Intelligence Analyst Policy Maker Relations

Intelligence Analyst - Policy Maker Relations Policymakers & Analysts To paraphrase Sherman Kent, the relationship between analysts and policymakers "does not fall naturally in place, but requires careful thought to set right and constant efforts to keep effective" (Strategic Intelligence for National World Policy, 1949, sited in Davis). It is the nature of that careful thought and constant effort that is the subject of this paper. Policymakers and analysts agree that "the quality and policy utility of analysis" must improve if intelligence is to help policymakers do their jobs[footnoteRef:1].

The desired improvements are unlikely to happen unless analysts can simultaneously achieve two important objectives: protection of the professional tradecraft and closer connections with policy action[footnoteRef:2]. The disconnection between the charge of policymakers and the deliverables of analysts has been an enduring one, and since the 1990s, a number of tactics have been implemented to address this matter.

For example, analysts have experienced rotational assignments that take them into policymaker units, they have been assigned as personal briefing officers, and they have served as liaison officers for executive branch departments. Less formally, analysts have spent more time making connections with policymakers by sitting on interagency groups and by creating opportunities for conversations. Good as these changes are, they are insufficient for addressing the magnitude of need for intelligence by national security policymakers and action-takers, the competition between insight and information providers, and a broadened policy base following 9/11[footnoteRef:3].

Five primary recommendations have since been developed, implemented, or established as standards for the transactions between intelligence analysts and policymakers. These recommendations are as follows: (1) Realistically define the analyst's mission; (2) know well Washington policymaking; (3) trust tradecraft; (4) adopt DI's best practices for crisis management and oral delivery of analysis, and (5) balance estimative and action analysis[footnoteRef:4]. [1: Jack Davis. "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process" (Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers: Volume 1, Number 2, n.d.),] [2: Ibid.] [3: Ibid.] [4: Ibid., p.

7.] An analyst's mission requires truth telling, but when the truth consists of just so many pixels, it is important to emphasize transparency, sound argumentation, ample and authentic evidence, and plausible alternative scenarios[footnoteRef:5]. The domestic and foreign policy arenas must be well-known to analysts as intelligence with high levels of policy utility cannot be crafted in a segregated environment. Bob Gates declarative[footnoteRef:6] bears repeating here: [5: Ibid.] [6: Ibid., p. 7.

As cited in Davis.] Unless intelligence officers are down in the trenches with the policymakers, understand the issues, and know what U.S. objectives are, how the process works, and who the people are, they cannot possibly provide either relevant or timely intelligence that will contribute to better-informed decisions.[footnoteRef:7] [7: Ibid., p. 7, Quotation attributed to Bob Gates. ] Policy utility depends on analysis customization which, though it is disparaging referred to as politicization, is a necessary and professional approach to intelligence.

The goal is to accomplish customization while ensuring that the hallmarks of tradecraft -- "tough-minded weighing of evidence and open-minded consideration of alternatives" -- remain foundational. A crisis management frame is intended to clarify "what kinds of questions policy officials ask and what kinds of answers experienced analysts find appropriate" so that communication is abbreviated and even more effective. The immediacy of oral delivery of analytics is beneficial to policymakers, action-takers, and analysts, as.