UAE-Israel Abraham Accords: Impact on Iran's Strategy
This paper examines the impact of the UAE-Israel Abraham Accords on Iran's expansionist strategy in the Middle East. Drawing on the complex web of Sunni-Shia alliances, Qatar's pivotal diplomatic role, and the broader geopolitical competition among the United States, Russia, and China, the paper argues that the Accords are unlikely to alter Iran's strategic vision. Rather than deterring Tehran, the agreement formalizes a pre-existing Israel-UAE relationship and may actually embolden Iran to deepen its regional network—spanning Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—and accelerate its nuclear program. The paper situates the Accords within Iran's long-term Strategy of 2036 and the global contest over Middle Eastern influence.
- Introduction: Research question and political-realism framing
- Arab Alliances and the Fluid Middle East: Qatar, UAE, Iran, and shifting Arab alignments
- The Abraham Accords in Context: Accords as geopolitical insurance amid US-Russia-China rivalry
- What the Abraham Accords Will Produce: Iran's 2036 strategy and Mediterranean expansion goal
- Iran Emboldened: Iran's defiant response and threat escalation
- Conclusion: Accords formalize existing ties; Iran remains undeterred
✍️ How to write this paper — guide, tools & examples ▾
What makes this paper effective
- It anchors the bilateral UAE-Israel agreement within a much larger geopolitical frame—US-Russia-China rivalry, China's Belt and Road Initiative, and Iran's Strategy of 2036—giving the analysis genuine depth beyond a simple regional read.
- The paper consistently uses named scholars and policy analysts (Levy, Avdaliani, IISS, Citrinowicz) to support each argumentative move, lending credibility and allowing readers to trace claims back to sources.
- The argument is structured as a layered counter-narrative: rather than simply agreeing or disagreeing with the Accords' significance, it acknowledges their symbolic value while systematically demonstrating why they leave Iran's strategic calculus unchanged—or even strengthen Iran's resolve.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates effective use of contextual reframing: each new section widens the analytical lens before narrowing back to the central thesis. This funnel-and-return structure prevents the argument from becoming a list of disconnected facts and instead builds a cumulative, coherent case that the Abraham Accords are best understood as symptom rather than cause.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with a guiding research question and a political-realism framing device. The second section maps Arab alliance fluidity—particularly the Qatar-Iran-UAE triangle—to show that Middle Eastern alignments are never fixed. The third section situates the Accords within the US-Russia-China power contest. The fourth section examines Iran's specific strategic goals, from Mediterranean reach to the 2036 plan. The fifth section presents Iran's emboldened response, including military threats, before the conclusion projects forward-looking stakes if the rivalry intensifies.
Introduction
Will the new relations between the UAE and Israel keep Iran's expansionist strategy at bay? This is a question that requires some political realism to answer. The political reality of the Middle East is that the various Sunni and Shia states of the Arab world have overlapping interests as well as conflicts; the situation is fluid, never static. This paper discusses the impact of the UAE-Israel Agreement, known as the Abraham Accords, on Iran and its expansionist strategy, arguing that in all likelihood the Accords will do little to alter Iran's position.
Arab Alliances and the Fluid Middle East
The Trump Administration had envisioned an Arab NATO in the Middle East, but this vision failed to materialize. The current UAE-Israel Agreement, called the Abraham Accords (also signed by Bahrain in Washington, D.C., in 2020), exists mainly as a type of American-Israeli insurance policy (Levy, 2020). The policy is one that ensures military support to its signatories from the US. It can also be understood as a hedging strategy: while an agreement of cooperation has been reached between the UAE and Israel, both states have maintained open channels of communication with states deemed hostile to their respective partners—the UAE still maintains contact with Iran, and Israel remains in communication with Qatar (Levy, 2020).
The UAE has also renewed diplomatic ties with Qatar, which had previously been severed (Arabian Business, 2020). Moreover, Qatar and Iran have close connections, both economically and politically, as both are part of the Non-Aligned Movement. Even though the UAE often criticizes Iran, Qatar withholds such criticism and routinely discusses security matters with the Iranian government (Fulton & Farrar-Wellman, 2011). So while Qatar and Iran are aligned, and the UAE and Israel are now formally aligned, the UAE and Qatar are also maintaining open channels—and Israel, too, has expressed hope of working directly with Qatar (Aloni, 2021).
