Organized Crime in Societal Context: Causes and Controls

Organized Crime and Its Societal Roots

It is prudent to consider organized crime within the broader societal context because research evidence and criminological theory have shown that such crime does not occur in isolation. Rather, it is driven by a set of societal factors ranging from cultural values to corruption, political failures, and economic issues. Society, therefore, does have a hand in the emergence and continued development of organized crime. As a matter of fact, organized crime is integrated into society, and unless we can effectively conceptualize and understand society's role in fueling it, we may not be able to devise a sustainable solution to the problem.

Criminological theory and models lend credence to the idea that organized crime is driven and fueled by society. They demonstrate that organized crime occurs as a result of failures or inconsistencies in the political, economic, and social systems that govern society.

The Role of Political Factors

Political models suggest that organized crime occurs as a result of the disconnect that exists within a country's political systems. When the political system is vulnerable, criminals take advantage of the inherent gaps to further their own interests at the expense of other citizens (Unit 3 lecture notes). In his review of the Sicilian Mafia, Servadio (1978), as discussed in the Unit 3 lecture notes, clearly demonstrates that when political systems are weak, there are no adequate mechanisms to keep the government in check — this provides room for unscrupulous officials to enrich themselves by forming links with criminal organizations. The tobacco smuggling business between Canada and the U.S., for instance, thrived primarily because of corruption among security and border patrol officials (Beare, 2002: 228). Moreover, when the government's authority is weakened — say, as a result of transitioning from autocracy to democracy — and the administration is unable to secure and provide for its people, criminal groups tend to develop and thrive as people seek alternative means of earning an income.

People then begin to rely on these criminal groups to provide the safety and security that the government is unable to offer. These were the circumstances under which the Sicilian Mafia developed. Anton Blok's 1974 review, as presented in the Unit 3 lecture notes, clearly demonstrates that with the break-up of feudalism, the central government became so weak that it was unable to protect its people's estates, leaving this responsibility to organized groups that ultimately ended up harassing poor citizens — especially those who could not afford to pay for services rendered. Society, therefore, contributes to organized crime through weak political systems, and in order to effectively combat it, policymakers will need to include in their prevention policies effective strategies for correcting gaps in those systems. Failure to consider organized crime from this perspective increases the risk of developing incomplete policies.

Economic Drivers and Patron-Client Relationships

The economic factors that open up opportunities for the emergence and development of organized crime cannot be overlooked. The organized crime business operates in the same way as a normal market. Sellers in any legitimate business will supply commodities to the market as long as there is demand for them. In the same way, criminals will keep supplying their goods as long as there is a market and demand for them (Ruggiero, 2002: 178). Society facilitates the emergence and continued development of organized crime by providing a market and demand for the commodities it supplies. This is clearly demonstrated by Beare (2002: 235) in the case of tobacco smuggling between the U.S. and Canada — despite stringent measures to curb cigarette transit, including numerous seizures, there was no evidence that the criminal activity would stop. As long as demand exists, organized crime cannot be expected to cease. The solution, as Beare (2002: 235) points out, lies in reducing that demand.

There is also the issue of patron-client relationships. Economics is based on the concept of exchange: individuals exchange something for goods and services, in which case they are termed the patron, and the other party is the supplier. Patron-client relationships aid in the development of organized crime. For instance, as the Unit 2 notes demonstrate, a criminal group could assist in campaigning and delivering votes for a particular politician, and the politician could offer its members protection in return. Alternatively, criminal groups could use their funds to finance community projects, and community members could give them support in return, allowing their activities to infiltrate even further. Criminal groups could also offer bribes to border patrol officers, and the officers would show leniency in return.

The most significant form of patron-client relationship is perhaps that between the state and criminal groups. In this case, criminal groups provide security — as was true of the Sicilian Mafia — and use the resulting leniency to grow their operations. This dynamic, however, is largely dependent on the political climate and the strength of political systems. Regardless of the direction in which the relationship flows, it facilitates the continued success of organized crime. Understanding these underlying issues is crucial to addressing the problem effectively.

