Egypt/U.s. Relationship in a New

¶ … Egypt/U.S. Relationship in a new Arab World

The world has historically had many hotspots. One, for instance, was the area surrounding Austria Hungary, which later morphed into the area surrounding Germany. Countless wars were fought in those regions, with tens of millions dead, and families constantly uprooted and moved to different locations from "homes" that were no longer friendly to them.

One hotspot that has stayed violent for much of recorded history is the middle east. Today, of course, is no exception. That is why it is ever so important to understand the role of every key player in the current crisis. One such key player has been a traditional Arab world leader, Egypt. Beginning with the peace treaty in 1979, let us trace Egypt's foreign relations with the United States and view the manner in which it affected and continues to affect Arab and middle eastern relations.

Egypt/Israeli Peace Treaty, 1979

1979 saw the signing of perhaps the most significant treaty of the modern era. After more than a year of intense negotiations following Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's famed visit to Israel, the Israeli/Egypt peace treaty was signed in Washington. There was a genuine fear that no peace treaty would be signed, and Egypt was under a lot of pressure from other Arab nations not to sign a treaty.

In fact, the Israeli Prime Minister, Begin, refused to budge on the Palestinian state issue, so many experts thought all bets were off on a treaty. However, the United States stepped into pressure Israel into dealing with Egypt in separate accords, noting that aid and other concessions would depend on Israel's cooperation. (www.mideastweb.org)

As a result of this multilateral effort, a treaty was finally signed. The main facets of the treaty were legitimate rights and just claims for the Palestinians, and return of all the Israeli held territories.

The treaty ended 30 years of war and marked an historic event. Public interest was high, as well as the public relations selling job by the United States: The signing was broadcast live on television from the White House lawn. (www.bbc.co.uk) a smiling President Jimmy Carter looked on as Sadat and Begin signed the historic document.

Mr Sadat praised President Carter as "the man who performed the miracle." "Without exaggeration," he said, "what he did constitutes one of the greatest achievements of our time."

Mr Carter, however, was more cautious, saying the treaty was "a first step on a long and difficult road." "We must not minimalise the obstacles that lie ahead," he said. (www.bbc.co.uk)

But all was not perfect. In retrospect, here are the upshots of the peace treaty: The Egypt-Israel peace treaty was a direct result of the Camp David Peace Accords, signed in September of 1978. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin were jointly and ceremoniously awarded the Nobel Peace Prize later that year.

Under the accords, Israel agreed to withdraw its troops from the Sinai Peninsula in return for Egypt's open recognition of the state of Israel. Palestinians were also granted the right to some self-determination of their people.

President Sadat died for his decision to deal with Israel, assassinated in 1981 by extremists in the Egyptian army who were opposed to the treaty.

The last Israeli troops finally left the Sinai Peninsula in 1982. However, not all was rosy here either: Less than two months later Israel invaded Lebanon. There was little further notable progress towards peace in the Middle East until the Oslo Peace Process began in 1993.

Although Palestinians now have some degree of self-determination, the central issues remain as intractable as ever, especially for Egypt. (www.bbc.co.uk) Egypt was expelled from the Arab League for negotiating with Israel, and very few Arab states gave their support to Carter's, Sadat's, and Begin's hard work.

In longer retrospect, the terms of the Egypt/Israeli treaty can be seen to have set an unfortunate precedent. Egypt had been an actual aggressor against Israel four times and had lost four times. Israel was the nation that had been attacked four times and had won four times. But under the peace treaty, Israel returned to the aggressor's role, Egypt, everything the aggressor had lost. This had never been done before in the long and violent history of warfare between nations, and is very bad policy because it makes aggression a "no lose" bet for the aggressor country. The Israel-Egypt agreement set expectations for all the later peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries that have repeatedly tried to destroy it, not to mention the Palestinian Arabs, so they are all looking for the same style of "no lose" treaty, which, of course, is not at all a practical bargaining table issue. (www.palestinefacts.org)

Egypt's Leadership in the Arab League

Egypt has long been a leader in the middle east, especially among Arab states. However, with its dealings with Israel in 1979, their position of leadership was put in serious doubt.

