UAE–Israel Normalization Deal: Causes, Impacts, and Regional Challenges

Introduction

Israel has been, for most of its existence, involved in some form of conflict with the Arab world. However, the Arab world itself is largely divided between the Sunni and Shia states. Israel's recent pivot toward forming greater relations with the Sunni states has indicated an improvement in relations between Israel and at least part of the Arab world. Yet, making matters more complicated is the fact that Palestine remains largely Sunni, and the Palestinians have viewed the Sunni states' engagement with Israel as a betrayal of their fight for independence and autonomy. For that reason, Palestine has disapproved of the new relations between Israel and the UAE. As a Sunni-majority state, the UAE had long sided with the rest of the Sunni Arab world in support of Palestine (Soriano, 2014), but that has changed to some extent. This paper discusses why the UAE chose this moment to begin formal relations with Israel, what the positives and negatives of the alliance are, and what new challenges will emerge in the Middle East as a result.

Why the UAE Chose Now to Start Relations with Israel

One reason the UAE has chosen this moment to start relations with Israel has to do with the various proxy wars ongoing in the Middle East between Sunni and Shia powers. The wars in Syria and Yemen are examples of exactly this type of proxy conflict. The rise of ISIS (ISIL), a Sunni extremist group supported by Sunni states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE in an attempt to overthrow Assad and the Shia population of Syria, is one part of the complex dynamic in the region (Bahi, 2018). Adding to this complexity is the growing threat posed by Qatar and Iran. While Qatar is a predominantly Sunni state — like Palestine, Egypt, KSA, and the UAE — Qatar has been identified by the KSA, UAE, and Egypt as supporting Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood (BBC, 2017). Likewise, the war in Yemen between the Houthis, backed by Iran, and the Sunni-Wahhabi alliance of KSA, UAE, Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey represents a further source of tension. These various conflicts have made it essential for nations in the Middle East to clarify their alignments and to coordinate intelligence communities so as to establish a powerful network. This is what the UAE accomplished through its 2020 pact with Israel.

The proxy war in Yemen has been ongoing for years. Saudi Arabia deployed approximately 100 aircraft in the Yemen intervention — dubbed the "Storm of Resolve" — with planes from Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain also participating in the effort to defeat the Iranian-backed Houthis (Scollon, 2015). The Houthis have focused largely on self-determination, opposing the US-allied Yemeni president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia while a Southern Transitional Council was established in Aden with UAE backing (Alshuwaiter, 2020). Supported by the KSA, UAE, and the United States, Hadi's government still exerts some influence in parts of Yemen. The Houthis reject Hadi as their leader, viewing him as a puppet of an alliance between the West and the KSA, and have therefore found support from Iran.

These examples illustrate the complexity of Middle Eastern affairs and why a UAE–Israel alliance at this juncture makes strategic sense. The UAE and Israel had already been collaborating on intelligence matters for several years; the formalization of this relationship is simply the next step in building a new alliance to counter the Russia–Iran–Hezbollah–Syria axis. In essence, it is an extension of the broader Sunni–Shia conflict in the Arab world, with Israel siding with the Sunni states to counter what it perceives as the Shia threat emanating from Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

The Sunni states view Iran as a threat if it is permitted to grow in energy dominance. This is why the sanctions imposed on Iran under the Trump Administration were viewed favorably by the Sunni states and by Israel, which has long viewed Iran as a threat — a hostility rooted in decades of mutual antagonism.

Under the Trump Administration, there was a concerted push to resolve some of these tensions, with Jared Kushner acting as a mediator between Netanyahu and the UAE regarding the 2020 pact (Alterman, 2020). The intent was to lock in and normalize relations between the two states before Trump potentially left office. One condition of the pact, however, was that Israel not move forward with plans to annex the West Bank. The West Bank has long been occupied by Israel but is legally Palestinian territory. Because Palestine is majority Sunni — like the UAE — the Emirates sought assurance that no annexation of Sunni land would take place before formalizing diplomatic relations. Israel agreed to suspend annexation plans and the agreement was reached. The difficulty, however, is that the Palestinian people have widely viewed this as a betrayal by the UAE (Baker et al., 2020).

The significance of the deal is that it represents a collapse in Arab solidarity (Alterman, 2020). For most of the past century, the Arab world has resisted normalizing relations with Israel over the Palestinian conflict. The UAE deal marks a shift in that longstanding policy. The UAE has essentially declared itself an independently minded actor that does not wish to blindly align with all other Sunni states on all matters (Alterman, 2020). From this perspective, the deal suggests that regional stability is a shared goal of the two signatories. Nevertheless, the facts remain that the Sunni and Shia states are still opposed through various proxy conflicts, and Russia's entry into the Middle East has nudged the Sunni states closer together. Since Israel is a major regional player with especially close ties to the United States, the UAE–Israel deal can also be read as a means by which the UAE strengthens its relationship with Washington in the face of a Russia–Iran–Syria axis — a dynamic in which the role of the US should not be understated, as it is simultaneously engaged in proxy contests with both Russia and China.

Conclusion

The deal between the UAE and Israel reflects the broader trend of closer collaboration between Israel and the Sunni Arab world in recent years. Although the UAE has broken with much of the Arab world by signing this agreement, the situation is not without historical precedent: Egypt made peace with Israel in the 1970s, and Jordan followed in the 1990s. Today, Israel's intelligence community works closely with many Arab states, and the UAE deal represents a further formalization of those ties with an important geopolitical actor in the Persian Gulf.

Whether the agreement will bring stability or instability to the Middle East depends largely on how the other major players respond. The United States views it as an opportunity to deepen its regional influence by drawing the UAE away from engagement with Iran and steering Israel away from economic partnerships with China. Russia is concerned that US arms sales to the UAE will further threaten Iran, compelling Tehran to seek closer military ties with Moscow. Russia and Iran have both worked closely with Syria, which has long been in Israel's crosshairs. The deal may very well solidify the Russia–Iran–Syria axis in opposition to the Sunni Arab states. Overhanging all of this is the unresolved question of what becomes of the Palestinian people, who feel both forgotten and betrayed by a deal struck without their consent or benefit.