Secularism One of the Most

Secularism

One of the most important and disruptive political and social movements of the last three centuries has been the push towards the secularization of the public sphere, but it has been frequently misunderstood by its proponents and critics alike. This is because, on the one hand, religious thought is definitionally incapable of accurately assessing either itself or other modes of thought, based as it is on illogic, or at least an indifference to logic. Secular thought, on the other hand, has consistently viewed religious thought as an aberration, something external or deviant from the norm, when in reality religious thought has characterized the vast extent of human history. Thus, in order to better understand secularization as a political and social force, it will be necessary to first correctly contextualize it within human history, and then one will be able to more accurately assess notable secular movements, such as those which occurred in the France during the revolution or in Iran prior to its own Islamic revolution. Doing so will serve to demonstrate not only why secularization has not proceeded at the pace predicted by many of its proponents, but also what lies in store for the future of secularization in the public sphere.

To begin, it is necessary to address some common misconceptions regarding secularization as it relates to the social and political spheres. To begin, it is necessary to first delineate between a few related concepts in order to ensure the precision of this study. Firstly, one must note the distinction between secularism and atheism, because the two are frequently used interchangeably (usually in a pejorative sense), and although they are related, they represent two distinct concepts. Atheism, in its most basic form, denotes the lack of belief in a deity, and as such represents a negative, or perhaps more accurately, neutral position. To be atheistic means nothing more that to reject the hypothesis of a deity, almost always due to a lack of evidence. Secularism, on the other hand, represents a positive (in the sense of arguing for something) position, because it constitutes a particular belief, as opposed to the lack of belief denoted by atheism.

In short, secularism is the position that the ideal functioning of political and social life (inasmuch as the social has the power to constrain or liberate the individual) includes a freedom from religious influence or control as a constituent element. This is frequently shortened to the notion "the separation of church and state." Although there are a number of subsequent theories and ideologies which have emerged from this concept, such as the field of secular ethics, for the purposes of this discussion it suffices to consider secularism as the belief in a worthwhile separation of religion from matters of political or social control, and thus, secularization may be understand as the process by which this occurs.

Clearly, atheism and secularism are related, but one does not necessarily demand the other; one could be atheistic while maintaining that religion plays a useful role in matters of politics and society, and one could be theistic while maintaining that religion has no role to play in politics or society. However, the two are frequently conflated, and briefly discussing why will serve as a useful entryway to the larger discussion of secularization as a social and political movement. In short, atheism and secularism are frequently conflated because in the case of nearly every major religion, the respective opposites of atheism and secularism are one and the same. That is to say, in the case of nearly every major religion (and particularly the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), the belief in a deity or deities is intrinsically tied to the belief that religion should play a central, and sometimes exclusive, role in matters of politics and society.

This is true both explicitly and implicitly. The foundational myths of many religions include explicit instructions for believers to impose the dictates of their god(s) onto society at large, and even in those cases where the institution of a theocracy is not demanded, a kind of implicit theocracy is desired due to the assumption all people should believe in these myths, and furthermore, that they should represent the most important element of the individual's identity. Thus, even if a government is not explicitly theocratic, if all members of that government follow the same religion, then it becomes a kind of implicit theocracy anyways.

Recognizing the possibility of an implicit theocracy is necessary for accurately understanding the trajectory of secularization as a political and social movement, because for all intents and purposes, nearly every major political and social organization in human history, continuing until this day, has been either an explicit or implicit theocracy. This fact has not been well understood by a number of proponents of secularism, because they have frequently operated under the assumption that "the modernization process reduces the threats to survival that are common in developing societies, especially among the poorest strata; and this enhanced sense of security lessens the need for the reassurance religion provides" (Norris and Inglehart, 2004, p. 53). This mistaken belief first emerged during the Enlightenment period and continues in certain circles to this day, such that "for nearly three centuries, social scientists and assorted western intellectuals have been promising the end of religion" in the face of continuing modernization (Stark, 1999, p. 249). This belief is frequently referred to as the "secularization theory," and it argues that secularization is a natural consequence of modernization.

Here it is necessary to further distinguish between secularism, secularization, and the secularization theory. The former represents an ideology regarding the ideal organization of politics and society, and thus cannot be "disproved" any more than one can "disprove" capitalism or Marxism; while certain claims made in the defining texts of these ideologies may be proved or disproved, whether or not the ideologies themselves represent ideal political and social organizations is dependent upon a number of arguable variables and assumptions. Secularization is the process by which societies become more secular, and as such, represents an objectively observable phenomenon, in the same way that one may observe any other number of naturally-occurring phenomenon. Secularization theory represents a theory in a scientific sense; that is, based on certain evidence, it makes falsifiable predictions regarding the future trajectory of society, and as such it can be proved or disproved with the acquisition of further evidence. Thus, one can imagine a secularist movement advocating for secularization, and this movement may or may not subscribe to the secularization theory.

It is important to note these distinctions, because for the last three centuries, many proponents of secularism, who naturally would support further secularization, have believed in the veracity of the secularization theory. As will be seen, the secularization theory does not hold up, but the close relationship between these concepts has meant that the process of secularization as such has been widely misunderstood by proponents and opponents alike. This misunderstanding has subsequently informed the actions of those seeking further secularization and those staunchly opposed to it, such that both sides have effectively exacerbated tensions without actually achieving what they desire.

