Women in CI/HUMINT: Gender Integration in Counterterrorism

Introduction

The success of counterinsurgency operations depends partly on the effectiveness of the intelligence function driving the operation (Goh, Hao & Tay, 2008). Simply stated, intelligence is foreknowledge that assists military forces in organizing themselves for optimal employment (Goh et al., 2008). Goh and his colleagues (2008) state that having accurate intelligence information increases the chances of combat success at all levels: strategic, tactical, and operational. Tactically, intelligence provides forces with crucial insight on the performance envelopes of missiles, making it possible to plan how to refine fighter tactics and outperform the enemy (Goh et al., 2008). At the operational level, intelligence aids forces in understanding and engaging enemy command elements or other operationally significant targets, thereby incapacitating rebel forces (Goh et al., 2008). Moreover, intelligence can assist forces in making strategic deployment decisions — such as how to strike the enemy's center of gravity — thereby weakening their will to fight back (Goh et al., 2008).

The Iraq War sufficiently demonstrated the importance of counterintelligence in combat operations (Walter, 2005; Kerr, Wolfe, Donegan & Pappas, 2008). The intelligence community found itself relying on historical information, thereby arriving at inaccurate and misleading conclusions (Walter, 2005; Kerr et al., 2008). Although the intelligence community was able to gather accurate information on a range of issues — including how Iraqi forces would fight, how the war would develop over time, how tribal and ethnic factions in Iraq would react, how the war would impact oil markets, and how Iraq was linked to Al-Qaeda — it lacked the means to explain how these issues were linked, particularly how each issue influenced the rest (Kerr et al., 2008). There was no comprehensive understanding of the Iraqi target by the time of deployment (Kerr et al., 2008).

This implies that there is a need to streamline the military's intelligence function in pre-war situations and during war. Improving intelligence-gathering techniques on the ground is crucial to ensuring that the force is able to conduct effective combat operations in the ongoing war against terrorism.

Despite this knowledge, studies seeking to establish exactly what needs to be done to streamline the intelligence function are rare. Moreover, few researchers examine the influence of gender integration in intelligence-collection units, particularly whether such integration streamlines a unit's operations. This is perhaps why women remain underrepresented in the intelligence-collection service area — particularly HUMINT — years after the Armed Forces began creating opportunities for them in the CI/HUMINT community. This thesis seeks to examine how the integration of women into the CI/HUMINT community facilitates intelligence gathering from human subjects in the war against terrorism in the Middle East, and what could be done to ensure the maximum realization of benefits.

Background

Women have served in the American military since the 1920s, typically playing the role of spies, cooks, and nurses (McSally, 2007). However, their role in frontline combat as well as in the HUMINT service area has been severely limited (Obradovic, 2014). One of the primary reasons for this is the perception that women are biologically meek and too "soft" to handle the challenges of the war environment (Frum, 2013; McSally, 2007; Alderman, 1992). This perception gives rise to the belief that women may not be able to cope with battlefield challenges to the same degree as men (Frum, 2013). Other concerns raised against the inclusion of women in war-torn zones revolve around unit cohesion and esprit de corps — valid concerns discussed in the literature review section of this thesis.

The transition of women into professional roles in the military began in 1948, when President Truman signed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act into law (McSally, 2007). The Act made it mandatory for women to constitute at least 2% of the total force (McSally, 2007). One controversial element of the Act was that it excluded women from combat units (McSally, 2007). This spurred numerous amendments over the subsequent years, the most prominent being the authorization of female soldiers to serve as pilots for combat aircraft in 1991 (McSally, 2007).

The passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1992 marked a crucial step in the participation of women in the U.S. military (McSally, 2007). The Act repealed the rules previously excluding women from combat operations, opening up opportunities for women to occupy a variety of specialties in the force (McSally, 2007). Although women still could not serve in the traditional combat-specific roles of artilleryman, tank operator, or infantryman, they could work in combat aviation roles and a number of other demanding occupations (McSally, 2007).

