Women in CI/HUMINT: Benefits and Strategies for Integration

Introduction and Background

The success of any counterinsurgency operation depends partly on the effectiveness of the intelligence function driving the operation (Goh, Hao & Tay, 2008). Intelligence is foreknowledge that assists military forces in organizing themselves for optimal employment (Goh et al., 2008). Having accurate intelligence information increases the chances of combat success at all levels of operations — the strategic level, the tactical level, and the operational level. On the tactical front, intelligence can provide forces with crucial insight on the performance envelopes of missiles, aiding them in planning how to refine fighter tactics to outmaneuver threats (Goh et al., 2008). At the operational level, intelligence could help forces understand and engage enemy command elements or other operationally significant targets, thereby incapacitating rebel forces (Goh et al., 2008). Moreover, intelligence could assist forces in making strategic deployment decisions such as how to strike the enemy's center of gravity, weakening their will to fight back (Goh et al., 2008). Essentially, intelligence is integral to mission success, influencing forces' activities from operational planning and daily training to force restructuring (Goh et al., 2008).

As the field of warfare has evolved, the human intelligence collection function has grown increasingly crucial for effective humanitarian assistance efforts and stable combat operations. This has proved more theoretical than practical in the context of the U.S. military — assignments have taken longer than usual, and the CI/HUMINT intelligence function has fallen far from perfect. This was clearly manifested during the Iraq War, when the intelligence community found itself relying on old and outdated information, arriving at conclusions that were largely inaccurate and misleading (Walter, 2005; Kerr, Wolfe, Donegan & Pappas, 2008). Moreover, despite gathering accurate information on a range of issues — including how Iraqi forces would fight, how the war would develop over time, how tribal and ethnic factions in Iraq would react, how the war would impact oil markets, and how Iraq was linked to Al-Qaeda — the intelligence community lacked the means to explain how these issues were interconnected (Kerr et al., 2008). By the time of deployment, there was no comprehensive understanding of the Iraqi target among camp members (Kerr et al., 2008).

An even greater problem was that once the war had begun, with a male-saturated force, it was difficult to obtain more accurate intelligence owing to cultural provisions that bar Islamic women from interacting physically with men unrelated to them (Kerr et al., 2008). This left the female population an underdeveloped and underutilized source of human intelligence (Kerr et al., 2008).

The Iraqi situation was not the first of its kind. In the 1990s, the intelligence community faced a number of significant tests, including emerging threats from Iran and North Korea, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the First Gulf War, yet its collection and analysis performance remained far from perfect (Kerr et al., 2008). These instances underscore the urgent need to streamline the military's intelligence function both before and during war, in order to mount effective combat operations and avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the taxpayer.

Very few studies have sought to examine the role played by female operatives in the collection of intelligence, particularly human intelligence. This is perhaps why women remain largely underrepresented in this area, years after the Armed Forces began opening opportunities for them in the CI/HUMINT community. This thesis examines how the integration of women into the CI/HUMINT community facilitates intelligence gathering from human subjects, and what steps are needed to ensure that the maximum benefits of such integration are realized.

Background to the Study

Women have served in the American military for a long time, typically in roles as spies, cooks, and nurses (McSally, 2007). However, their role in frontline combat and in the HUMINT service area has been severely limited (Obradovic, 2014). One primary reason is the perception that women are biologically less capable and too "soft" to handle the challenges of the war environment (Frum, 2013; McSally, 2007; Alderman, 1992). This perception gives rise to the belief that women may not be able to handle the challenges inherent in the field to the same degree as men (Frum, 2013). Other concerns raised against the inclusion of women in war-torn zones relate to unit cohesion and esprit de corps.

The transition of women into professional military roles began in 1948, when President Truman signed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act into law (McSally, 2007). The Act made it mandatory for women to constitute at least 2% of the total force (McSally, 2007). However, it excluded women from combat units — a provision that spurred numerous amendments over subsequent years, the most prominent being the authorization of female soldiers to serve as pilots of combat aircraft (McSally, 2007). The inclusion of women in more professional roles increased rapidly with the elimination of the Women Army Corps in the 1970s and during President Clinton's administration (McSally, 2007).

The passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1992 marked a crucial step in women's participation in the U.S. military (McSally, 2007). The Act repealed rules that previously excluded women from combat operations, opening opportunities for women to occupy a variety of specialties in the force, most of which could essentially be categorized as combat jobs (McSally, 2007). Although women still could not serve in the traditional combat-specific roles of artilleryman, tank operator, or infantryman, they could potentially work in combat aviation roles and a number of other dangerous occupations (McSally, 2007). Two decades after the passage of the Defense Authorization Act, both the Marine Corps and the Army still excluded women from combat roles. History has shown that women engaged in combat successfully in many historic wars — including the Vietnam War, the Korean War, World War II, World War I, and the Civil War — and made immense contributions to the military's aerial operations during the Gulf War (McSally, 2007).

Several years back, the U.S. Armed Forces began allowing women into specific sections of the counterintelligence/human intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). However, women still remain largely underrepresented in these communities.

This thesis aims to show why the integration of women in these communities was a wise decision, and why increasing their participation is advisable. It seeks to determine how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates the process of gathering intelligence from human subjects. The modern-day battlefield requires a stable and robust human intelligence collection function to aid counterinsurgency operations (Kerr et al., 2008). Kerr and colleagues (2008) argue that the presence of female operatives could give CI/HUMINT collection operatives greater access to local populations and make information on insurgency operations more easily obtainable. The study comprises two parts: the first demonstrates how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates intelligence gathering from human subjects; the second identifies specific strategies that could be used to ensure that maximum benefits of integration are realized.

The research questions guiding the study are:

RQ1: How does the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitate the process of gathering intelligence from human subjects?
RQ1A: Are there biological qualities that make women more effective CI/HUMINT gatherers than men?
RQ1B: What qualities make it a challenge for male operatives to collect CI/HUMINT from local populations in contested zones?
RQ2: What strategies could be used to ensure that maximum benefits of integration are realized?
RQ2A: What issues do researchers raise about integration?
RQ2B: What are the required steps to address the identified issues and ensure the full benefits of integration?

Rationale of Study

The current study rests on the premise that having female operatives in the HUMINT service area places the discipline in a better position to obtain human intelligence, particularly from the female faction of the population. Most previous studies in this area focused on the harms or benefits accruing from the integration of women in ground combat roles. Knowledge gaps remain regarding how integration has affected support service roles such as CI/HUMINT collection.

Larger knowledge gaps exist in relation to the proper integration strategy needed to realize the full benefits of integration in different contexts. The few studies that have addressed this area have focused on the European context, leaving much to be desired in the American context. The most probable reason why the American context has remained largely understudied is that women are still largely underrepresented in HUMINT roles in the U.S. military, making America a less viable area of study.

This study complements existing research and provides crucial insight on how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates intelligence gathering from human subjects. Its findings will go a long way toward streamlining the intelligence function in the military, thereby minimizing the risk of mission failure such as occurred in Iraq. The study is particularly relevant to the ongoing global war on terrorism. Research has shown that having a male-saturated force was one of the core reasons for the failed mission in Iraq, as it made it almost impossible for operatives to collect human intelligence on insurgents' operations from the female population (Kerr et al., 2008).

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of the current study is to demonstrate how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates intelligence gathering from human subjects, and why there is a need to increase female operatives' participation in the same. Studies have shown that inaccuracies and flaws in intelligence collection and analysis are to blame for combat missions failing to meet expectations or taking longer than anticipated (Reese, 2008; Kerr et al., 2008).

The primary motivation behind the research is to provide insight on how women were used to gather human intelligence historically, and the potential benefits that the CI/HUMINT function of the military could reap from increasing the participation of women in its environment. Data was collected through qualitative techniques, particularly document review. Autobiographies of famous female agents who worked as spies during World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the Iraq War — as presented in military resources and peer-reviewed journals — were reviewed to identify the specific qualities that made women effective at gathering human intelligence without arousing suspicion.