As mentioned above, this ultimately means that both proponents and opponents of secularism have largely been operating under a faulty understanding of the phenomenon itself, albeit for different reasons. Proponents of secularism that agree with the "secularization theory" have been mistaken because they believe that the correlation between modernization and secularization over the course of the last three centuries is causal. Opponents of secularism (religious ones, at least), have erred simply because religious thought makes one definitionally incapable of accurately assessing the world, especially in regards to phenomenon and ideas that run directly counter to the dictates of that religion. "As is always the case when strategies are based on mistaken perceptions of the terrain," this has had somewhat disastrous consequences for all parties involved (Berger, 1999, p. 3).

Recognizing how secularization has been misunderstood allows one to now begin a more in-depth investigation into how secularization has actually played out, because it is now possible to explain precisely why it has not occurred in the way that its proponents once believed. Put simply, while modernization has occurred alongside secularization, correlation does not equal causation, and the religious reaction to this secularization demonstrates that the secularization theory is false. This is because, while modernization has resulted in a certain degree of secularizing of the public sphere, religion has not resigned itself to disappearing quietly, but rather in many cases has forcefully responded "with beliefs and practices dripping with reactionary supernaturalism" (Berger, 1999, p. 4). Rather than a diminishing of religious control over politics and society, in many instances religious groups have reasserted control forcefully, and sometimes violently.

Even in those instances where direct religious control over politics and society has declined (as in the case of the Roman Catholic Church), individual religious belief has not necessarily dropped off (Stark, 1999, p. 152). In these latter cases, religion has succeeded in passing itself off as a kind of benign adviser to the state and society, losing some degree of direct influence but maintaining for itself a kind of pseudo-legitimacy over areas of society that it deems in the exclusive purview of religious thought. As a result, explicit religious control over social and political life diminishes, but it still retains its ability to control and constrain individuals; it simply relies more on its individual adherents than formal church hierarchies and leadership.

This process has played itself out in a number of different contexts, and although the particular religious response to secularization differs according to nations and societies, in each case these responses disprove the secularization theory while reiterating the danger of religious influence in political and social affairs. For example, though the Enlightenment saw a somewhat dramatic increase in the secularization of Europe, particularly during the French Revolution, this secularization did not correspond to the expected decrease in religious influence over political and social affairs. This is because even when formal religious institutions lose some explicit power, religious belief remains an acceptable justification for the formation of public policy and social norms (Audi & Wolterstoff, 1997, p. 77). Direct religious power over political and social life might diminish, but this power does not simply disappear.

The French Revolution was dependent upon a certain conception of liberal democracy that included in it the ideal of a secular state (partially based as it was on the American Revolution), the supplanting of religious political influence with "the liberal political theory's 'procedural republic,' in which religion is privatized and made irrelevant to public deliberations," did not actually occur, or at least not to the extent that proponents of the secularization theory would believe (Smith, 2003, p. 3). Instead, this religious control simply became diffused and distributed, in the same way that political power itself is diffused and distributed in a liberal democracy (so long as that liberal democracy actually holds to its ideals; there has yet to be any real-world example of a democratic state where power did not ultimately end up in the hands of a relative few). While France has continued on a relatively steady course of secularization, the fact that it continues to face strong resistance for its attempts to ban religious symbols and iconography in public spaces demonstrates the lingering influence of religion over political and social life.

Where the case of the French Revolution demonstrates a more subtle religious response to secularization, the experience of Iran during and after its secularization under the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Pahlavi came to rule as a result of British, Soviet, and American intervention. Though he originally ascended to the throne during World War II, he would not gain full control until a CIA-orchestrated coup deposed the democratically elected prime minister. Over the course of his reign Pahlavi instituted a number of reforms intended to increase the secularization and modernization of Iran, and according to the secularization theory, this would have been more than enough to ensure the continued secularization of Iran well into the future.

However, these reforms actually succeeded in galvanizing the powerful religious leadership, such that in 1979, he deposed in a revolution that resulted in one of the few newly established theocracies of the twentieth-century. Despite Iran's modernization, the new Islamic regime succeeded in imposing a number of religiously-informed rules onto society, such that much of the secularization which occurred under Pahlavi was reversed. Although there is some evidence to suggest that "the most militant Islamic movements will find it hard to maintain their present stance vis-a-vis modernity once they succeed in taking over the governments of their countries," this difficulty of reconciling modernization with religious dictatorship has only made the religious leadership of Iran more strict (Berger, 1999, p. 12). In effect, because modernization and secularization have been viewed as such close counterparts, the religious leadership of Iran has met increased modernization with increased religious imposition, and every attempt to perpetuate either modernization or secularization by internal or external forces is only met with harsher and harsher responses.

The cases of France and Iran are only two in a vast number of movements toward secularization that disprove the assumption that modernization necessarily means a decrease in religious influence over politics and society. Instead, one must consider the possibility that secularization and modernization have merely been contemporaneous phenomenon, rather than inextricably linked developments. This recognition leads one to a subsequent realization regarding the nature of secularist social and political movements; namely, that they are working against thousands of years of human history and evolution, and as such represent not so much the natural progress of human society, but rather a disruptive revolutionary movement. This stands in stark contrast to one of the central beliefs inherent to secularization theory, which is the notion that religious thought represents some kind of aberration or external intrusion onto the otherwise logical cognition of humans (Berger, 1999, p. 2). In reality, secularism is the aberration, because nearly all of human history and evolution has been characterized by the supreme dominance of religious thought.