Women in CI/HUMINT: Gender Integration in Counterterrorism

Introduction

The success of counterinsurgency operations depends partly on the effectiveness of the intelligence function driving the operation (Goh, Hao & Tay, 2008). Simply stated, intelligence is foreknowledge that assists military forces in organizing themselves for optimal employment (Goh et al., 2008). Goh and his colleagues (2008) state that having accurate intelligence information increases the chances of combat success at all levels: strategic, tactical, and operational. Tactically, intelligence provides forces with crucial insight on the performance envelopes of missiles, making it possible to plan how to refine fighter tactics and outperform the enemy (Goh et al., 2008). At the operational level, intelligence aids forces in understanding and engaging enemy command elements or other operationally significant targets, thereby incapacitating rebel forces (Goh et al., 2008). Moreover, intelligence can assist forces in making strategic deployment decisions — such as how to strike the enemy's center of gravity — thereby weakening their will to fight back (Goh et al., 2008).

The Iraq War sufficiently demonstrated the importance of counterintelligence in combat operations (Walter, 2005; Kerr, Wolfe, Donegan & Pappas, 2008). The intelligence community found itself relying on historical information, thereby arriving at inaccurate and misleading conclusions (Walter, 2005; Kerr et al., 2008). Although the intelligence community was able to gather accurate information on a range of issues — including how Iraqi forces would fight, how the war would develop over time, how tribal and ethnic factions in Iraq would react, how the war would impact oil markets, and how Iraq was linked to Al-Qaeda — it lacked the means to explain how these issues were linked, particularly how each issue influenced the rest (Kerr et al., 2008). There was no comprehensive understanding of the Iraqi target by the time of deployment (Kerr et al., 2008).

This implies that there is a need to streamline the military's intelligence function in pre-war situations and during war. Improving intelligence-gathering techniques on the ground is crucial to ensuring that the force is able to conduct effective combat operations in the ongoing war against terrorism.

Despite this knowledge, studies seeking to establish exactly what needs to be done to streamline the intelligence function are rare. Moreover, few researchers examine the influence of gender integration in intelligence-collection units, particularly whether such integration streamlines a unit's operations. This is perhaps why women remain underrepresented in the intelligence-collection service area — particularly HUMINT — years after the Armed Forces began creating opportunities for them in the CI/HUMINT community. This thesis seeks to examine how the integration of women into the CI/HUMINT community facilitates intelligence gathering from human subjects in the war against terrorism in the Middle East, and what could be done to ensure the maximum realization of benefits.

Background

Women have served in the American military since the 1920s, typically playing the role of spies, cooks, and nurses (McSally, 2007). However, their role in frontline combat as well as in the HUMINT service area has been severely limited (Obradovic, 2014). One of the primary reasons for this is the perception that women are biologically meek and too "soft" to handle the challenges of the war environment (Frum, 2013; McSally, 2007; Alderman, 1992). This perception gives rise to the belief that women may not be able to cope with battlefield challenges to the same degree as men (Frum, 2013). Other concerns raised against the inclusion of women in war-torn zones revolve around unit cohesion and esprit de corps — valid concerns discussed in the literature review section of this thesis.

The transition of women into professional roles in the military began in 1948, when President Truman signed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act into law (McSally, 2007). The Act made it mandatory for women to constitute at least 2% of the total force (McSally, 2007). One controversial element of the Act was that it excluded women from combat units (McSally, 2007). This spurred numerous amendments over the subsequent years, the most prominent being the authorization of female soldiers to serve as pilots for combat aircraft in 1991 (McSally, 2007).

The passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1992 marked a crucial step in the participation of women in the U.S. military (McSally, 2007). The Act repealed the rules previously excluding women from combat operations, opening up opportunities for women to occupy a variety of specialties in the force (McSally, 2007). Although women still could not serve in the traditional combat-specific roles of artilleryman, tank operator, or infantryman, they could work in combat aviation roles and a number of other demanding occupations (McSally, 2007).

Two decades have lapsed since the passage of the Defense Authorization Act, yet both the Marine Corps and the Army still excluded women from combat specialties. Moreover, prior to 2008, women were not allowed to serve in the CI/HUMINT service area since the CI/HUMINT role is embedded directly in combat units. The force began allowing women into the CI/HUMINT service area in 2008; however, female operatives remain the minority and are largely underrepresented in this specialty.