Assumptions

Throughout this thesis, the terms military effectiveness and combat effectiveness are used interchangeably and taken to mean the same thing. The study makes use of examples from the Iraq War as these are more easily obtainable than those from other conflicts. The researcher assumes that the phenomena described may vary across different nations, but those variations may not be significant enough to affect the findings of the thesis. The study also assumes that HUMINT is collected by operatives accompanying deployed soldiers in war-torn environments overseas, meaning that HUMINT operatives encounter the same challenges and social issues as their counterparts serving in combat roles.

Limitations

A number of limitations affect the validity of the study findings. First, the study makes use of a significant number of military sources and monographs. These resources could carry high risks of bias, given that a majority of military personnel have opposed the idea of integration from the outset. Secondly, owing to the structural differences that exist between countries and societies, the use of Iraq as a blanket example limits the generalizability of findings. Thirdly, since the study is qualitative in nature, its findings are not supported by empirical evidence, making it less likely to be taken seriously by policymakers and other academic researchers.

Literature Review: Nature of War and Public Perceptions

A large body of literature exists about the inclusion and participation of women in the U.S. military, with most of the focus on women in combat and combat-related jobs. As the debate about the future of women in combat continues to evolve, researchers are increasingly studying women's abilities to handle the physical difficulties and emotional challenges of the battlefield. Today, women remain severely underrepresented in combat roles (McSally, 2007). Opinions differ widely: one faction believes that women may not perform effectively in frontline combat roles because of their nurturing and caring nature, while others believe that female soldiers undergo the same training as their male counterparts and are equally prepared for the challenges of the battlefield. The bulk of existing literature has focused on this aspect, creating knowledge gaps in relation to how integration affects other areas of military operations such as HUMINT collection.

The Nature of War

Many commentators have addressed whether women ought to accompany their male counterparts to war as frontline soldiers; however, very few have commented on the general nature and context of war and how it affects the integration debate. Alderman (1992) points out that understanding the nature of war is crucial to developing an effective answer to the question of whether women ought to be allowed into the field of war. He argues that the process of war can be broken down into three dimensions: the physical domain, the cybernetic domain, and the moral domain.

According to Dr. James Schneider, former Military Science professor at the U.S. Army's School of Military Studies, the physical domain encompasses the material forces present during war, including logistical, geographic, and technological factors that shape the way war is fought (Alderman, 1992). The cybernetic domain covers the communication, control, command, and organizational systems within a unit during war (Alderman, 1992). The moral dimension integrates the social, psychological, and physiological factors that affect both units and individuals — including morale, group bonding, discipline, commitment, attitude, values, fear, courage, leadership, and motivation (Alderman, 1992).

Combat provides the arena for these three domains to interact. Its aim is to defeat and completely destroy the enemy (Alderman, 1992). The combat process occurs along a continuum, beginning in the physical domain with the destruction of materials and communication systems, leading to casualties (Alderman, 1992). Physical destruction of cybernetic elements causes disorganization, which opens opportunities for moral destruction (Alderman, 1992). Moral destruction, coupled with physical destruction, creates uncertainty and fear, attacking individual soldiers' wills and destroying the bonds between them and other members of their crew (Alderman, 1992). These broken bonds ultimately cause the force to disintegrate, unless the individual members have the will, strength, and cohesion to resist (Alderman, 1992). This analysis frames the overriding question: whether women have the strength and capacity to navigate the complex nature of combat, and whether their integration affects the military's ability to do so.

Public Perceptions about the Integration of Women in Ground Combat Roles

Researchers are increasingly seeking to study how American society perceives women's roles in the military. Brown (2012) demonstrated that the way society perceives the role of women is a crucial determinant of how they will be treated in military service, particularly when serving in ground combat roles. Stachowitsch (2013) examined a range of relevant newspaper articles in the Washington Post and the New York Times written between 1990 and 2010, categorizing the opinions presented into four distinct eras: 1990–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2005, and 2005–2010. The study established that positive statements about integration among the general public exceeded negative ones by almost 69% (Stachowitsch, 2013). Negative references only outweighed positive ones in the period between 1995 and 1999, perhaps because the concepts of integration and women in service were still relatively new (Stachowitsch, 2013).

