Washington vs. Jefferson: Federal Power and Internal Improvements

Introduction: Two Founders, Two Visions

George Washington and Thomas Jefferson are perhaps the most revered of the Founding Fathers. Even during their own time, they were regarded as the leaders of the fledgling republic before they became the heads of their respective political parties. Their beliefs and actions established a political struggle that has persisted to this day, with debates as lively as those that took place during the framing of the Constitution.

Washington and Jefferson's respective beliefs took on special significance in the area of "internal improvements." As historian John Larson uses the term, "internal improvement" refers to all kinds of public works programs designed to encourage security, prosperity, and enlightenment among the people — a concept central to early American political life. Internal improvements implicated both leaders because of the heavy involvement they required of the federal government.

The central argument of this paper is that Washington and Jefferson adopted opposing positions on the role of the federal government because they held fundamentally different views about human nature. Washington believed the average person was selfish and would not do the right thing independently, and therefore that the federal government had to act in the public interest when individuals would not. Jefferson believed that the average person was capable of becoming a good citizen if given the space and abundance necessary to cultivate himself — a condition he viewed as impossible under an overly powerful federal government.

Development of Beliefs Among the Monied Gentry

Thomas Jefferson and George Washington had much in common. They were both from Virginia, owned large farms, and practiced the doctrine of self-sufficiency. Throughout their lives, both men were curiously reluctant to accumulate personal power. In a sense, they were true aristocrats, embodying the ideal of the gentleman-farmer.

Washington referred to men like Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and himself as part of a distinct social class — the "monied gentry." According to Larson, this class "assumed a right to lead based on superior knowledge, patriotic feeling, and what they called their 'wisdom.'" Indeed, many men of this class were genuinely brilliant. They were not only intellectual elites relative to their American countrymen but also the equals of the great statesmen and philosophers of their day in Europe — figures comparable to Locke, Hobbes, and de Tocqueville.

In addition to their intellectual gifts, the monied gentry were uniquely industrious, paternalistic, and patriotic. The Republican experiment was, in a sense, their great project — a creation in need of nurturing and guidance that only they believed they could provide. They truly cared for the welfare of the American people, though they likely cared even more deeply about the success of the Republican experiment itself.

Washington's View of Human Nature and Internal Improvements

Although he had a fatherly concern for the welfare of the American people, Washington harbored deep suspicions about the character of his countrymen. He doubted their ability to "do the right thing" — to place the interests of the nation before their own. Generally, he regarded the average American as lazy, selfish, and short-sighted, especially when compared to the Founding Fathers. This view was indicative of the Federalist attitude in general.

For Washington, the lack of civic-mindedness among his fellow citizens was especially frustrating. He believed the nation had to make significant sacrifices and investments upfront in order to make the Republican experiment succeed. Washington, being a highly self-sacrificing individual, expected the same from others. He understood the Republican experiment as an opportunity for the nation to "do the right thing," and he believed that the preservation of liberty required a strong federal government that would act correctly when selfish individuals would not.

Washington began with an orientation not entirely unlike Jefferson's. In fact, he might have developed a similar political philosophy had circumstances been different. However, his experience in the Revolutionary War — shared with his adjutant Alexander Hamilton — engendered in him deep concerns about the weakness of the federal government. As a general, Washington was also highly observant of material conditions throughout the nation, particularly its infrastructure.

Unlike Jefferson, Washington traveled extensively, both for business and pleasure, encountering parts of America that Jefferson never saw. He developed a particular fascination with the American interior, which was still largely a frontier region at the time. He recognized enormous commercial potential in the resources of the more fertile West, but also observed a lack of ambition and work ethic among its inhabitants — a deficiency he attributed to the abundance of land and the fertility of the soil. In his view, the American interior would have to be "Americanized" with the values of industry and self-sufficiency before it could realize its full potential.

Washington envisioned "a channel of commerce between Great Britain and the American interior." To realize this vision, he emphasized the construction of roads, canals, and bridges, most notably the Potomac River Canal. These internal improvements were also meant to achieve a second goal: the interconnectedness of the Republic. The transportation infrastructure was partly intended to prevent individual states from becoming insular and neglectful of the larger nation. The planners desired the exchange of ideas and experiences as much as the exchange of goods.

Conclusion: The Legacy of Federalism

Federalism was adopted by Washington as a necessary evil to prevent a greater evil — the threat of subjugation or annihilation by foreign interests such as England, France, Spain, and the Netherlands. In this light, Federalist institutions can be understood as pragmatic responses to urgent circumstances. Those circumstances, of course, proved to be temporary. The United States has been a first-rate power for over a century and a hegemonic power for more than half a century. It may therefore be worth asking whether it remains reasonable to maintain such institutions long after the threat that gave rise to them has passed.