Two decades have lapsed since the passage of the Defense Authorization Act, yet both the Marine Corps and the Army still excluded women from combat specialties. Moreover, prior to 2008, women were not allowed to serve in the CI/HUMINT service area since the CI/HUMINT role is embedded directly in combat units. The force began allowing women into the CI/HUMINT service area in 2008; however, female operatives remain the minority and are largely underrepresented in this specialty.

The ongoing war against terrorism in the Middle East requires a stable and robust human intelligence collection function to aid counterinsurgency operations (Kerr et al., 2008). Kerr and his colleagues (2008) argue that the presence of female operatives could give CI/HUMINT collection specialists greater access to local populations and make information on insurgency operations more easily obtainable, particularly in the war against terrorism.

Most contemporary studies focus on explaining why the integration of men and women in the combat environment is or is not a good idea. However, little literature exists on how specific areas of the military — such as the CI/HUMINT field — stand to benefit from integration. Moreover, studies on the effective execution of integration and best practices for realizing maximum benefits are rare. The current study addresses these gaps in two parts:

1. The first part seeks to demonstrate how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates the process of gathering intelligence from human subjects in the war against terrorism.

2. The second part seeks to identify strategies for ensuring the maximum realization of benefits.

The research questions guiding the study are:

RQ1: How does the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitate the process of gathering intelligence from human subjects in the ongoing war against terrorism?

RQ1a: Are there biological qualities that make women more effective CI/HUMINT gatherers than men?

RQ1b: What qualities make it a challenge for male operatives to collect CI/HUMINT from local populations in contested zones?

RQ2: What strategies could be used to realize the maximum benefits of integration?

RQ2a: What issues do researchers raise about integration?

RQ2b: What steps are required to address the identified issues and ensure the full realization of benefits?

Rationale

The current study rests on the premise that having female operatives in the HUMINT service area places the discipline in a better position to obtain human intelligence, particularly from the female faction of the population. Most previous studies in this area focus on the harms or benefits accruing from the integration of women in ground combat roles. However, knowledge gaps remain in regard to how integration has affected support service roles such as CI/HUMINT collection, and how it influences the war against terrorism in the Middle East.

Larger knowledge gaps exist in relation to the proper integration strategy required to realize the full benefits of integration. The few studies that have delved into this area focus on the European context, leaving much to be desired in the American context. The most probable reason the American context has remained largely understudied is that women are still largely underrepresented in HUMINT roles in the U.S. military, making America a less viable area of study. This study complements existing studies and provides crucial insight on how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates the process of gathering intelligence from human subjects in the Middle East.

Statement of Purpose

In 2008, the U.S. Armed Forces began allowing women into specific sections of the counterintelligence/human intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). The aim was to tap resources that male operatives in this service area were unable to access. However, years later, women remain underrepresented in these communities, perhaps because most personnel do not understand the crucial role played by female HUMINT operatives in intelligence collection.

The current study demonstrates how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates the process of gathering intelligence in the war against terrorism, and why there is a need to increase female operatives' participation in the specialty. The research provides insight on how the CI historically used women to gather intelligence and the potential benefits that the CI/HUMINT function of the military could reap from increasing the participation of women in its environment. Data collection and analysis utilized qualitative techniques, particularly document reviews. Autobiographies of famous female agents who worked as spies during World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and most recently the Iraq War — as presented in military resources and peer-reviewed journals — were reviewed to identify the specific qualities that made women effective at gathering human intelligence without arousing the suspicion of their handlers.

Assumptions and Limitations

Examples from the Iraq War are utilized as these are more easily obtainable than those from other conflicts. It is assumed that the phenomena described may vary across nations; however, those variations may not be significant enough to affect the findings of the thesis. The study also assumes that HUMINT collection is conducted by operatives accompanying deployed soldiers in war-torn foreign environments, and that HUMINT operatives of any gender encounter the same challenges and social issues as their counterparts serving in combat roles.

A number of limitations affect the validity of the study findings. First, the study relies on a significant number of military sources and monographs examining the gender topic, which could carry bias based on the contributors' positions in the gender integration debate. Second, owing to structural differences between countries and societies, using Iraq as a blanket example impedes the generalizability of findings, given Iraq's unique environment. Third, the study is qualitative in nature — the rarity of empirically supported findings impedes analysis and makes it less likely that strong conclusions will be drawn by policymakers and other academic researchers.