Support for these findings comes from Young and Nauta (2013), who examined the attitudes of military-affiliated college students (those currently in Reserve Officers' Training Corps, ROTC) toward women in combat, and how those attitudes differed from those held by civilian college students. The study established that military-affiliated students held more negative attitudes toward women in combat than their civilian counterparts, suggesting that while the general public finds little fault with gender integration, the military community remains overtly opposed to the idea.

Per Koeszegi and colleagues (2014), this explains the high incidences of bullying and workplace harassment against women in military camps, particularly in combat units. Moreover, as Segal and colleagues (1998) point out, it also explains the low enlistment rates of female soldiers. In their study seeking to determine the propensity by gender to enlist in combat roles, Segal and colleagues (1998) found that only 8.1% of women interviewed would like to work in the military. Most women unwilling to work in combat roles cited limited opportunities, parental concerns, and the masculine norms of the military as reasons for their negative attitudes toward the institution.

Operational and Social Concerns Surrounding Integration

Opening up opportunities for women in CI/HUMINT collection roles means opening up opportunities for them in frontline combat, since only then will they be able to interact with and collect information from locals (Kerr et al., 2008). Researchers have offered conflicting views on whether this ought to happen (Alderman, 1992; Frum, 2013; Kerr et al., 2008; Thompson, 2002), focusing on two aspects: the effect of such inclusion on unit cohesion, and the effect on mission effectiveness.

Effect on Unit Cohesion

Unit cohesion, from a military perspective, refers to the bonding together of members of a unit in such a way as to sustain their commitment to mission accomplishment, to the unit, and to each other (MacCoun & Hix, 2000). It comprises two aspects: task cohesion and social cohesion (MacCoun & Hix, 2000). Task cohesion is the bonding together of members to achieve a goal requiring the collective effort of all (MacCoun & Hix, 2000). Social cohesion refers to "the extent to which group members like each other, prefer to spend their social time together … and feel emotionally close to one another" (MacCoun & Hix, 2000). Multiple studies show a strong, positive correlation between unit cohesiveness and performance (MacCoun & Hix, 1993; Beal et al., 2003; Oliver et al., 1999).

One faction believes that the integration of women in ground combat roles would harm unit cohesion; the other believes that such inclusion would have no effect as long as appropriate training is provided. Frum (2013), in his article "The Truth about Women in Combat," opines that integrating women into ground combat roles would encourage sexual relationships, thereby ruining unit cohesion and combat readiness. Eden (2013) supports this view, pointing to the Navy's experience when female soldiers were allowed on ships — jealousy fomented, perceptions of favoritism emerged, relationships soured, sexual assaults became prominent, and unit cohesion suffered (Eden, 2013).

Frum (2013) further argues that sexual tensions are not the only issue — there is also the question of the place of the woman in command. As female officers ascend to higher leadership levels, it is possible that men may not readily accept female leadership, owing to the perception that women lack the physical strength to drive combat operations (Frum, 2013). Male soldiers could develop the notion that women are accorded leadership positions on a silver platter in the name of achieving fairness, which could damage both task and social cohesion (Frum, 2013).

Major M. I. Alderman (1992), in his monograph "Women in Direct Combat: What is the Price for Equality?", examines three aspects of unit cohesion: primary group bonding, system bonding, and organizational bonding. He posits that the disintegration of any of these three elements would result in a degradation of unit cohesion and consequently reduced combat effectiveness (Alderman, 1992). He argues that women are physically and psychologically different from men — lacking sufficient upper body strength for heavy weapons or sufficient ammunition — and this impedes on system bonding (Alderman, 1992). Moreover, male soldiers could feel that women are being favored by being given positions in combat despite being physically and emotionally weaker, leading to resentment that could damage primary group bonding (Alderman, 1992). One major limitation of Alderman's study, however, is that it fails to recognize the fact that some men may not reach the physical standards required for combat, yet some women could.

