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Intelligence Analyst - Policy Maker Relations
Policymakers & Analysts
To paraphrase Sherman Kent, the relationship between analysts and policymakers "does not fall naturally in place, but requires careful thought to set right and constant efforts to keep effective" (Strategic Intelligence for National World Policy, 1949, sited in Davis). It is the nature of that careful thought and constant effort that is the subject of this paper.
Policymakers and analysts agree that "the quality and policy utility of analysis" must improve if intelligence is to help policymakers do their jobs[footnoteRef:1]. The desired improvements are unlikely to happen unless analysts can simultaneously achieve two important objectives: protection of the professional tradecraft and closer connections with policy action[footnoteRef:2]. The disconnection between the charge of policymakers and the deliverables of analysts has been an enduring one, and since the 1990s, a number of tactics have been implemented to address this matter. For example, analysts have experienced rotational assignments that take them into policymaker units, they have been assigned as personal briefing officers, and they have served as liaison officers for executive branch departments....
Less formally, analysts have spent more time making connections with policymakers by sitting on interagency groups and by creating opportunities for conversations. Good as these changes are, they are insufficient for addressing the magnitude of need for intelligence by national security policymakers and action-takers, the competition between insight and information providers, and a broadened policy base following 9/11[footnoteRef:3]. Five primary recommendations have since been developed, implemented, or established as standards for the transactions between intelligence analysts and policymakers. These recommendations are as follows: (1) Realistically define the analyst's mission; (2) know well Washington policymaking; (3) trust tradecraft; (4) adopt DI's best practices for crisis management and oral delivery of analysis, and (5) balance estimative and action analysis[footnoteRef:4]. [1: Jack Davis. "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process" (Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers: Volume 1, Number 2, n.d.),] [2: Ibid.] [3: Ibid.] [4: Ibid., p. 7.]
An analyst's mission requires truth telling, but when the truth consists of just so many pixels, it is important to emphasize…
The necessity to safeguard intelligence information from parochialism and political pressures will be a strong argument in promoting a centralized and strong capability. This is contrary to leaving decisions that affect critical intelligence related concerns solely to the makers of policy. Centralization of policymaking process faces the politicization risk that stems from the department of DCI. It is only the Congress, the President, and Senior National Security Officials who can
[footnoteRef:5] the coordination required to produce a document also is problematic given the hostilities which exist between different agencies. This can result in gridlock or groupthink, depending on the parties involved. [5: Rosenbach, 2009] A more serious allegation is the politicization of the intelligence-gathering process. This was particularly noteworthy during the debriefings after the Iraq War, in which Democrats accused the Bush Administration of deliberately fabricating a threat from Iraq to
Sometimes, it is even necessary to carry out certain clandestine operations like deceptions, clandestine collection of information, covert actions, and also the carrying out of the exercise of distributing disinformation or misleading information, which would mislead the suspected threat. The United States Intelligence Community is, as stated earlier, made up a number of different agencies. The Central Intelligence Agency is one of these. Also known popularly as the CIA, this
Identify the analysts and the policymakers It is not possible for one individual to collate and possess all necessary information required to make good decisions regarding national security and foreign policy issues. Indeed, the higher up one goes up the hierarchy of policy making ladder, the more complicated it becomes. Therefore, senior policy officials rely on their juniors and others for information and proper processing of the same[footnoteRef:1]. In effect, in
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), its creation and the different roles it plays. The duties of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are also highlighted in the paper. The paper also highlights the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 and the amendments that were made after the date of enactment. Lastly, the paper discusses the major components of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the roles played by them
Varnava (2012) commented on the multifaceted intelligence attributes that went into making the construct of British Intelligence gathering in Cyprus, a successful vocation in World War II. This review aims to explore the implications of the role played by local, civil populace in thwarting attempts by military in allowing intelligence inputs through counter-espionage on British and Middle East territories. The review revisits some work on the First World War British