Perjury in Policing: Constitutional Rights and Police Dishonesty
This paper examines the phenomenon of perjury in law enforcement, tracing how the U.S. Supreme Court's development of the exclusionary rule — particularly through Mapp v. Ohio (1961) and subsequent decisions — inadvertently incentivized false police testimony. Beginning with an overview of deception in policing, the paper analyzes how procedural safeguards designed to protect Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights led some officers to falsify reports and court testimony, especially in drug-related cases. It also discusses landmark exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the Inevitable Discovery doctrine established in Nix v. Williams and the good-faith exception recognized in Hudson v. Michigan, arguing that these limitations ultimately reduced officers' perceived need to commit perjury.
- Introduction: Deception in Law Enforcement: Contextualizes deception in policing and everyday life
- Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Rights: Constitutional framework balancing prosecution and civil rights
- The Exclusionary Rule and the Rise of Police Perjury: Mapp v. Ohio and increased false police testimony
- Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule: Inevitable Discovery doctrine and Nix v. Williams ruling
- Conclusion: Balance between constitutional safeguards and police ethics
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What makes this paper effective
- The paper moves logically from broad observations about human deception to the specific legal framework governing police conduct, anchoring its argument in concrete Supreme Court cases.
- It demonstrates nuance by acknowledging the understandable motivations behind police dishonesty while still treating perjury as a serious threat to constitutional rights.
- The use of the Mollen Commission findings grounds the legal analysis in documented real-world conduct, lending empirical weight to the argument.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper employs a cause-and-effect legal analysis, tracing how one constitutional safeguard (the exclusionary rule) generated an unintended behavioral consequence (increased police perjury), and how subsequent judicial refinements corrected that imbalance. This technique — identifying a legal mechanism, tracking its real-world impact, and evaluating corrective measures — is a strong model for criminal justice and constitutional law writing.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with a broad introduction contextualizing deception in human and professional life, then narrows to the constitutional framework of criminal procedure. The body develops the exclusionary rule's history, the surge in perjury it catalyzed, and institutional responses like the Mollen Commission. The final section addresses doctrinal exceptions that reduced incentives for dishonesty, culminating in a balanced conclusion about the relationship between procedural safeguards and ethical policing.
Introduction: Deception in Law Enforcement
Dishonesty has always been part of human behavior, and it occurs at some point in virtually every conceivable type of relationship. Parents sometimes lie to children and vice versa, students sometimes lie to teachers, friends sometimes lie to friends, and spouses sometimes lie to each other. Certain lies are intended to mislead for the purpose of benefiting the liar at the expense of someone else; other lies are motivated by the desire to accomplish something positive, such as shielding someone from painful truths or embarrassment.
In law enforcement, deception often plays a role in investigating crimes, questioning persons of interest, interrogating suspects, concealing facts from public disclosure to preserve the integrity of ongoing investigations, and maintaining tactical advantage in covert operations and surrender negotiations. Not uncommonly, police officers are encouraged to misrepresent the truth in the performance of their duties — such as extending a "professional courtesy" to other law enforcement officers during routine traffic stops, or exercising "discretion" in ways that are technically prohibited. One of the most common examples occurs when a highway patrol officer decides to give a cooperative citizen a "break" by writing a summons for a speed less than the actual speed of the violation (Raymond, 1998).
In policing, the line between routine lies that are tacitly accepted and encouraged and lies that threaten constitutional rights can become blurry, especially when officers are genuinely motivated by the desire to protect society from those who are obviously guilty of heinous crimes. The motive is understandable — especially from the point of view of someone dedicated to fighting crime — when adhering strictly to the letter of the law would undermine the prosecution and punishment of known dangerous criminals. Likewise, when certain types of dishonesty are tolerated, the tendency to rationalize or justify other types of dishonesty naturally increases.
References
Cloud, M. (1994). The dirty little secret. Emory Law Journal. Retrieved September 15, 2007, from
Foley, M. (2000). Police perjury: A factorial survey. U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved September 15, 2007, from http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/181241.pdf
Hendrie, E. (1997). The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Retrieved September 15, 2007, from
Raymond, M. (1998). Police policing police: Some doubts. St. John's Law Review. Retrieved September 15, 2007, from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3735/is_199807/ai_n8806451/pg_1
Schott, R. (2006). Knock and announce violations: No "cause" to suppress. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Retrieved September 15, 2007, from
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