Proponents of integration have strongly disputed these arguments. Goldstein (2001) conducted a study to determine whether there were differences in cohesion levels between male-only combat teams and mixed-gender groups, concluding that bonding and cohesion were not adversely affected in mixed groups, and that male and female soldiers can work effectively together, especially when the latter are not a novelty in the group (Goldstein, 2001). Harrell and Miller (1997) replicated these findings, concluding that gender differences alone had no significant effect on unit cohesion, and that integration would have no significant effect on morale, readiness, and overall cohesion as long as the unit had the right leadership and members remained committed to the task at hand.

Egnell (2014) supports this view, expressing that although sexual relations are inevitable whenever men and women are kept in close contact for prolonged periods, effective unit leadership could go a long way toward ensuring that group cohesion is not undermined as a result. In his view, unit cohesion is a function of leadership more than of team composition (Egnell, 2014).

Alderman (1992) provides two historical illustrations that demonstrate the contribution of leadership to unit cohesion: the U.S. 106th Infantry Division during the Battle of the Bulge and the German SS Totenkopf Division (SSTK) during the Battle of Lushno. In 1941, the SSTK was forced to withstand the full force of three powerful Soviet divisions despite being ill-equipped and ill-prepared (Alderman, 1992). Though its subordinate battalions suffered widespread casualties, leaving only 150 men to defend the Village of Lushno, those 150 men reorganized, re-strategized, and ultimately regained lost ground and defeated the Soviet force (Alderman, 1992). The high cohesion produced anti-tank crews that continued to fire even when overwhelmed, and battalions that continued to counterattack successfully even after taking 80% casualties (Alderman, 1992). In stark contrast, when three German divisions attacked the U.S. 106th Infantry Division (the Golden Lions) in Ardennes in 1944, the Golden Lions shattered — units fled before even seeing the enemy, drivers abandoned artillery pieces, and there were massive avoidable casualties (Alderman, 1992). The primary cause of the defeat was insufficient unit cohesion (Alderman, 1992). These two illustrations perfectly support the view that unit cohesion is a function of leadership more than of team composition (Egnell, 2014).

Bartone and colleagues (2002) expressed that besides leadership, training and competence were also key to ensuring unit cohesion in gender-mixed teams. They found that previous familiarity between team members and shared experience of stressful exercises had a strong effect on group cohesion, and concluded that a leader could increase overall cohesion by providing opportunities for shared experiences and offering mixed-gender training (Bartone et al., 2002).

Rosen and colleagues (2003) argue that the integration of women in ground combat roles could actually help build unit cohesion by breaking down the culture of hyper-masculinity (HM) that develops in all-male units — manifested in stereotypic and exaggerated masculine actions and attributes that can be detrimental to team unity (Rosen et al., 2003). Their study found that male-only units had higher levels of HM than gender-mixed teams, and concluded that in gender-mixed teams, the culture of HM is replaced by "ungendered professionalism," the bond that holds team members together (Rosen et al., 2003).

Feitz and Nagel (2008) found that gender integration as an independent variable had a very negligible effect on morale, cohesion, and readiness, supporting Egnell's (2014) findings that cohesion and morale are functions of training and leadership more than of unit composition. The results showed that the effects of gender integration were almost invisible in units with high task cohesion, and gender integration did not affect team morale unless it was accompanied by bullying or sexual assault (Feitz & Nagel, 2008).

Brower (1996) supports this view, arguing in the Armed Forces Journal that a woman can be as tough as any man in combat as long as she is properly trained. He cites a 1995 UK Ministry of Defense study, which concluded that "women can be built up to the same levels of fitness as men of the same size and build" (Brower, 1996, p. 13), and a 1995 U.S. military training study in which civilian women demonstrated dramatic improvement in physical ability, leading researchers to conclude that women were just as physically capable as their male counterparts given the right training and guidance (Brower, 1996).