To understand the impact of the Abraham Accords on Iran, it is necessary to understand Qatar's role. Qatar is a close ally of Iran, and its relationship with the UAE has been severely strained in recent years. Cohen (2021) describes the situation as follows: "The Qatari Diplomatic Crisis began in June 2017. It was a sophisticated plan to isolate Qatar politically and economically, in order to bring it to a breaking point and force it to succumb to the demands of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE." Qatar has been at odds with other Arab states for years—partly because of its prominence on the world stage, partly because of its support of the Muslim Brotherhood, and partly because of Al-Jazeera, which it hosts and which provided extensive coverage of the Arab Spring (Cohen, 2021). As Qatar was cut off, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) closing the Salwa crossing—Qatar's only land border crossing—it turned to Iran and Turkey for logistical assistance. Thus, the close alliance between Iran and Qatar is partly a result of other Arab states ostracizing Qatar. In return for its support, Iran received billions in investment and praise for its top general (Cohen, 2021).
Yet at the annual summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the leaders of the KSA and Qatar embraced and appeared to set aside their differences. At the GCC summit, the Saudi Crown Prince also called for unified opposition to Iran. The KSA reopened the Salwa crossing for Qatar, so it now remains to be seen what Qatar will do in return (Cohen, 2021). The hope among the Sunni Arab states is that Qatar will move closer to them and away from Iran. The Abraham Accords could be the first step in achieving that hope, but time will tell.
The fact of the matter is that Qatar is not necessarily to be considered a formal ally of Iran but rather more of a diplomatic neighboring state that pursues its own interests first and foremost. Because of clashes with the GCC, Qatar found it expedient to work more closely with Iran (Al-Tamimi, 2018). It has been a pragmatic and respectful relationship, but now with the Saudi blockade lifted, Qatar may find it more expedient to realign with the GCC. In the Middle East, Arab alliances are fluid and complex. Even the UAE has had relations with Iran (Cheon, Di Paola, & Sergie, 2018), and the UAE has also been rumored to be restoring its diplomatic offices in Syria in an effort to renew ties with Assad (Xinhua, 2018). What all of this means is that relationships between Middle Eastern states are not always what they seem: they can be strained, broken, and seemingly beyond repair—yet geopolitical factors are always at play behind the scenes. The situation is dynamic, to say the least.
The Abraham Accords in Context
From this perspective of a dynamic Middle East, the Abraham Accords may be seen as a play to woo Qatar away from Iran and Turkey, similar to the KSA's lifting of its blockade. As the GCC made clear, opposition to Iran remains the overarching goal, and the GCC wants total commitment on this matter from its member states. The problem, however, is that Iran is unlikely to be meaningfully affected by hard-line opposition from the GCC. Iran has cultivated relationships with states outside the Arab world—including Russia and China—and this has been especially the case since the Trump-approved assassination of General Soleimani (Shamkhani, 2021).
As Shamkhani (2021) observes, "strategic cooperation between Iran, Russia, and China comes with benefits for each one of them, the value of which is not yet clear. But what is certain is the more beneficial the alliance is for the eastern side of the equation, the heavier price the western side has to pay." The UAE-Israel Agreement should, therefore, be considered within the framework of the larger geopolitical contest playing out among Russia, China, and the US. Russia and China have long made clear their intention to develop a multipolar world order, which the US views as a threat to its unipolar vision (Turner, 2009). The US has no intention of ceding influence in the Middle East to either Russia or China, but it may have little choice as its influence wanes—Russia has become a dominant player in Syria, and its missile defense shield system is coveted by numerous states, including Iran (Al-Monitor Staff, 2020).
Thus, Levy (2020) states that "to imagine that the Iranian-led axis or Turkish-led axis would look at this week's developments and conclude that they had better fold, withdraw, and pursue a Versailles Treaty of surrender is to be either Pollyannaish or plain ignorant of regional realities." Iran is not going to view the Abraham Accords as a crossing-the-Rubicon moment. When it comes to the power plays being conducted in the Middle East, Iran does not appear likely to be broken by a new formal agreement between two states that have long maintained a working relationship. Iran's position and strategic vision have not been directly impacted.
