The a And B Theory of Existence

¶ … B-Theory, one need not fear death?

There is a common assumption that all atheists fear death, given that the atheist lacks the comfort of a world which exists after this one. However, according to Robin Le Poidevin's essay "Should the Atheist Fear Death?" this is not necessarily the case. First of all, Le Poidevin points out that not all theists believe in a concrete conception of the afterlife (643). Secondly, the question arises as to why we are so fearful of the "attenuation of the effects of our life after we die" and why we "fear being forgotten" (643). Le Poidevin implies that a theist conception of the universe is in part why we regard such an eventuality as an awful thing.

Over the course of his essay, Le Poidevin makes a contrast between what he calls the A-theory and B-theory of time. The A-theorist conceives of time as being composed of a past, present, and future (644). This view suggests that there is a value upon preserving our present achievements for future immortality. The B-theorist, in contrast, views divisions between past, present, and future as meaningless. It is based upon where the individual stands in the moment, much like saying something is far away or near, but no object inherently possesses nearness as a stable feature of its existence (645). The same is true regarding whether an object exists in the past or present. "A given time is only present only with respect to some particular event or observation" (645). Time is a reflection of the individual's perspective, not something which has an absolute property and the fact that the future seems to be more important than the past is only true based upon a single person's personal experience (646). For the B-theorist, "a premature death is no more of an evil than a delayed birth" (648).

From the B-theorist's perspective, the present should not be focused upon creating memorials for an indeterminate future time which we cannot predict (649). Future events seem to have greater significance than past ones only because of our limited framework of knowledge, not because of their intrinsic qualities. Future nonexistence should not trouble an individual any more than his or her past nonexistence since both are equally relative and will be experienced by the individual in the same way (651). He or she will not necessarily cease to have any effects upon the world after death and even if that is the case, why should it be so troubling (650). A B-view of time that denies the significance of the demarcations of past and future encourages a detachment to the emotional weight attached to the A-view of the future of each and every single individual.