The Arab League was founded in Cairo in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan (Jordan, as of 1950), and Yemen. Countries that later joined are: Algeria (1962), Bahrain (1971), Comoros (1993), Djibouti (1977), Kuwait (1961), Libya (1953), Mauritania (1973), Morocco (1958), Oman (1971), Qatar (1971), Somalia (1974), Southern Yemen (1967), Sudan (1956), Tunisia (1958), and the United Arab Emirates (1971). The Palestine Liberation Organization was admitted in 1976. Egypt's membership was suspended in 1979 after it signed a peace treaty with Israel; the league's headquarters was moved from Cairo, Egypt, to Tunis, Tunisia. In 1987 Arab leaders decided to renew diplomatic ties with Egypt. Egypt was readmitted to the league in 1989 and the league's headquarters was moved back to Cairo. (the Volume Library).

The Arab League is involved in political, economic, cultural, and social programs designed to promote the interests of member Arab states. The Arab League has served as a forum for member states to coordinate their policy positions and deliberate on matters of common concern, settling some Arab disputes and limiting some potentially horrific conflicts such as the Lebanese civil wars of 1958. The Arab League has served as a platform for the drafting and conclusion of almost all landmark documents promoting economic integration among member states, such as the creation of the Joint Arab Economic Action Charter, which set out the principles for economic activities of the Arab League. It has played an important role in shaping school curricula, and preserving manuscripts and Arab cultural heritage.

The Arab League has launched literacy campaigns, and reproduced intellectual works, and translated modern technical terminology for the use of member states. It encourages measures against crime and drug abuse and deals with labor issues (particularly among the emigrant Arab workforce). (Volume Library)

The Arab League has also fostered cultural exchanges between member states, encouraged youth and sports programs, helped to advance the role of women in Arab societies, and promoted child welfare activities. (Volume Library)

The Egyptian government first proposed the Arab League in 1943. Egypt and some of the other Arab states wanted closer cooperation without the loss of self-rule that would result from total union. The original charter of the Arab League created a regional organization of sovereign states that was neither a union nor a federation. Among the goals the league set for itself were winning independence for all Arabs still under alien rule, and to prevent the Jewish minority in Palestine (then governed by the British) from creating a Jewish state. The members eventually formed a joint defense council, an economic council, and a permanent military command. (Volume Library)

Even with Arafat's recent death, all Arab states looked again to Egypt for guidance on how to react. The incidents showed Egypt's continuing power as a force in the Arab world, a force that cannot be put aside even by a temporary eviction from the Arab League: Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak, called Mr. Arafat a "historic leader," while King Fahd of Saudi Arabia said he shared the pain of the Palestinian people. King Abdullah of Jordan called his death a tragedy. (www.smh.com.au)

Egypt Today, in the World, and its relations with America

Today, Egypt is a huge economic force, and its impact on the world is partially through its relations with America.

Traditionally, the foreign policy of the Arab Republic of Egypt has three major facets: Arab, Islamic and African. To these, Presidents Sadat and Mubarak added the strategic alliance with the United States, a the afore-mentioned settlement with Israel and active support for the Middle East peace process. Egyptian diplomacy plays a visible role in all Third World bodies, the United Nations and cooperation with Europe, advancing its own interests along with those of its partners in multilateral foreign relations. (World Book)

Relations with the European Union

Today, Cairo is seeking closer relations with the European Union. It welcomes the EU's contribution to promoting the Middle East peace process, although in the face of the latest developments it is skeptical about the prospects of successfully implementing the much-troubled 'Road Map', the joint peace plan of the UN, EU, USA and Russia.

Egypt hopes to gain economic and political momentum for itself and the region through ongoing partnership with the EU and Mediterranean cooperation within the Barcelona Process. The Association Agreement between the EU and Egypt is expected to enter into force soon. It has already been ratified by the majority of the EU member states (also including Germany) and the section on trade relations has already come into provisional effect, and of course, this is a significant accomplishment, given the diversity of political opinion among EU member states.

Relations with neighbouring Arab countries

Since Egypt's return to the Arab League in 1990, Cairo has once again become the seat - both physically and politically -- of the Pan-Arab organization. Amr Moussa, who served as Egypt's Foreign Minister for many years, became the Arab League's new Secretary-General in March 2001. Since emerging from its isolation in the Arab bloc following its peace accord with Israel in 1979, Egypt has succeeded under President Mubarak in largely regaining its leadership role. Within the Arab League, Egypt supports the reform efforts initiated by Amr Moussa aimed at making the organization more effective and better able to take action on a variety of issues.

