UAE–Israel Abraham Accords: Opposing Common Enemies
This paper examines the geopolitical motivations behind the UAE's decision to formalize relations with Israel through the 2020 Abraham Accords. It analyzes how shared threats—particularly from Iran's nuclear ambitions, Hezbollah's regional influence, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood—drove the two states together. The paper explores the UAE's explicit rejection of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority as corrupt actors, its coordination with Israel on intelligence and cybersecurity, and the broader implications of the Accords for Gulf state diplomacy. It also considers criticism of the deal and the hope that normalized Arab–Israeli relations can create conditions for sustainable peace through mutual economic and security cooperation.
- Introduction: UAE motivations for normalizing ties with Israel
- Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood: UAE rejects Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist threats
- Iran and the Nuclear Agreement: UAE and Israel united against Iran's nuclear ambitions
- Hezbollah's Regional Influence: Shared intelligence efforts against Hezbollah's growing power
- Uniting to Oppose Common Enemies: Accords forge social, economic, and military cooperation
- Conclusion: Accords mark a decisive shift in Middle East diplomacy
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What makes this paper effective
- The paper organizes its argument around clearly defined shared threats—Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and Hezbollah—giving each a dedicated section that builds a cumulative case for the UAE–Israel alliance.
- It draws on a diverse range of sources, including wire reports, think-tank analysis, and official embassy statements, lending credibility to its geopolitical claims.
- The paper balances advocacy for the Accords with a brief acknowledgment of critics who warn the deal could heighten rather than reduce regional tensions, demonstrating intellectual honesty.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper makes effective use of direct quotation from primary actors—ambassadors, foreign ministers, and lawmakers—to substantiate its policy claims. Rather than paraphrasing, it lets officials speak in their own voices, which anchors the analysis in documented positions and avoids over-reliance on the author's interpretation alone.
Structure breakdown
The essay opens with a research question about timing, then moves through four thematic threat sections (Hamas/Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, Hezbollah, and a synthesis section on common enemies) before concluding with a forward-looking assessment. Each thematic section follows the same pattern: identify the threat, present UAE and Israeli positions, and cite supporting evidence. This parallel structure makes the argument easy to follow and reinforces the central thesis through repetition and accumulation.
Introduction
Why has the UAE determined that now is a good time to formalize relations with Israel? One reason for the timing is that Iran has been growing its power and support network for years, backing groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, which the UAE sees as a threat to peace. The UAE does not support these groups and has condemned others, like the Muslim Brotherhood, for being corrupt and murderous. The UAE seeks to develop its state economically, establish a stable region that is good for trade and tourism, and put past grievances in their place. The key to moving forward and establishing a lasting peace in the Middle East is to develop win-win relationships with other states, and that is why it has determined to normalize its relationship with Israel. With Iran looking to develop nuclear capabilities, Hezbollah spreading its influence as far as Yemen, and Hamas still engaging in attacks on Israel while doing little to help the Palestinian people, the UAE has seen now as the time to turn a new page and work more closely with the one state that has been targeted by Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas for years—Israel.
Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood
The UAE and Israel have developed very close ties since celebrating the Abraham Accords in 2020. In 2021, they looked to collaborate more closely still in order to safeguard themselves against their enemies in the region. Part of doing so depends upon each honoring the culture and legacy of the other. That is why "Israel's top diplomat to the United Arab Emirates attended a ceremony in Dubai on the grounds of the Arabian Peninsula's first permanent exhibition to commemorate the Holocaust. Hours earlier, he'd attended an event establishing a joint venture between an Israeli and Emirati company" (Batrawy, 2021). This sign of brotherhood and solidarity is all the more significant given that Israel and Hamas had been engaged in conflict recently and that the UAE, since formalizing relations with Israel, has shown more support for its new partner than in the past. According to Israeli Ambassador Eitan Na'eh, "What we see here is the exact opposite of what we see in Gaza… What we see here in the whole normalization process is a departure from the past" (Batrawy, 2021).
The recent conflict between Hamas and Israel took place during Ramadan, considered the holiest month of the year for Muslims. Because of this, many Arabs voiced support for Palestine and Hamas against Israel—but not the UAE. While the UAE government did express concern about the violence and did lead a rebuke of Israeli security forces for storming a mosque, the relationship between the UAE and Israel was not derailed. The opening of the permanent Holocaust exhibit in the UAE demonstrates the UAE's commitment to strengthening ties with Israel for the future.
The UAE is intent on walking a fine line between showing support for Muslims while also showing support for Israel. For instance, when Hamas fired rockets into Israel, the UAE did not celebrate the assault but rather called for a cease-fire in order to promote peace. The UAE also sees Hamas as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, which it has long viewed as a threat to peace (Batrawy, 2021). The UAE would like to see the Arab world designate Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organizations (Sisodia, 2021). This insistence that the rest of the Arab world sever ties with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood indicates the strength of the new relationship brought about by the Abraham Accords. The UAE and Israel can both agree that Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood represent a threat to peace and stability in the Middle East. Since formalizing their relationship, the two states are now focused on improving economic conditions and enhancing regional security. Thus, even in the face of conflict between Israel and Palestine, the UAE is focused on calling for a truce while admonishing the groups that both states see as enemies to peace.