Francine D'Amico (1996), in her essay "Women at Arms: The Combat Controversy," argues that excluding women from combat roles is irrelevant since women are already proven combatants. She notes that in the modern-day battlefield, the line between combat and combat-related jobs has become increasingly blurred as weapon ranges and troop mobility have increased substantially (D'Amico, 1996). She systematically counters physiological, psychological, military-strategic, and socio-political objections to integration, noting that some women meet the physical standards required of combat roles while some men do not, and arguing that "the problem is not with women in combat, but with men's attitudes towards women in combat" (D'Amico, 1996, p. 11).

Effect on Combat Effectiveness

Combat effectiveness can be defined as the ability of a military force to realize its intended objective (Harrell & Miller, 1997). Frum (2013) believes that male soldiers will most likely resist taking orders from a female leader, particularly because military leadership calls for an authoritarian style, while female leaders tend to be accepted more readily when they exhibit maternal, nurturing, and warm leadership approaches. When such negative perceptions dictate the behavior of subordinates, they could lead to decreased commitment and consequently, combat ineffectiveness (Frum, 2013).

A second concern surrounding integration is that it could jeopardize male soldiers' abilities to "put the mission before the man" (Christopher, n.d.). Sayle (2014) wonders whether it would be possible for a male soldier who sees a female colleague wounded to maintain mission focus, or whether he would instinctively break off to offer protection. It is in men's nature to be protective of women, and it may be unreasonable to assume that a male soldier would be able to suppress that instinct in such circumstances (Christopher, n.d.).

Another concern raised by critics touches on how women will be distributed across the unit, and how they will be accorded leadership positions without male soldiers — who have served in combat roles longer — developing wrong perceptions (Burton, 1998). Burton (1998) argues that commanders are faced with two options: to concentrate women in one subunit or to distribute them across the division as a whole. Concentrating women in one subunit would afford them valuable opportunities to support each other but would perpetuate the problem of inequity and perceived differences (Burton, 1998). Distributing women across the unit would present them with the best possible opportunities for equity and fairness and allow them to learn from more experienced counterparts, but could cause feelings of isolation (Burton, 1998).

Researchers also argue that women's mothering instincts could impede on combat effectiveness (Christopher, n.d.; Frum, 2013). It is believed that women's nurturing characteristic would interfere with their ability to place the mission before the men and to make tough life-and-death decisions in the battlefield (Christopher, n.d.). This argument has, however, come under serious criticism. Christopher (n.d.) points out that no scientific evidence has been produced to prove that women are inherently nurturing even beyond their familial associations. Moreover, Sayle (2014) notes real-life cases demonstrating that women are just as capable as their male counterparts of killing the enemy in combat — for example, Lyudmila Pavlichenko, the female Soviet sniper during World War II who killed 309 people, 36 of whom were German snipers (Sayle, 2014).

A further argument against integration is that women lack the physical strength to effectively execute the demands of the battlefield (Sayle, 2014; Frum, 2013). A 2012 study by the U.S. Army found that women sustained stress fractures at a rate four times higher than that of their male counterparts (Sayle, 2014). Thompson (2013) found that women were hospitalized at a rate 30% higher than that of males, even after delivery hospitalizations and pregnancies were removed from the equation. This raises the additional concern that women are costlier to maintain in the field of war (Thompson, 2013).

Other researchers, however, strongly counter the ideology that the integration of women in combat roles would adversely affect combat effectiveness. Harries-Jenkins (2002) found no direct evidence to prove such a negative impact, noting that women served in combat roles during the Persian Gulf War and in the Iraq War — they were taken prisoner, wounded, and killed, just like their male counterparts — and that there is no indication that their participation affected the military's overall level of effectiveness. In his view, women actually produced a calming influence in camps and among locals in times of high tension (Harries-Jenkins, 2002).

Social Concerns Surrounding Integration

A large number of researchers have also studied the possible social and health concerns that could result from integration (Feitz & Nagel, 2008; Hoglund & Schwartz, 2014; Manski et al., 2014).