The HUMINT Function and Collection Methods

HUMINT is the collection of information from media sources and human subjects, with the aim of identifying elements, capabilities, equipment, tactics, dispositions, strength, composition, and intentions (U.S. Army, 2006). It is carried out by trained HUMINT operatives, including enlisted personnel in MOS 97E and 351Y (formerly 351C), Warrant Officers in MOS 351M (formerly 351E) and MOS 351Y (formerly 351C), and commissioned officers in MOS 35F and 35E (U.S. Army, 2006).

A HUMINT source is a subject from whom information can be obtained (U.S. Army, 2006). Sources include civilian personnel as well as threat, neutral, and friendly military personnel (U.S. Army, 2006). HUMINT source categories include members of governmental and non-governmental organizations, friendly forces, local inhabitants, displaced persons (DPs), refugees, and detainees (U.S. Army, 2006). These sources may possess either first-hand information or second-hand knowledge obtained through hearing or sight (U.S. Army, 2006).

The primary tasks of HUMINT operatives include: (a) screening potential sources of information by asking general questions to determine a source's level of knowledge and cooperation; (b) exploiting material, media, and documents for crucial information; (c) interrogating detainees; (d) debriefing local inhabitants, third-country nationals, displaced persons, refugees, and other civilian personnel; (e) debriefing personnel from U.S. and allied forces; (f) liaising with allied counterparts and host nation officials; and (g) conducting source operations (U.S. Army, 2006).

Phases of HUMINT Collection

A typical HUMINT session, regardless of the type of operation or methodology used, consists of five sequential phases: planning and preparation, approach, questioning, termination, and reporting (U.S. Army, 2006). Reporting may occur at any point when a collector has obtained crucial information (U.S. Army, 2006).

Planning and preparation: The collector conducts relevant research in preparation for interaction with a specific source (U.S. Army, 2006). The collector strives to understand the environment, the supported unit's mission, the source, and the cultural environment (U.S. Army, 2006). General areas of research include current events indicating the population's attitudes toward the United States; the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of one's own unit and supported units; the umbrella concept issued by the taskforce (TF) commander specifying collection parameters; equipment and weapon guides; and the intelligence summary (INTSUM) provided by the TF commander (U.S. Army, 2006).

Approach: The collector establishes conditions of rapport and control with the aim of gaining the source's cooperation and facilitating information collection (U.S. Army, 2006). The goal is to establish a trust relationship that evokes cooperation and truthful information. Available approaches include the emotional approach — appealing to the source's emotions of revenge, hate, love, or greed — and the incentive approach, offering something in exchange for information (U.S. Army, 2006).

Questioning: The collector asks the source questions on relevant topics with the aim of eliciting any valuable information in their possession, making use of one of three methodologies: elicitation, debriefing, or interrogation (U.S. Army, 2006).

Termination: The collector completes the questioning session and establishes conditions for future information collection from the source by himself or another operative (U.S. Army, 2006).

Reporting: The operative writes and submits written or oral reports on information gathered throughout the collection effort, which are forwarded to TF commanders for implementation (U.S. Army, 2006).

Methods of HUMINT Collection

Interrogation is a systematic effort to obtain information from a source in the custody of the HUMINT collector, using either direct or indirect questioning tactics (U.S. Army, 2006). The interrogation can range from totally cooperative to highly antagonistic, depending on the type of operation and the source's attitudes (U.S. Army, 2006).

Debriefing involves questioning a cooperating human source to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law (U.S. Army, 2006, p. 1-8). In a debriefing session, the source is not in the collector's custody and is often willing to cooperate. There are two types: refugees, DPs, and local civilian debriefing operations; and friendly force debriefing operations (U.S. Army, 2006). The study is particularly concerned with determining how the integration of female HUMINT operatives facilitates the collection of HUMINT from local civilians in the Middle East.