Relations with Israel

Egypt has had a peace agreement with the neighboring State of Israel since 1979. It has put its political weight behind establishing a durable peace since this process began and has used the trust placed in it by both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides to overcome major obstacles. Its political relations with Israel are shaped by developments in the Middle East peace process, however. Since the second Intifada broke out in September 2000, relations with Israel have been under considerable strain, and have not gotten better in the recent months. The Egyptian Government recalled its Ambassador to Tel Aviv back in November 2000 and the post has been vacant since, leaving a foreboding feeling for the future.

Relations with the U.S.A.

Egypt maintains a very critical strategic partnership with the United States of America. This does not preclude differences of opinion on major foreign-policy questions, e.g. On Iraq, but of course, which countries did not question America's policy on Iraq? America particularly values Egypt's support in the fight against international terrorism, however, and not just since 11 September 2001, and as we know, this is the focus of the second Bush administration.

In the context of the Middle East peace process and the U.S.A.'s policy on Iraq, Egypt seeks to strike a balance between solidarity with Arab countries and awareness of critical public opinion towards the U.S.A. On the one hand and loyalty to its chief strategic ally on the other, which means so much to it from an economic standpoint.

Aid is central to Washington's relationship with Cairo. The U.S. has provided Egypt with $1.3 billion a year in military aid since 1979, and an average of $815 million a year in economic assistance. All told, Egypt has received over $50 billion in U.S. largesse since 1975. (www.csmonitor.com)

The money is seen as bolstering Egypt's stability in the region and in the world at large, support for U.S. policies in the region, for U.S. access to the Suez Canal, and peace with Israel. But some critics question the aid's effectiveness in spurring economic and democratic development in the Arab world's most populous country - an obviously higher U.S. priority after Sept. 11, 2001.

Aid offers an easy way out for Egypt to avoid reform," said Edward Walker, the U.S. ambassador to Egypt from 1994 to 1998 in a Christian Science Monitor interview. "They use the money to support antiquated programs and to resist reforms." (www.csmonitor.com)

Egypt's economy is deeply troubled today, more than ever in recent history. Unemployment has climbed astronomically to 25%, foreign investment last year dropped to a 20-year low, and until recently the currency was losing value on a weekly basis. Rather than helping, American aid is "depressing the need for reform," according to former Ambassador Walker in the Christian Science Monitor. (www.csmonitor.com)

Meanwhile, the Mubarak in Egypt regime is inching slowly towards political reform and democratic pluralism at a pace so slow that many question the sincerity of the government's pro-democracy rhetoric. This obviously does not thrill the United States, which has given so much money to Egypt.

In the past, issues like democracy and economic reform were of secondary concern to policymakers looking to shore up a friendly government. Support for Egypt jumped after it made peace with Israel in 1979.

However, U.S. policy has changed since 19 hijackers demonstrated that bolstering stable, pro-American, but undemocratic regimes in the Middle East affected America's security. The ringleader and four of the 9/11 hijackers were Egyptian, after all. This did not, however, truly affect Egyptian/U.S. policy making towards terrorism.

In 2002, the U.S. National Security Strategy articulated a new aid doctrine, saying that money should go to "countries whose governments rule justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom." And of course, Egypt maintains that status by fighting terrorism.

Colin Powell's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is refocusing funding priorities in the Middle East - including those at USAID's 300 person Cairo office - on economic reform, democracy, education, and women's issues, which is a welcome departure from terrorism-based policy.

Relations with African countries

In addition to efforts to strengthen Pan-African structures, major developments in the Horn of Africa are of particular concern to Egypt. Relations with Sudan - after years of conflict -- have recently been returning to normal, as evidenced by President Mubarak's state visit to Khartoum in June 2003 and the meeting of the joint high commission there in August 2003, chaired by Prime Minister Atef Ebeid.

Following its initial opposition, Egypt now supports peace efforts by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Machakos framework agreement of July 2002. (www.washingtonpost.com) This provides for a referendum to be held six and a half years following the conclusion of the peace agreement, giving the southern Sudanese people the option of founding their own state. Together with the Arab League, Egypt is planning reconstruction measures for southern Sudan, which was badly damaged by the civil war. Nevertheless, it is keeping a close watch on proposals by other Nile Basin countries for reapportioning the water quotas of 1929. (www.nytimes.com)

Historical Progression of Egypt/Arab/U.S./EU relations, with focus on the Suez Canal and its negotiations

In the fall of 1948, the UN Security Council called on Israel and the Arab states to negotiate peace through armistice agreements. Egypt agreed, but only after Israel had routed its vaunted army and driven to El Arish in the Sinai. At that time, the British were ready to defend Egypt under a unique Anglo-Egyptian treaty. Rather than accept the humiliation of British assistance, however, the Egyptians met the Israelis at Rhodes instead.

