Political Nature of the Federal Budget Process Explained
This paper examines the deeply political character of the U.S. federal budget process, arguing that it is fundamentally shaped by self-interest, lobbying, and partisan conflict rather than the collective good. Drawing on agency theory, the paper explains how members of Congress—as agents of the voting public—are routinely captured by special interest groups and super PACs, creating persistent conflicts of interest. The paper traces the procedural steps of the budget process and identifies where political gaming distorts outcomes, from departmental submissions through conference committees to government shutdowns. It then applies a feminist ethics-of-care framework, drawing on Machold et al. (2007), to argue that a relational, care-centered approach offers a more holistic alternative to the shareholder- and stakeholder-centric models that currently dominate political decision-making.
- Introduction: Conflict of interest in the congressional budget process
- Politics and Agency Theory: How lobbying distorts the principal-agent relationship
- The Federal Budget Process: Step-by-step process and where politics intervenes
- Shareholder vs. Stakeholder Perspectives: Competing interests politicians must balance
- A Feminist Ethics-of-Care Framework: Care ethics as an alternative to political self-interest
- Conclusion: Care ethics needed to overcome political dysfunction
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What makes this paper effective
- It integrates a theoretical framework (agency theory) with concrete procedural details of the budget process, grounding abstract concepts in real examples such as Citizens United and the CARES Act.
- The paper moves beyond simple critique by proposing an alternative model—feminist ethics of care—giving the argument a constructive dimension rather than merely identifying problems.
- Citations from multiple disciplines (public administration, business ethics, feminist theory) are woven together coherently, demonstrating interdisciplinary reasoning appropriate to the topic.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates comparative theoretical analysis: it sets up a tension between the Friedman shareholder model and the Freeman stakeholder model, then introduces a third framework (Machold et al.'s ethics of care) as a synthesis. This triadic structure allows the writer to show command of the literature while advancing an original normative claim about how the budget process ought to be managed.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with an introduction that establishes the central conflict of interest, then develops agency theory as the explanatory lens. The procedural section walks through the actual budget steps while embedding political critique throughout. Two shorter analytical sections address shareholder/stakeholder tensions and the feminist care-ethics alternative. A brief conclusion ties the theoretical and procedural threads together, returning to the agent-principal paradox as the root problem.
Introduction
The federal budget process is overseen by members of Congress, who are fundamentally immersed in the political nature of government. As Elwood (2008) notes, members of Congress are influenced in three ways: (1) by money used to finance their political campaigns; (2) by obtaining the votes necessary for reelection; and (3) by obtaining expert advice on topics of personal importance to them. The federal budget process is particularly impactful on the first two factors, and vice versa. For example, "the ability to funnel money into a congressional district or state provides an excellent opportunity for a legislator to remain in office" (Elwood, 2008, p. 3).
This ability creates a conflict of interest among the politicians overseeing the budget process. On the one hand, they are tasked with producing a budget resolution and allocating funds based on the duty to serve the collective good; on the other hand, they have a vested self-interest in ensuring that funds are diverted in ways that will benefit themselves, their political careers, and their political allies. This paper discusses the political nature of the federal budget process.
References
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57–74.
Elwood, T. W. (2008). Politics of the US federal budget process. International Quarterly of Community Health Education, 28(1), 3–12.
Jennings, M. (2008). Business ethics: Case studies and selected readings. Cengage.
Machold, S., Ahmed, P. K., & Farquhar, S. S. (2007). Corporate governance and ethics: A feminist perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 81, 665–678.
ProActive Solutions. (2020). Agency theory. Retrieved from
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