For that reason, it is unlikely that the Abraham Accords will alter Iran's expansionist strategy. Levy (2020) notes that "the Abraham Accords are best understood as reflecting and formalizing rather than changing realities in the region." The realities in the region are that Israel and the UAE have been close for years—the former selling military hardware to the latter and cooperating on intelligence matters. It is therefore logical to predict that "the repercussions emanating from these accords are minimal" (Levy, 2020). However, this does not mean the Abraham Accords will have no impact whatsoever. On the contrary, the agreement is most likely to further entrench Iran in its oppositional stance toward the Sunni states, its support of Palestine and Hezbollah, and its antipathy toward Israel. As Levy (2020) concludes, "to the extent that the impact may be more widely felt, it is likely to be negative, both with regard to the deepening fault lines and conflicts in the region as a whole and vis-à-vis Israel's treatment of the Palestinians." From this perspective, the Abraham Accords should be seen as little more than a formal announcement of an already implicit reality.
Conclusion
The Abraham Accords, sponsored by the Trump Administration, may not have produced the Arab NATO that Trump envisioned, but they did at least formalize an implicit and practical relationship that already existed between Israel and the UAE. The effect of the UAE-Israel Agreement on Iran and its expansionist strategy remains to be fully determined. But judging from where things stand today, Iran appears undeterred and unlikely to change course. Iran has managed to secure for itself a strong network of partners throughout the Middle East and beyond. Its strategic vision will not change. The larger geopolitical ambitions of the world's major powers also remain firmly in place, raising the stakes of the contest in the Middle East. If Israel is able to swing the Arab states to its side, Iran will likely turn further toward Russia and China for additional support—bringing into the fore the prospect of a wider, global conflict between the world's major powers. At the heart of it all will be a Persian dream of expansion, countered by an equally ambitious plan of expansion championed by Israel.
References
Al-Monitor Staff. (2020). Russia may sell S-400 to Iran after UN embargo expires, ambassador says. Retrieved from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/10/iran-russia-s400-missile-defense-system.html
Aloni, Y. (2021). Israel-Qatar Cooperation? Retrieved from https://www.israeltoday.co.il/read/israel-qatar-cooperation/
Al-Tamimi, A. (2018). Qatar: Ally of Iran? Retrieved from https://spectator.org/qatar-ally-of-iran/
Arab News. (2020). Iran threatens to attack UAE over Israel deal. Retrieved from https://www.arabnews.com/node/1720081/middle-east
Arabian Business. (2020). Qatar blockade over as UAE, Saudi, Bahrain and Egypt agree to fully restore ties. Retrieved from
Associated Press. (2020). Iran threatens 'dangerous future' for UAE after Israel deal. Retrieved from
Avdaliani, E. (2020). Iran's Middle East strategy. Retrieved from https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/01/12/irans-middle-east-strategy/
Cheon, S., Di Paola, A., & Sergie, M. (2018). Iran oil buyer and rival, U.A.E., may be cracking down on trade. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-03/iran-s-oil-buyer-and-rival-u-a-e-may-be-cracking-down-on-trade
Citrinowicz, D. (2020). Israel and the UAE on Iran: Shared foe, different perspectives. Retrieved from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-and-uae-iran-shared-foe-different-perspectives
Cohen, E. (2021). A Jew makes peace between Muslims! Retrieved from https://www.israeltoday.co.il/read/a-jew-makes-peace-between-muslims/
CSIS. (2020). Russia's security interests in the Middle East. Retrieved from
Dunne, C. (2021). China's Belt and Road Initiative and US Middle East policy. Retrieved from http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-us-middle-east-policy/
Fulton, W., & Farrar-Wellman, A. (2011). Qatar-Iran foreign relations. Retrieved from
IISS. (2019). Chapter one: Tehran's strategic intent. Retrieved from https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-03-ch-1-tehrans-strategic-intent
Levy, D. (2020). The missing peace in the Abraham Accords. Retrieved from
London-Information. (2016). Iran's strategy for year 2036 to empower Hezbollah and Al-Assad's regime. Retrieved from
Shamkhani, M. (2021). Iran-Russia-China alliance after Soleimani assassination. Retrieved from https://en.mehrnews.com/news/170163/Iran-Russia-China-alliance-after-Soleimani-assassination
Turner, S. (2009). Russia, China and a multipolar world order: The danger in the undefined. Asian Perspective, 33(1), 159–184. Retrieved from
Xinhua. (2018). Syria welcomes return of Arab embassies in Damascus. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/18/c_137615517.htm
Yinon, O. (1982). A strategy for Israel in the nineteen eighties. KIVUNIM (Directions): A Journal for Judaism and Zionism, 14(11). Retrieved from
Always verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.