Liaison operations are programs through which the military exchanges information with civilian agencies, non-governmental organizations, and allied military in the host country (U.S. Army, 2006).

Document exploitation (DOCEX) operations involve extracting information from electronic, published, and open-source documents, including GPS terminals, personal digital assistants (PDAs), telephones, and computers (U.S. Army, 2006).

Gender Integration: Operational and Social Concerns

Researchers provide conflicting opinions on the integration of females in areas originally dominated by men. These opinions revolve principally around the issue of unit cohesion.

Effect on Unit Cohesion

Unit cohesion refers to the bonding of members of a unit in such a way as to sustain their commitment to mission accomplishment, to the unit, and to each other (MacCoun & Hix, 2000). It comprises two different aspects: task cohesion and social cohesion (MacCoun & Hix, 2000). Task cohesion is the bonding together of members to achieve a goal requiring the collective effort of all unit members (MacCoun & Hix, 2000). Social cohesion, on the other hand, refers to "the extent to which group members like each other, prefer to spend their social time together ... and feel emotionally close to one another" (MacCoun & Hix, 2000). A unit with high task and social cohesion is considered to have high overall cohesion.

Multiple studies show a strong, positive correlation between unit cohesion and performance (MacCoun & Hix, 1993; Beal et al., 2003; Oliver et al., 1999). In their 1993 study, MacCoun and Hix found cohesion to be the strongest determinant of performance in combat operations. Beal and his colleagues (2003) hold a similar view, demonstrating that the cohesion-performance link is stronger when the task requires high degrees of coordination among members.

From these studies, there appears to be some consensus regarding how unit cohesion affects overall performance. However, there is still considerable controversy concerning how the inclusion and increased participation of women in specific battlefield roles affects unit cohesion. One faction believes that the integration of men and women would harm unit cohesion; the other believes that inclusion would have no meaningful effect on unit cohesion as long as appropriate training is provided.

Frum (2013) opines that integrating women into the battlefield would encourage sexual relationships, thereby ruining unit cohesion and, consequently, overall effectiveness. He points out that once the band of brothers begins competing for the available women, social cohesion within the team suffers (Frum, 2013). Eden (2013) supports this view, pointing out that the Navy demonstrated this when they began allowing female soldiers on ships — jealousy fomented, perceptions of favoritism emerged, sexual assaults became more prominent, and soldiers lost faith in their colleagues. In the end, there was disunity among team members and unit cohesion suffered (Eden, 2013).

Frum (2013) further expresses that sexual tensions and relations are not the only issues that could ruin unit cohesion following gender integration — there is also the issue of the place of the woman. Women become candidates for leadership once opportunities arise for them; however, men may not readily accept female leadership (Frum, 2013). One possible reason is that men may feel women have not been in the field long enough to match them (Frum, 2013), or may develop the notion that women receive such positions merely to achieve fairness and equality (Frum, 2013). Eventually, men are likely to be reluctant to take orders from female leaders, damaging both task and social cohesion (Frum, 2013).

Proponents of integration strongly dispute these arguments. Goldstein (2001) conducted an analysis to determine whether there were any differences in cohesion levels between male-only teams and mixed-gender groups in the war zone. He concluded that bonding and cohesion experienced no disassociation in the latter, and that men and women can work effectively together in the war zone, especially when women are not a novelty in the group (Goldstein, 2001). Harrell and Miller (1997) replicated these findings, concluding that gender integration alone had no significant effect on cohesion, and that the integration of females would have no significant effect on morale, readiness, and overall cohesion as long as the unit had the right leadership and members remained committed to the task at hand.

Egnell (2014) supports this view, expressing that although sexual relations are inevitable whenever men and women remain in close contact for prolonged periods, effective unit leadership could help ensure that group cohesion is not ruined as a result. In his view, unit cohesion is more a function of leadership than of team composition (Egnell, 2014).

In a separate study, Bartone and his colleagues (2002) expressed that besides leadership, training and competence were also key to ensuring unit cohesion in gender-mixed teams. They studied the factors influencing team cohesion among Norwegian officer cadets and found that previous familiarity between team members and shared experience of stressful exercises together had a strong effect on group cohesion (Bartone et al., 2002). The researchers concluded that a leader could increase their team's overall cohesion by providing opportunities for shared experiences and offering mixed-gender training (Bartone et al., 2002).