Modern Threats Posed by Organized Crime

Globalization and technological advancement have changed the way organized crime is managed and conducted, making it increasingly difficult for law-enforcement agencies to control criminal activities (Unit 5 lecture notes). Just as is the case with cybercrime and fraud, organized crime has evolved alongside changing opportunities and environments. Criminal groups today, unlike their counterparts in earlier centuries, are not confined to specific territories, geographical locations, or countries. The internet has made it relatively easy for criminals to form virtual networks that communicate, coordinate, and conduct activities online without ever meeting physically. This has not only made it easy for such gangs to evade detection but has also provided expansion opportunities through a wider target market.

Beyond the issue of expanded geographical territories, modern criminal gangs exhibit significantly higher levels of cooperation with other groups and terrorist organizations (Finckenauer, 2005: 65). This was not the case in the traditional setting, where groups confined themselves to specific territories and acted more like competitors. This increased degree of cooperation is driven by the expansion of criminal territories — in order for a gang to succeed in a territory that was traditionally not its home ground, it must form an alliance with the recognized home criminal group to gain vital information about local conditions, administrative weaknesses, and targets. Links with terrorist groups have also become more common in the modern era (Finckenauer, 2005: 65). Traditional criminal groups operated differently from terrorist groups because the latter were seen as more politically motivated; their resistance was politically driven (Finckenauer, 2005: 65). Makarenko (2005), however, illustrated in Unit 3 class notes that this distinction is no longer as significant — criminal and terrorist groups now form alliances to gain access to smuggling routes or specialized knowledge.

This view is supported by Finckenauer (2005: 65), who also agrees that large-scale cooperation poses a serious danger to states, since it enables criminal groups to do things together that they could never have achieved individually. Godson and Olson (1995: 22), for instance, note that with such alliances, criminal groups can challenge a superpower, hinder economic development, undermine democratic institutions, or even destabilize administrations and governments.

A third major characteristic of modern criminal groups is that they no longer restrict recruitment to people of a particular religion or ethnic group (Galeotti, 2005: 3). Traditionally, groups such as the Yakuza accepted only members from the Japanese community, and the Vory v Zakone of the Soviet Union recruited only from Soviet Gulag prison camps (Finckenauer, 2005). Today, networking is the more common model — as long as an individual possesses the right skill set, they can be accepted into a particular group (Finckenauer, 2005: 66). This high degree of inclusiveness has made it extremely difficult for law-enforcement agencies to accurately identify members of a particular criminal group, enabling members to pass undetected more easily, especially when they do not match the group's traditional profile.

The fourth major issue with modern criminal groups is sophistication. Unlike their traditional counterparts, most criminal group members today are educated, holding degrees, certifications, and professional qualifications (Galeotti, 2008: 2). This means that the strategies used to execute criminal activities and evade detection are more complex than in the past. This sophistication has made it increasingly difficult for law enforcement agencies to conduct successful seizures and make relevant arrests (Galeotti, 2008: 2).

Conclusion

There is a need for policymakers to put in place effective measures for addressing the problems outlined above; only then will they be able to mount an effective fight against organized crime. It is also important that the entanglement between the legitimate and underground economies be recognized, and steps taken to correct its effects. Moreover, there is a need to develop uniform legislation to govern organized crime across jurisdictions. In order to be effective in fighting organized crime, law-enforcement agencies must ensure that they evolve and expand their capabilities to match the changing dynamics of criminal activity. The first step toward achieving this, however, is recognizing and understanding that organized crime is best understood when situated within a broader societal context.

Beare, M. (2002). Organized corporate criminality: Tobacco smuggling between Canada and the U.S. Crime, Law and Social Change, 37(3), 225–243.

Finckenauer, J. O. (2005). Problems of definition: What is organized crime? Trends in Organized Crime, 8(3), 63–83.

Finckenauer, J. O., & Voronin, Y. A. (2001). The threat of Russian organized crime: Issues in international crime. U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/187085.pdf

Galeotti, M. (2008). Criminal histories: An introduction. Global Crime, 9(1), 1–7.

Godson, R., & Olson, W. J. (1995). International organized crime. Society, 32(2), 18–29.

Ruggiero, V. (2002). Fuzzy criminal actors. Crime, Law and Social Change, 37(3), 177–190.

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