Anthrax as a Weapon of Mass Destruction: The 2001 Attacks

Introduction

Just one week following the deadly terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, three dozen envelopes were mailed through the U.S. Postal Service — including one to Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle's office and others to news media outlets — containing anthrax that killed five people and injured more than a dozen others. These events, falling hard on the heels of the most destructive domestic terrorist attack in U.S. history, had many already-nervous Americans wondering if their own mailboxes would also come under attack. Since that time, concerns over new anthrax attacks have diminished, but some observers caution that the threat remains as serious as it was in 2001. To determine the facts, this paper reviews the relevant literature to assess the impacts of anthrax when used as a weapon of mass destruction, its overall biothreat, and the lasting consequences of the 2001 mail attacks.

The 2001 Anthrax Mail Attacks and the Amerithrax Investigation

On October 15, 2001, a letter postmarked October 9, 2001, containing anthrax spores was received in the offices of Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (Brookmeyer & Blades, 2003). The letter had been processed by the Hamilton, New Jersey post office and forwarded to the Brentwood post office in the District of Columbia on October 12, 2001 (Brookmeyer & Blades, 2003).

Besides the letters to two senators, other anthrax-laced letters were mailed to news media outlets, including NBC Nightly News, the New York Post, and the National Enquirer (Zelizer & Stuart, 2003). After the anthrax was discovered in Senator Daschle's mail, the Hart Office Building was quarantined and everyone in the building was provided with antimicrobial prophylaxis (Brookmeyer & Blades, 2003). Two postal workers were among the five fatalities that resulted from the 2001 anthrax mail attacks (McElhatton, 2011). Shortly thereafter, all postal workers employed in the two affected post offices were also treated prophylactically, and none of those treated experienced any adverse effects (Brookmeyer & Blades, 2003).

The 2001 anthrax mail attacks were codenamed "Amerithrax" by the FBI (Ake, 2011). According to Ake (2011), "It was the worst biological attack in U.S. history. The most likely biothreat comes from nature, but the most significant threat is from a bioterrorism attack" (p. 38). The Amerithrax Task Force was comprised of between 25 and 30 full-time investigators who invested hundreds of thousands of hours in the case, interviewing in excess of 10,000 witnesses around the world and conducting 80 searches that yielded more than 6,000 items regarded as potential evidence (Amerithrax, 2015).

The FBI concluded its investigation into the 2001 anthrax mail attacks on February 19, 2010, stating that based on their analysis of circumstantial evidence, Dr. Bruce Ivins at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Maryland, was responsible (Ayotte, 2011). In July 2008, Dr. Ivins committed suicide using an overdose of codeine-laced Tylenol (Review panel faults FBI anthrax probe, 2011), purportedly as a result of the enormous pressure he experienced during the FBI's investigation, but there has been no conclusive evidence that this individual was responsible or whether he acted alone (Ayotte, 2011).

Moreover, subsequent research showed that although the anthrax strain used in the mail attacks shared some genetic markers with strains used in Dr. Ivins' laboratory, there were sufficient differences to rule out this individual as the definitive source (Review panel faults FBI on anthrax probe, 2011). Many authorities, however, continue to assign responsibility to Dr. Ivins despite this evidence to the contrary. While the real perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax mail attacks remains unknown, the event served to highlight the nation's vulnerability to bioterrorism attacks.

As one analyst noted, "This was an extensive and coordinated incident, even if perpetrated by a lone, disturbed individual. It highlights an aspect of preparedness that is underserved" (2011, p. 4). The impacts of the 2001 anthrax mail attacks were also heightened by the general state of the American public at the time, just one week after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In this regard, Zelizer and Stuart (2003) report that, "In a country still reeling from the September 11 attacks, the letters and the death of a photo editor renewed a sense of panic" (p. 210).

It is important to note that the 2001 anthrax attacks were not the first of their kind, but rather a continuation of a series of similar attacks occurring in the years leading up to 2001. Gegax and Hosenball (1999) note that during 1998, more than 100 anthrax scares were perpetrated in the United States, primarily against abortion clinics and women's health centers. The letters used in these incidents included a computer-generated sheet that read simply, "Anthrax. Have a nice death" (cited in Gegax & Hosenball, 1999, p. 36). Likewise, Johnstone (2008) points out that the potential use of anthrax by Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War resulted in approximately 150,000 military personnel being vaccinated, and renewed concerns in 1998 led to all U.S. military personnel being vaccinated against anthrax. In addition, more than 100,000 American civilians were recommended to receive a 60-day antibiotic regimen following the 2001 mailed anthrax incidents (Brookmeyer & Blades, 2003).

Public Health Response and Institutional Countermeasures

These precautions were deemed justifiable given the more powerful strains of anthrax that have been developed in recent years (Anthrax, 2003). A report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) emphasized that, "The recent cases of anthrax that occurred after B. anthracis spores were distributed through the U.S. mail have further underscored the potential dangers of this organism as a bioterrorism threat" (Anthrax, 2003, p. 42).

In response to the 2001 anthrax mail attacks, the U.S. Army was tasked with developing response teams to handle future domestic bioterrorist threats (Magnuson & Tadjdeh, 2014). In 2001, there were just 10 such units available to respond to bioterrorist attacks; since that time, an additional 47 response teams have been deployed across the country (Magnuson & Tadjdeh, 2014).

Likewise, the U.S. Postal Service implemented a number of costly bioterrorism countermeasures — amounting to approximately $150 million per year — in response to the 2001 attacks, and mail carriers are being considered as potential distributors of antibiotics by the CDC in the event of future widespread anthrax attacks (McElhatton, 2011). Since 2001, the U.S. Postal Service has investigated more than 50,000 suspicious pieces of mail, and all mail processing facilities in the United States have been equipped with air-sampling early warning detectors (McElhatton, 2011).

A study by Blendon, Benson, DesRoches, and Pollard (2002) specifically analyzed the American public's local and national response to the 2001 anthrax mail attacks. These researchers randomly surveyed households by telephone in three cities — Boca Raton, Trenton/Princeton, and the District of Columbia. Based on their findings, Blendon et al. (2002) report that, "Residents of those three areas and people there who were affected by the incidents expressed a higher level of concern and took more precautions handling their mail" (p. 37). In addition, Blendon and his associates (2002) identified heightened levels of anxiety among these populations and a corresponding increase in health care services utilization.

Conclusion

In October 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were received by two U.S. senators and numerous news media offices, resulting in five deaths and more than a dozen injuries. These attacks were followed by relentless coverage by the mainstream media, including numerous reports that fed into the growing culture of fear that exists in the United States today. More than 100,000 American civilians and hundreds of thousands of military personnel were also treated prophylactically against anthrax contamination following these attacks. The public reaction to these events was shown to be far out of proportion to the actual risk that existed, but this reaction was understandable given the state of emergency in the immediate days following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

Nevertheless, the research consistently showed that the perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax mail attacks succeeded in causing sustained nationwide alarm far out of proportion to the actual threat the attacks represented. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that the 2001 anthrax mail attacks succeeded in inculcating a culture of fear among many Americans that remains firmly in place today. Moreover, that culture of fear is further reinforced every time a high-profile jihadist attack takes place. Although it is also reasonable to conclude that it is not a matter of whether there will be more anthrax attacks in the future but only a matter of when and who, Americans cannot allow these threats to fundamentally alter their way of life — otherwise, the terrorists will have in fact won without firing a shot or mailing a letter.

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