Rosen and his colleagues (2003) argue that the integration of women in the war zone could actually help build unit cohesion. They base their argument on the culture of hyper-masculinity (HM) in military units. When males bond together in all-male units, they develop HM, manifested in stereotypic and exaggerated masculine actions and attributes that could be detrimental to team unity and cohesiveness (Rosen et al., 2003). Including women in such teams helps break down this culture of HM and its negative consequences (Rosen et al., 2003). In their comparative study, Rosen and colleagues found male-only units to have higher levels of HM than gender-mixed teams, and concluded that gender-mixed units supplant the uni-gender culture of HM with one of ungendered professionalism (Rosen et al., 2003).

Feitz and Nagel (2008), in their study seeking to determine whether gender integration had any effect on the morale, cohesion, and readiness of the U.S. Army, found that gender integration as an independent variable had a very negligible effect on those factors. Their results showed that the effects of gender integration were almost invisible in units with high task cohesion, and concluded that the integration of women into ground combat units did not affect cohesion negatively — if anything, it resulted in even greater cohesion. The report also concluded that gender integration did not have an effect on team morale unless it was accompanied by hazing or sexual assault (Feitz & Nagel, 2008).

Social Concerns Surrounding Integration

Besides concerns about performance, researchers have studied the possible social and health concerns that could result from gender integration in CI/HUMINT units (Feitz & Nagel, 2008; Hoglund & Schwartz, 2014; Manski et al., 2014).

Personal health issues. Researchers have raised concern about the personal health of women in gender-mixed units (Hoglund & Schwartz, 2014). The most common concerns have touched on mental health (Hoglund & Schwartz, 2014) and reproductive health (Manski et al., 2014). Since HUMINT operatives accompany deployed soldiers to the war zone, female HUMINT operatives encounter the same social challenges in the battlefield as their counterparts in combat.

Manski and his colleagues (2014) conducted interviews with 22 women serving in the military to obtain insight about their reproductive health experiences during deployment. Participants identified multiple barriers to receiving proper care in the war zone, including a general stigma associated with seeking out care facilities, a lack of female care providers, and confidentiality concerns (Manski et al., 2014). Most of the women interviewed revealed that they avoided seeking healthcare for fear of being stereotyped as weak or shirking responsibility (Manski et al., 2014). A fundamental concern with this particular study is the small sample size, which impedes the generalizability of findings.

Hoglund and Schwartz (2014) integrated data from a variety of sources to determine how the mental health of veterans differed from that of the general population. They found that female deployed veterans ran higher risks of adverse mental health, suggesting a strong association between degraded mental health and working in the war zone, particularly in the case of women (Hoglund & Schwartz, 2014). These studies provide sufficient illustration that the personal health of women could pose serious challenges for stakeholders as female HUMINT operatives continue to integrate into the war zone.

Personal privacy issues. Koeszegi and his colleagues (2014) conducted a survey to determine how masculine norms and workplace aggression could affect the private security of women serving in spheres traditionally dominated by men. The researchers administered the Leymann Inventory of Psychological Terror (LIPT) to 443 soldiers in the Austrian Armed Forces and established that 6.5% of female soldiers had been victims of some form of long-term, severe hazing (Koeszegi et al., 2014). The results showed that most hazing occurred in combat units and training centers, and that one in every two soldiers had witnessed an aggressive act committed by a male colleague against a female (Koeszegi et al., 2014).

Sexual assault is another key concern. Rosen (2014) indicates that 22% of female service members experienced some form of sexual harassment in 2014, compared to 7% of men. Moreover, 26% of those who reported these incidents suffered professional retaliation and were ostracized by their fellow servicemen (Rosen, 2014). The Pentagon acknowledges that sexual assaults overall have decreased — the Army recorded a 1.8% decline in the rates of unwanted sexual contact, from 6.1% in 2012 to 4.3% in 2014 (U.S. Army, 2014). Despite the drop, the figures remain relatively high, requiring policymakers' attention as gender integration in the military and its service areas progresses (Rosen, 2014).