The ongoing war against terrorism in the Middle East requires a stable and robust human intelligence collection function to aid counterinsurgency operations (Kerr et al., 2008). Kerr and his colleagues (2008) argue that the presence of female operatives could give CI/HUMINT collection specialists greater access to local populations and make information on insurgency operations more easily obtainable, particularly in the war against terrorism.

Most contemporary studies focus on explaining why the integration of men and women in the combat environment is or is not a good idea. However, little literature exists on how specific areas of the military — such as the CI/HUMINT field — stand to benefit from integration. Moreover, studies on the effective execution of integration and best practices for realizing maximum benefits are rare. The current study addresses these gaps in two parts:

1. The first part seeks to demonstrate how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates the process of gathering intelligence from human subjects in the war against terrorism.

2. The second part seeks to identify strategies for ensuring the maximum realization of benefits.

The research questions guiding the study are:

RQ1: How does the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitate the process of gathering intelligence from human subjects in the ongoing war against terrorism?

RQ1a: Are there biological qualities that make women more effective CI/HUMINT gatherers than men?

RQ1b: What qualities make it a challenge for male operatives to collect CI/HUMINT from local populations in contested zones?

RQ2: What strategies could be used to realize the maximum benefits of integration?

RQ2a: What issues do researchers raise about integration?

RQ2b: What steps are required to address the identified issues and ensure the full realization of benefits?

Rationale

The current study rests on the premise that having female operatives in the HUMINT service area places the discipline in a better position to obtain human intelligence, particularly from the female faction of the population. Most previous studies in this area focus on the harms or benefits accruing from the integration of women in ground combat roles. However, knowledge gaps remain in regard to how integration has affected support service roles such as CI/HUMINT collection, and how it influences the war against terrorism in the Middle East.

Larger knowledge gaps exist in relation to the proper integration strategy required to realize the full benefits of integration. The few studies that have delved into this area focus on the European context, leaving much to be desired in the American context. The most probable reason the American context has remained largely understudied is that women are still largely underrepresented in HUMINT roles in the U.S. military, making America a less viable area of study. This study complements existing studies and provides crucial insight on how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates the process of gathering intelligence from human subjects in the Middle East.

Statement of Purpose

In 2008, the U.S. Armed Forces began allowing women into specific sections of the counterintelligence/human intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). The aim was to tap resources that male operatives in this service area were unable to access. However, years later, women remain underrepresented in these communities, perhaps because most personnel do not understand the crucial role played by female HUMINT operatives in intelligence collection.

The current study demonstrates how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates the process of gathering intelligence in the war against terrorism, and why there is a need to increase female operatives' participation in the specialty. The research provides insight on how the CI historically used women to gather intelligence and the potential benefits that the CI/HUMINT function of the military could reap from increasing the participation of women in its environment. Data collection and analysis utilized qualitative techniques, particularly document reviews. Autobiographies of famous female agents who worked as spies during World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and most recently the Iraq War — as presented in military resources and peer-reviewed journals — were reviewed to identify the specific qualities that made women effective at gathering human intelligence without arousing the suspicion of their handlers.

Assumptions and Limitations

Examples from the Iraq War are utilized as these are more easily obtainable than those from other conflicts. It is assumed that the phenomena described may vary across nations; however, those variations may not be significant enough to affect the findings of the thesis. The study also assumes that HUMINT collection is conducted by operatives accompanying deployed soldiers in war-torn foreign environments, and that HUMINT operatives of any gender encounter the same challenges and social issues as their counterparts serving in combat roles.

A number of limitations affect the validity of the study findings. First, the study relies on a significant number of military sources and monographs examining the gender topic, which could carry bias based on the contributors' positions in the gender integration debate. Second, owing to structural differences between countries and societies, using Iraq as a blanket example impedes the generalizability of findings, given Iraq's unique environment. Third, the study is qualitative in nature — the rarity of empirically supported findings impedes analysis and makes it less likely that strong conclusions will be drawn by policymakers and other academic researchers.