By coming together to celebrate each other's cultures, the UAE and Israel are showing the rest of the Middle East that the tide has turned in Arab-Israeli relations. Violent groups like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood will continue to be branded as terrorists by both states, and pressure will be put on other Gulf states to reject these organizations for the sake of common prosperity and stability throughout the Middle East. That is one of the most important facets of geopolitical change to emerge from the Abraham Accords.
The UAE has never made a secret of its opposition to Hamas. It has not stopped supporting the Palestinian people—but it does refuse to support Hamas as well as the Palestinian Authority. According to one UAE lawmaker, the anger directed toward the UAE is explained as follows: "Now the anger towards the UAE, from both the PA and Hamas, has been created because we have stopped paying. We want to pay and we will pay the people. Not Hamas and the PA" (Chemla, 2020). Al Falasi, a member of the UAE Federal Council, has stated unequivocally that "the United Arab Emirates is committed to the Palestinian people, not to Hamas and the Palestinian Authority," which "are both corrupt and murderers" (Chemla, 2020). The UAE continues to seek reconciliation between Israel and Palestine—but it does not do so by supporting Hamas. Nor does it approve of Qatar's funding of Hamas (Chemla, 2020).
Al Falasi states that Qatar has been funding the terrorist organization for so long that it cannot stop, and that this will be a problem for Qatar going forward: "You have in Qatar now the leadership of Hamas, the leadership of the Taliban, and the most dangerous—the Muslim Brotherhood—whose leadership sits there. Hamas is the armed arm of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. Turkey is there, too. This 'cocktail' is dangerous" (Chemla, 2020). To confront this danger, the UAE is joining with Israel in a show of solidarity and peace, encouraging other Gulf states to follow suit.
Iran and the Nuclear Agreement
Another enemy that the UAE and Israel have agreed represents a threat is Iran. The Obama Administration made an effort to strike a deal with Iran that would shape the state's nuclear capabilities. Both the UAE and Israel viewed this as a real danger. Under the Trump Administration, the deal with Iran was taken off the table. The UAE and Israel then worked with the Biden Administration to find an alternative approach to the problem they saw in Iran (Kelly, 2021). The two Middle Eastern partners sought a diplomatic solution but discussed alternative options with the US should diplomacy fail. US Secretary of State Blinken stated that "time is running out" for Iran to agree to new terms to the nuclear deal made under the Obama Administration. The US, Israel, and the UAE all want tighter scrutiny over the deal, but Iran has shown little interest in such an arrangement. Israel's Foreign Minister Lapid went so far as to suggest that force would be used against Iran if it attempted to secure nuclear capabilities on its own (Kelly, 2021). Lapid stated unequivocally: "Israel reserves the right to act at any given moment in any way; it's not only our right, it's also our responsibility. Iran has publicly stated it wants to wipe us out. We have no intention of letting this happen" (Kelly, 2021).
Iran, meanwhile, views US sanctions as illegal and regards its nuclear development as peaceful. It does not accept the way the US has handled the situation—but the UAE and Israel appear united on this front. They see Iran as dangerous and as a threat to the regional peace they are trying to promote through their formalized relationship.
The UAE supported the Trump Administration's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement made with Iran under Obama. The UAE announced that "the agreement does not guarantee Iran would refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons in the future" (UAE Embassy, 2020). Thus, on this matter, the UAE and Israel are in full agreement: Iran's nuclear development program represents a threat to their existence, and they want a solution that will address the matter, whether diplomatic or military.
According to Frantzman (2021), Iran's threat to the Gulf has been consistent over the years, primarily because of its use of various proxy organizations: "Iran operates through a series of proxies and partners, from Yemen to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. These groups have varying degrees of links to Iran; some of them are likely directly controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Others, like Hamas, are supported by Iran but probably do not take orders from Tehran. Iran's goal is to keep these groups armed and ready to support its activities, such that they can be operationalized or used as leverage and tools for Tehran's regional project." States like the UAE and Israel, which are promoting peace and trade stability, view Iran's activities as a catastrophe waiting to happen. That is why the UAE does not support Hamas, and it is why it has joined with Israel to denounce Iran's development of nuclear capabilities.
Conclusion
For the UAE, the Abraham Accords came about at a decisive moment in Middle East history. So long as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Authority, and the Muslim Brotherhood continued to build their support networks and increase their strength and influence in the region, no state would be safe. Israel and the UAE recognized this problem together, and with Trump in the White House they found a more sympathetic partner than had existed during the Obama Administration. By moving forward with the Accords, the two states sought to cement a new beginning in history—one that would further their aims and lead to an environment in which other Gulf states and Arab communities could see that a better future lay ahead, achievable through mutual respect, collaboration, and win-win negotiations. Relying on terror tactics, violence, murder, and subterfuge would no longer be tolerated. That was the aim of the UAE. Whether it works remains to be seen—and the ball is now in the court of its enemies. Time will tell what they do with it.
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