Analyst and Policymakers Relationship

Identify the analysts and the policymakers
It is not possible for one individual to collate and possess all necessary information required to make good decisions regarding national security and foreign policy issues. Indeed, the higher up one goes up the hierarchy of policy making ladder, the more complicated it becomes. Therefore, senior policy officials rely on their juniors and others for information and proper processing of the same[footnoteRef:1]. In effect, in such countries as the US, it means that such senior officials cannot afford to ignore advice from the US intelligence fraternity. [1: Ford, Relations between Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers]
Unlike information, intelligence is a filtered form that is responsive to stated needs and specified policy requirements. The intelligence community members are experts charged with the responsibility to analyze relevant data. Information is converted to intelligence by linking it to specific issues of national security importance; hence infusing it with value. The intelligence bodies serve various clients including the president, the Security Council, law enforcers, officials in government departments, and military commanders[footnoteRef:2]. [2: Davis, Tensions in analyst-policymaker relations]
“Policy makers” is the name given to people who have contested electoral positions and won. They are the ones that set budgets and govern. They also order operations and make important decisions. Policy makers benefit from intelligence service[footnoteRef:3]. While intelligence is a crucial component of the policy making process, its application should be determined by the policy maker. [3: Lowenthal, The policymaker-intelligence relationship]
Why is this relationship so important?
Products of intelligence should be tailored to support better decision making and strategy creation. Hence, a good relationship between intelligence analysts and policy makers cannot be overemphasized. Policy makers must trust the analysts in deciding which information is redundant and which one is helpful in the national security pursuits. Corporation between the two groups is necessary for compliance and understanding. It is the role of analysts to instill trust and confidence in the policy makers while keeping it objective[footnoteRef:4]. It is also important that policy makers and analysts, alike, express their requirements while keeping a keen eye on objectivity. They must not let their personal views interfere with the truth of the intelligence. [4: Gookins, The role of intelligence in policy making, 65-73]
Value is accorded to the information gathered by the intelligence analyst by linking it to national security issues. The products play an important role on the knowledge set needed to fulfill objectives at national level. They range from tactical aspects to strategic realms. Time frames are important factors in the categorization of intelligence. In intelligence circles, tactical data is regarded more urgent and crucial. Long term issues are addressed in strategic intelligence. They incorporate economic and political patterns and factors spreading over time[footnoteRef:5]. [5: LORNE, The Impact of the Information Revolution]
To maintain its relevance to the process of policy making, the intelligence community must generate expert input that the policy makers lack. In such an age of information accessibility by the wider public, analysts must add value to the information they share. Analysts add value by, among other things, establishing the credibility of the sources and giving the context. By doing so, analysts clarify information further[footnoteRef:6]. Apart from knowledge depth infused in conventional matters, an intelligence analyst delves beyond the political and even economic aspects and explores emerging issues that may not be conventional or traditional such as arms proliferation, crime and terrorism. The latter aspects are clear distinguishing points of the intelligence community in their analysis. [6: Ibid]
What are its flaws?
The available literature on intelligence shows that there are at least three key challenges with regard to the analytic purpose of intelligence. One of them has to do with the information age. The information age has broadened the body of information to be analyzed by the intelligence community; hence complicating analysis. The second challenge has to do with mindsets. Biased mindsets interfere with the generation and production of intelligence. The third issue is the mixing of intelligence with politics. The latter scenario can happen from the top down or bottom up. Either way, intelligence is dealt a blow[footnoteRef:7] [7: Supra note 4]
It is common for mistrust to develop among policy makers towards the analyst. Mistrust is especially rife when the analyst does not support the strategy or agenda of the policy maker. Similarly, analysts may encounter difficulties in accepting criticism from the policy makers. As opposed to viewing it as a legitimate concern in their business of intelligence gathering and analysis, they may consider it as mere whining informed by the fact that the analyst does not agree with the agenda of the policy maker. As a matter of fact, the two are fallible groups[footnoteRef:8]. Several factors including professional linguistics may cause tension and friction. It is common for policy makers to quickly claim that estimations, assumptions and evidence inform analysis. [8: Supra note 3]
On the other hand, it is also worrisome when the policy maker and the analyst are too close. Experts warn against such relationship because the chance that the analyst will lose their depth and independence is high. It is observed that as the analyst is made conscious of the customer policy preferences and assumptions, they inadvertently generate analysis that tends to conform to such preferences, hence biases[footnoteRef:9]. [9: Supra note 1]
It is a dilemma of sorts because, again, if the analysts keep away from the policy makers, it would be impossible to receive the necessary guidance and feedback. Analysts must also confine their work to the questions asked by policy makers, lest they become redundant or risk losing relevance. A god number of intelligence products are not regarded as useful by the policy makers. According to the Brown Commission, there is greater danger in non cooperation between the intelligence community and the policy makers than the two groups relating closely and the resultant biasness that might develop in favor of the needs of the policy maker[footnoteRef:10]. [10: Ibid]
Recommendations to improve the relationship overall
Analysts can add value to intelligence work by asking the policy makers to focus on the need for intelligence to answer the right requirements. In other words, analysts need feedback from the policy makers so as to enable them to tweak or change future intelligence for specified consumers in future assignments. The feedback will also facilitate rapid reaction review of the existing intelligence services to respond more accurately to the question asked[footnoteRef:11]. The need for analysts to understand their clients is evident. [11: Supra note 4]
On the other hand, findings elsewhere indicate that some of the burden is shifted to the consumer. The Rumsfeld Commission pointed out that policy makers would gain by asking analysts to explain the intelligence they provide them. In order to develop quality service, analysts must be provided with the whole intelligence question. Breaking intelligence into small bits may carry elements of security but does not help in recreating the full puzzle picture[footnoteRef:12]. There is also a need for policy makers to ask questions about the intelligence provided, so as to help them to understand the analysis, and to get the satisfaction that the answers fulfill the question needs. [12: Ibid]
Distrust between analysts and policy makers is also useful. Adversarial collaboration leads to better intelligence processing. It means that analysts will inspect their product with a keener eye, to avert criticism. If, on the other hand the policy makers realize that their questions are answered adequately by the analyst, they develop more confidence in the intelligence products[footnoteRef:13]. [13: Supra note 1]
Reading intelligence regularly, not just the conclusions, is an imperative responsibility for policy makers[footnoteRef:14]. If a policy maker does not find time to engage in discussions with the intelligence analysts regarding the high points and weaknesses of the various intelligence reports, and the assumptions made, they are ill-prepared for the evaluation of the intelligence they receive. [14: Supra note 4]
Bibliography
Davis, Jack. Tensions in analyst-policymaker relations: Opinions, facts, and evidence. WASHINGTON DC: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 2003.
Ford, Christopher A. Relations between Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers: Lessons of Iraq. Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2009.
Gookins, Amanda J. "The role of intelligence in policy making." SAIS Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1, 2008: 65-73.
LORNE, Teitelbaum. The Impact of the Information Revolution on Policymakers’ Use of Intelligence Analysis. Washington DC: Georgetown University, 2011.
Lowenthal, Mark M. The policymaker-intelligence relationship. 2010.