Personal health issues. Researchers have raised concern about the personal health of women in military units (Hoglund & Schwartz, 2014), most commonly touching on mental health and reproductive health (Manski et al., 2014). Manski and colleagues (2014) conducted interviews with 22 women serving in the military and found that participants identified multiple barriers to receiving proper care in the battlefield, including a general stigma associated with seeking out care facilities, a lack of female care providers, and confidentiality concerns. Most women interviewed revealed that they avoided seeking healthcare for fear of being stereotyped as weak, not giving the mission priority, or shirking responsibility. Pregnancy was named a fundamental reproductive health concern — once a service member fell pregnant, she was sent home, leaving a void that the remaining unit members had to fill (Manski et al., 2014).

Hoglund and Schwartz (2014) found that female deployed veterans ran substantially higher odds of adverse mental health than their male counterparts, suggesting a strong association between poor mental health and serving in combat roles, particularly in the case of women.

Personal privacy issues. Koeszegi and colleagues (2014) conducted a survey of 443 soldiers in the Austrian Armed Forces using the Leymann Inventory of Psychological Terror (LIPT), establishing that 6.5% of female soldiers had been victims of some form of long-term, severe bullying (Koeszegi et al., 2014). The results showed that most bullying occurred in combat units and training centers, and that one in every 10 male soldiers had participated in committing an aggressive act against at least one female counterpart, while one in every two soldiers had witnessed such an act (Koeszegi et al., 2014). The researchers, however, showed that the high rate of bullying within combat units could not be attributed solely to the presence of women, but to poor leadership — women are more vulnerable to bullying in units that lack effective leadership to help curb the vice (Koeszegi et al., 2014).

Benefits of Integration for CI/HUMINT Collection

As mentioned in the preceding sections, the general public appears to support the participation of women in the military and their integration into combat roles (Brown, 2012; Stachowitsch, 2013). A lot of literature has been written on the potential benefits the military stands to derive from integrating men and women in ground combat roles, particularly in the areas of intelligence collection, cultural barriers, emotional support, and unit effectiveness.

Women and HUMINT Collection

Researchers have offered a variety of reasons why women are likely to perform better than men in CI/HUMINT collection, most of them centered on the biological differences between men and women (Burleson, 1996; Moghaddam, 2014; Root, 2011). Root (2011) points out that women are more effective than men at interacting with and obtaining crucial intelligence on insurgents' operations from local populations. Moghaddam (2014) notes that this became evident during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, when the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) implemented initiatives such as the Women's Engagement Program (WEP), popularly known as the Lioness Program, to address the divide between the U.S. military and the local Iraqi population. The mere presence of female soldiers on the ground created an immediate calming and reassuring atmosphere, and Iraqi women were more at peace discussing crucial subjects about counterinsurgency operations with female marines than with their male counterparts (Moghaddam, 2014).

The role of women in society has traditionally been in the home — nurturing children and playing a supportive role to their husbands (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009). Researchers contend that women are therefore naturally more nurturing than men (Christopher, n.d.), and Burleson (1996) showed that this nurturing nature gives women the ability to empathize with, connect with, and understand others better than men. This breeds the development of trust and a relational bond that allows for the effective sharing and discussion of information, particularly with other women (Burleson, 1996).

Kerr and colleagues (2008) demonstrated in their analysis that cultural issues made the collection of HUMINT by male soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan difficult because the very presence of a male soldier was intimidating to Iraqi women. Moreover, the Iraqi culture forbids women from being searched or handled by male service members, and the handling of Iraqi women by male service officers was widely interpreted as a sign of disrespect to Iraqi cultural norms and values (Kerr et al., 2008). The introduction of female marines through the Women's Engagement Program (WEP) provided a calming effect and reassured Iraqi women that the course was geared at protecting their welfare (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009).

Those opposed to the idea of integration have critiqued the applicability of this argument, contending that there is no scientific evidence to prove that women are nurturing even in associations beyond their familial links (Christopher, n.d.). Christopher (n.d.) argues that women may behave the way they do because they are required by the conventions of their traditional cultures to behave in a certain way — making their reason for behaving so social rather than natural.