Researchers contend that the high rate of hazing within combat units cannot be attributed to the mere presence of women in such units, but rather to poor leadership — women are more vulnerable to hazing in male-dominated platforms when their unit lacks effective leadership (Koeszegi et al., 2014). According to Koeszegi et al. (2014), hazing incidents would be minimized if unit leaders in mixed-gender teams build cohesion and encourage peaceful coexistence.

Conclusion and Implications for Future Research

Women are already serving in CI/HUMINT roles in the U.S. Armed Forces. However, very few studies have sought to examine the role of women in HUMINT, or how female inclusion would affect HUMINT gathering in the war against terrorism. Moreover, studies seeking to develop strategies for realizing the full potential of female HUMINT operatives are rare.

This study complements existing literature by demonstrating how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates the process of gathering intelligence from human subjects in the war against terrorism, and by identifying best practices for realizing the full potential of female operatives. What is apparent from the results is that female HUMINT operatives would facilitate the gathering of intelligence from both local women and the general population. Their mothering nature tends to produce a reassuring effect that makes it possible for local populations — particularly women — to trust the military and be at peace sharing information with its officers. Moreover, women are able to disguise effectively, thereby interacting with and obtaining sensitive information from high-ranking officials and the general population. The autobiographies of spies such as Margaretha Zelle and Virginia Hall provide proof that locals are often more comfortable sharing information with female specialists than male ones, because the former are perceived as meek and less likely to conspire.

Male soldiers may not be effective HUMINT gatherers for two principal reasons. First, the presence of males intimidates local populations, creating tension that makes the sharing of information difficult. Second, men are more inclined to use physical tactics to obtain information, which can lead locals to view them as adversaries and makes it difficult for locals to believe that the mission is geared at protecting their well-being.

Critics of integration argue that there is no proof that women carry their mothering and nurturing qualities beyond their familial associations. One is nonetheless poised to accept the argument that women are naturally more nurturing than men based on ideas presented in Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory and Skinner's reinforcement theory (Sanderson, 2009). Both theories suggest that humans will often seek to maintain consistency in their attitudes and norms; thus, women, having learned the nurturing role from their place in the home, may act in consistency with that role even when away from the home. In this regard, one can conclude that the nurturing nature of women would indeed facilitate the collection of CI/HUMINT from local populations in the war against terrorism, helping to realize mission success.

In order for this and other benefits of integration to be realized in full, however, the concerns raised by critics will first require assessment. Integration needs to be accompanied by proper planning processes to avoid impacting negatively on overall effectiveness. The core issues raised have to do with cohesion, the personal health of deployed females, and their personal safety and privacy. Studies show that integration would not affect unit cohesion if effective leadership and appropriate training accompany it, and that women are just as physically capable as their male counterparts if they receive the right competency training and guidance.

In order to realize maximum benefits, stakeholders will need to ensure that the institution is safe for women to execute their duties and that women are accorded opportunities because they have displayed competence — not merely so that the institution appears fair. The mental and reproductive health issues raised by critics must be addressed to increase the effectiveness of female specialists.

Implications for Future Research

A large number of issues in this area of study remain unsolved. Researchers continue to focus on the question of whether or not integration is a wise idea, leaving knowledge gaps in regard to the best and most appropriate strategies for implementation. Future research needs to focus on this aspect as well as on the effects of integration on combat power. The impact of integration on unit cohesion requires study on a larger scale to ensure that unforeseen issues regarding effectiveness and cohesion do not arise in the long-term. Psychological differences between women and men in HUMINT roles also require additional research so that effective measures for ensuring the safety of each can be devised.

In conclusion, the researcher believes that the findings of this study will be crucial in helping CI/HUMINT unit leaders bring about the required leadership needed to effect change in their units. Maintaining an open mind is crucial for the success of the integration process. Women should be accorded the best chances of success in HUMINT; they should be selected appropriately based on qualifications and should not be accorded any preferential treatment.