UN mediator Ralph Bunche brought them together at the conference table and was later honored with a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. He warned that any delegation that walked out of the negotiations would be blamed for their breakdown, and this proved a powerful argument.

By the summer of 1949, optimistic armistice agreements had been negotiated between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Iraq, which had also fought against Israel, refused to follow suit. Bunche succeeded at Rhodes because he insisted on direct bilateral talks between Israel and each Arab state, including, of course, and most importantly, Egypt.

Meanwhile, on December 11, 1948, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the parties to negotiate peace and armistice and creating a Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), which consisted of the United States, France and Turkey. All Arab delegations, including Egypt, voted against it.

After 1949, the Arabs, led by Egypt again, insisted that Israel accept the borders in the 1947 partition resolution and repatriate the Palestinian refugees before they would negotiate an end to the war they had initiated. This was a whole new approach that they would use after subsequent defeats: the doctrine of the limited-liability war. Under this theory, an aggressor may reject a compromise settlement and gamble on war to win everything in the comfortable knowledge that, even if he fails, he may insist on reinstating the status quo before; quite flies in the face of historical precedent.

Egypt had maintained its state of belligerency with Israel after the famed armistice agreement was signed. The first manifestation of this was the much-hyped closing of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping. On August 9, 1949, the UN Mixed Armistice Commission upheld Israel's complaint that Egypt was illegally blocking the critical canal. UN negotiator Ralph Bunche declared: "There should be free movement for legitimate shipping and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the armistice agreements."

On September 1, 1951, the Security Council flat-out ordered Egypt to open the Canal to Israeli shipping. Egypt steadfastly refused to comply.

The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Muhammad Salah al-Din, said early in 1954:

The Arab people will not be embarrassed to declare: We shall not be satisfied except by the final obliteration of Israel from the map of the Middle East (Al-Misri, April 12, 1954).

New Type of Warfare

In 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser began to import arms from the Soviet Bloc nations to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. In the short-term, however, he employed a new tactic to prosecute Egypt's war with old foe Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955:

Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine....There will be no peace on Israel's border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel's death.

These "heroes" were, as we now know, Arab terrorists, or fedayeen, trained and equipped by Egyptian Intelligence to engage in hostile action on the border and infiltrate Israel to commit acts of sabotage and murder. The fedayeen cleverly operated mainly from bases in Jordan, so that Jordan would bear the brunt of Israel's retaliation, which inevitably followed. The terrorist attacks violated the armistice agreement provision that prohibited the initiation of hostilities by paramilitary forces; nevertheless, it was Israel that was condemned by the UN Security Council for its powerful but somewhat broad counterattacks.

The escalation continued with the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and Nasser's re-nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. On October 14, Nasser made clear his intent:

I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations.

Less than two weeks later, on October 25, Egypt signed a tripartite agreement with Syria and Jordan placing Nasser in command of all three of the Arab armies.

The continued blockade of the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, combined with the increased fedayeen attacks and the bellicosity of recent Arab statements, prompted Israel, with the firm backing of Britain and France, to attack Egypt on October 29, 1956.

Israeli Ambassador to the UN Abba Eban explained the provocations to the Security Council on October 30:

During the six years during which this belligerency has operated in violation of the Armistice Agreement there have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of incursion from Egyptian controlled territory, 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and fedayeen in Israel. As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel, 364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone, as a result of this aspect of Egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 wounded.

One reason these raids were so intolerable for Israel was that the country had chosen to create a relatively small standing army and to rely primarily on its voluntary and involuntary reserves in the event of war. This meant that Israel had a small force to fight in an emergency, that threats provoking the mobilization of reserves could virtually paralyze the country, and that an enemy's initial thrust would have to be withstood long enough to complete the mobilization.

Israel Routs Egypt

When the decision was made to go to war in 1956, more than 100,000 soldiers were mobilized in less than 72 hours and the air force was fully operational within 43 hours, indicating that the war had strong backing in Israel. Egypt was a necessary enemy. Paratroopers landed in the Sinai and Israeli forces quickly advanced unopposed toward the Suez Canal before halting in compliance with the demands of allies England and France. As expected, the Egyptians ignored the Anglo-French ultimatum to withdraw since they, the victims in their eyes, were being asked to retreat from the Sinai to the west bank of the Canal while the Israelis were permitted to stay just 10 miles east of the Canal.