McSally (2007) and Root (2010) contend that the modern-day battlefield is of a push-button era, where physical strength is not as important as "street smarts." Traditionally, HUMINT was collected mainly through spies or through physically abusive and manipulative techniques (Root, 2010). With evolving battlefield dynamics and human rights activism, however, such tactics are falling out of play and are being replaced by "street smart" techniques — the ability to assess the vulnerability of a target and devise peaceful yet clever ways to obtain information from it (Root, 2010). Throughout history, women have lived as the physically weaker sex and have compensated for their physical inabilities by developing these smart techniques (Root, 2010).

Root (2010) presents the autobiographies of various women who worked as HUMINT gatherers in different wars to reveal some of the techniques women used to obtain information from human subjects. Margaretha Zelle, a French spy in Belgium, used her exotic dancing routines to build connections with the Belgian authorities and obtain crucial intelligence from key figures (Root, 2010). Anna Chapman, a Russian spy in the United States, used her charm to win the hearts of top officials, obtain sensitive HUMINT, and relay it to the Kremlin (Root, 2010). Virginia Hall, popularly known as "the limping lady," having lost her lower leg in a hunting incident, relied on a wooden prosthetic leg to disguise herself as an elderly goat-herder while gaining sensitive information for the French in Nazi Germany (Root, 2010). Women are able to effectively employ such "smart" techniques because of the widespread perception that they are meek, sincere, and less inclined to conspire (Root, 2010).

Breaking Down Cultural Barriers to Combat Effectiveness

Kerr and colleagues (2008) contend that culture was a significant barrier to combat effectiveness and mission success during the Iraq War. Research has shown women, regardless of ethnic background or race, to have a higher ability than their male counterparts to comfort and understand each other in times of chaos and crisis (Kerr et al., 2008). In the Iraqi context, the very presence of male American soldiers intimidated Iraqi women, impeding on their ability to associate effectively with the U.S. military or believe that American soldiers were out to protect their well-being (Cruz, 2005). The introduction of female marines through the Women's Engagement Program provided a calming effect and reassured Iraqi women that the course was geared at protecting their welfare, so that they did not have to feel intimidated whenever they encountered routine military operations in their neighborhoods (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009).

A Source of Emotional Support to Other Crew Members

Besides providing support to local populations during combat operations, women have also been shown to be a source of emotional and psychological support for their male crew members (Holmstedt, 2008). In her book Band of Sisters: American Women at War in Iraq, Holmstedt (2008) mentions that most infantrymen during the Iraq War preferred to confide in women about issues in their personal lives rather than in their male counterparts. Regardless of the theory used to explain such associations, there is no doubt that having female soldiers in the battlefield would provide a de-facto support system for male soldiers, allowing them to cope more effectively with the tensions and pressures of war (Holmstedt, 2008).

Improved Social and Unit Cohesion

Rosen and colleagues (2003) conducted a study demonstrating that integration could actually help to build unit cohesion by breaking down the culture of hyper-masculinity in all-male units. Their study found that male-only units consistently had higher levels of HM than gender-mixed teams, and that in gender-mixed teams the culture of HM is replaced with that of "ungendered professionalism" — the bond that holds team members together (Rosen et al., 2003). From this perspective, integration could help break the masculine norms of the military and thereby increase overall cohesion among members of a unit or division.

Conclusion

Leadership training is deemed to go a long way toward addressing the issues raised by critics and making HUMINT units on the ground safe for both male and female operatives so that the maximum benefits of integration are realized. The researcher strongly believes that the findings of this study will be crucial in helping commanders bring about the required leadership needed to effect change in their units. Maintaining an open mind is crucial for the success of the integration process. Women should be accorded the best chances of success in HUMINT — they should be selected appropriately, based on qualifications, and should not be accorded any preferential treatment, first because that would create animosity between them and their male colleagues, and second because they do not need to be favored as they have already proven their abilities in the past.

For further reading on the evolving role of women in the United States military and ongoing policy debates surrounding gender integration in combat and intelligence roles, the Wikipedia article on Women in the United States Military and the Britannica overview of counterintelligence provide accessible foundational context.

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