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Dereliction of Duty by H.R. McMaster
Brigadier General H.R. McMaster's 1998 book "Dereliction of Duty" addresses a series of inconsistencies concerning the Vietnam War and the Johnson Administration's indifference regarding the most probable outcome that the conflict would have. McMaster harshly criticizes Robert McNamara as a result of his role in the war and because he is primarily responsible for having brought the U.S. In this particular clash. The book describes the Vietnam War and the events preceding it, most probably with the purpose of presenting readers with the set of events that paved the road to the conflict. In addition to expressing his perspective about McNamara's influence in the war, McMaster also focuses on the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations and on their involvement in the war.
Judging from historical facts and from their tendency to put across their regret as regards their failure to prevent the Vietnam War from turning into an unwinnable conflict, it is only natural for McNamara and Johnson to be considered largely responsible for the men and resources that the U.S. has lost as a result of its participation in the war. McMaster emphasizes the fact that the technical experts in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations can be categorized as conceited individuals who believed that they were able to conduct...
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were thus limited in their control over the conflict and were only allowed to intervene in minor situations - when their interference would not have a decisive effect on the war.
McNamara and Johnson appeared to be more interested in political affairs than they were in the Vietnam War. Johnson constantly related to how he wanted the war to be short-lasting and to how he was unwilling to support an unjust conflict. His behavior was defined by his determination to be seen as one of the most significant politicians in the U.S. And by his interest in having the American public know as little as possible in regard to the war. McMaster coolly deals with historical data, as he apparently wants his readers to understand more in regard to the Johnson Administration and its relationship with the Secretary of Defense. Johnson's diplomatic abilities and his capacity to influence others in providing him with what he wanted were essential in having his advisors perform incorrect acts.
McMaster's concentration on the Vietnam War does not just deal with the fact that it was badly managed or with how the U.S. military was unsuccessful in completing its mission. The book also deals with how Kennedy and Johnson failed to focus on the core elements of the problem,…
The Vietnam War was basically meant to have the general public consider that the U.S. was willing to fight against authoritarian regimes from all over the world, given that it had apparently been one of the most virtuous democratic forces. However, political leaders were uncertain in regard to the military objectives that American troops should be given or concerning how exactly they would assist the South Vietnamese in having access to a better life. The Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves were unable to act according to their role of providing professional military advice, as they were required to be loyal to the president first. The catastrophic decisions made by the Johnson Administration thus took their toll on the troops in Vietnam, as it came to be the main actor in the conflict.
McNamara was primarily determined to act in disagreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff because he considered that they were unable to respond rapidly to his demands. According to McMaster, McNamara gradually developed a tendency to act on account of the advices he received from presidential advisors and depending on what he thought was best. McNamara came to overestimate the power of U.S. military forces in Vietnam, and, furthermore, considered that military leaders on the front were perfectly able to take important diplomatic decisions. According to McMasters, McNamara failed to realize the fact that the military was but a tool that needed to be directed in accordance to professional military advice.
McMaster, Dereliction of duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the lies that led to Vietnam, (HarperPerennial, 1998).
Vietnam War Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam 1945-1995 In Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam 1945-1995, James S. Olson and Randy Roberts provide a compact history of the war and its resulting aftermath. The authors work to explain one of the most important and difficult issues in war history - the U.S. And its involvement in the Vietnam War. Throughout the years since the war ended, people have said
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