The HUMINT Function and Collection Methods

HUMINT is the collection of information from media sources and human subjects, with the aim of identifying elements, capabilities, equipment, tactics, dispositions, strength, composition, and intentions (U.S. Army, 2006). It is carried out by trained HUMINT operatives, including enlisted personnel in MOS 97E and 351Y (formerly 351C), Warrant Officers in MOS 351M (formerly 351E) and MOS 351Y (formerly 351C), and commissioned officers in MOS 35F and 35E (U.S. Army, 2006).

A HUMINT source is a subject from whom information can be obtained (U.S. Army, 2006). Sources include civilian personnel as well as threat, neutral, and friendly military personnel (U.S. Army, 2006). HUMINT source categories include members of governmental and non-governmental organizations, friendly forces, local inhabitants, displaced persons (DPs), refugees, and detainees (U.S. Army, 2006). These sources may possess either first-hand information or second-hand knowledge obtained through hearing or sight (U.S. Army, 2006).

The primary tasks of HUMINT operatives include: (a) screening potential sources of information by asking general questions to determine a source's level of knowledge and cooperation; (b) exploiting material, media, and documents for crucial information; (c) interrogating detainees; (d) debriefing local inhabitants, third-country nationals, displaced persons, refugees, and other civilian personnel; (e) debriefing personnel from U.S. and allied forces; (f) liaising with allied counterparts and host nation officials; and (g) conducting source operations (U.S. Army, 2006).

Phases of HUMINT Collection

A typical HUMINT session, regardless of the type of operation or methodology used, consists of five sequential phases: planning and preparation, approach, questioning, termination, and reporting (U.S. Army, 2006). Reporting may occur at any point when a collector has obtained crucial information (U.S. Army, 2006).

Planning and preparation: The collector conducts relevant research in preparation for interaction with a specific source (U.S. Army, 2006). The collector strives to understand the environment, the supported unit's mission, the source, and the cultural environment (U.S. Army, 2006). General areas of research include current events indicating the population's attitudes toward the United States; the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of one's own unit and supported units; the umbrella concept issued by the taskforce (TF) commander specifying collection parameters; equipment and weapon guides; and the intelligence summary (INTSUM) provided by the TF commander (U.S. Army, 2006).

Approach: The collector establishes conditions of rapport and control with the aim of gaining the source's cooperation and facilitating information collection (U.S. Army, 2006). The goal is to establish a trust relationship that evokes cooperation and truthful information. Available approaches include the emotional approach — appealing to the source's emotions of revenge, hate, love, or greed — and the incentive approach, offering something in exchange for information (U.S. Army, 2006).

Questioning: The collector asks the source questions on relevant topics with the aim of eliciting any valuable information in their possession, making use of one of three methodologies: elicitation, debriefing, or interrogation (U.S. Army, 2006).

Termination: The collector completes the questioning session and establishes conditions for future information collection from the source by himself or another operative (U.S. Army, 2006).

Reporting: The operative writes and submits written or oral reports on information gathered throughout the collection effort, which are forwarded to TF commanders for implementation (U.S. Army, 2006).

Methods of HUMINT Collection

Interrogation is a systematic effort to obtain information from a source in the custody of the HUMINT collector, using either direct or indirect questioning tactics (U.S. Army, 2006). The interrogation can range from totally cooperative to highly antagonistic, depending on the type of operation and the source's attitudes (U.S. Army, 2006).

Debriefing involves questioning a cooperating human source to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law (U.S. Army, 2006, p. 1-8). In a debriefing session, the source is not in the collector's custody and is often willing to cooperate. There are two types: refugees, DPs, and local civilian debriefing operations; and friendly force debriefing operations (U.S. Army, 2006). The study is particularly concerned with determining how the integration of female HUMINT operatives facilitates the collection of HUMINT from local civilians in the Middle East.

Liaison operations are programs through which the military exchanges information with civilian agencies, non-governmental organizations, and allied military in the host country (U.S. Army, 2006).

Document exploitation (DOCEX) operations involve extracting information from electronic, published, and open-source documents, including GPS terminals, personal digital assistants (PDAs), telephones, and computers (U.S. Army, 2006).