actors (Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt)" (p. 59). For the most part, the absence of U.S. recognition of such groups is a direct consequence of foreign policy decisions; in some cases, however, it is a response to opposition to such groups by a friendly government — for example, the Egyptian government's previous outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood (Chickering and Haley, p. 60).

Hasan al-Banna: biography and ideology

According to Moussalli, the group's founder, Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), provided a framework that would be followed by other Islamic groups in the decades to come. "In Egypt in 1927," Moussalli advises, "Hasan al-Banna founded the first full-fledged Islamic fundamentalist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, in the Arab world; it spread throughout the Muslim world and became the prototype that most Islamic movements tried to imitate" (p. 21). In his book Islamic Fundamentalism, Davidson (1998) reports that Hasan al-Banna was born in 1906 in the town of Mahmudiyya, situated approximately 90 miles northwest of Cairo. Davidson adds that "Hasan was the oldest of five children. His father, a teacher at the local mosque school, passed on to his eldest son his piety and love of learning. Hasan chose the teaching profession and at the age of sixteen entered the teacher training school at Dar al-Ulum in Cairo. He attended to his studies diligently and was active in the many religious clubs and societies affiliated with the institution" (p. 20).

During his tenure as a teacher in the Suez Canal Zone, al-Banna sought to link political and economic issues to religion, maintaining that Islam was a complete moral, economic, social, political, and philosophical system that would provide a superior approach to governance. These beliefs were further reinforced by the significant British colonialist presence in the region as well as the corruption and inefficiency that characterized the Egyptian government at the time. Davidson reports that:

Working within this atmosphere, al-Banna — increasingly aware of the eroding social and religious values he so treasured — rejected the passive posture of the Egyptian ulama of his day and instead, in March 1928, organized the Society of the Muslim Brothers. This action was motivated by his conviction that Muslims were called upon to be socially, economically, and politically aware and active in ways prescribed by Islam. Although the organization had only six members at its founding, it would grow quickly. (p. 20)

The rapid growth enjoyed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has been attributed to both the appeal of its message and the untiring efforts of its founding members, especially al-Banna himself. Moussalli advises, "Al-Banna called for active commitment to Islam through political actions that seek the establishment of the Islamic state. The assassination of al-Banna in 1949 led to splits within the movement" (p. 21). These ideological splits notwithstanding, when people are convinced they are doing God's will and are willing to die to further it, they represent a powerful and deadly force — and this is precisely what is taking place among those drawn to the Muslim Brotherhood today. According to Nusse (2002), "The appeal to the personal consciousness and responsibility of Muslims indicates an activist Islam in mind. This is a very important feature of modern Islamic thought. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had been one of the first mass movements in the Islamic world and this popular nature is still a characteristic of the fundamentalist movement today" (p. 84).

Usman (2002) points out that "The Muslim Brotherhood grew under the founder's fiery oratory and positive approach to a personal and social religion. He exhorted his followers to return to the Islam of the prophet Muhammad, which meant an acceptance of the Quran as the basic law of society. He desired to make Egypt, as well as other Muslim lands, an Islamic theocracy and to stop the trend toward a secular state" (p. 1679). Likewise, Sullivan and Abed-Kotob (1999) note that "Al-Banna also found that he shared one goal with the secular nationalists: to end British rule in Egypt. Yet that was virtually the only shared goal. Al-Banna called for the return to shari'a and the establishment of an Islamic government" (p. 10). According to Pires-O'Brien (2002), "Al-Banna was assassinated in 1950 by the intelligence services in retaliation for the murder of the Prime Minister, Nuqrashi Pasha, in December 1949 by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood" (p. 243).

While the message communicated by al-Banna was enormously compelling for the downtrodden of the day, it was the relentless actions of the group's founder and his like-minded cohorts that were the actual driving force behind the Muslim Brotherhood's initial successes. According to Usman, "The true strength of the Muslim Brotherhood lay not so much in its ideology as in the energy, devotion, and ruthlessness of its leaders. In its early years the Muslim Brotherhood maintained an active program of social welfare and agricultural cooperatives; in its later years it became more militant" (p. 1680). The original goal of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was focused on reshaping society into one that mirrored Hasan al-Banna's rigid concept of early Islamic life.

Not surprisingly, the Egyptian government was alarmed by this movement because not all of the group's activities were considered benign social efforts; many were viewed as threats to the existence of the legitimate Egyptian government:

Reprisals, pressure, assassination, and armed gangs gave the Muslim Brotherhood power, and its actions attracted youth yearning for an active course to follow. The secular Egyptian government found the Muslim Brotherhood a serious threat and took measures against it, leading to the assassination of the prime minister in 1948. When Hasan al-Banna was murdered, the government took no serious steps to identify his assailants. In 1951 permission was given to reactivate the Brotherhood on the condition that its semi-military activities be discontinued. (Usman, p. 1680)

Conclusion

The research showed that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was established by Hasan al-Banna and a few followers in 1928, or thereabouts depending on the source. From these humble beginnings, the organization has grown to become a political force to be reckoned with in Egypt and other countries in the Middle East. Today, the fundamentalist Islamic trend is clearly a growing political force in the Middle East, and the European Union is slowly becoming Islamized as well.

While it would be premature to assert that the Muslim Brotherhood has been transformed into a completely political rather than terrorist organization, it is reasonable to maintain that the group's leaders are sufficiently savvy to recognize what works best. By foregoing terrorist activities in favor of working within the legitimate political frameworks of Arab nations, the group has acquired a significant amount of power and influence. It is therefore reasonable to expect that similar approaches will be pursued in other Arab nations as well as in the West, where these trends are already being witnessed.

In the final analysis, only time will tell whether the West possesses the resolve to withstand these challenges to its political, social, and legal institutions. The day may well come when a clash between these two civilizations results in yet another crusade — only this time, the whole world could be engulfed in what would likely be a far more destructive conflict than those involving swords and lances.

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