Political Action in Arendt and Niebuhr: A Comparative View

Introduction: Defining Political Action

What is political action, and how do Hannah Arendt and Reinhold Niebuhr recommend going about it? The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines political action as "action designed to attain a purpose by the use of political power or by activity in political channels; specifically: such action by organized labor through recognized political means (as participation in party organization, in elections, and by lobbying) — contrasted with direct action" (2015, p. 1). While this definition captures the institutional dimension of political action, both Arendt and Niebuhr offer richer and more philosophically grounded accounts of what political action means, why it matters, and how it should be pursued.

Niebuhr's Framework for Political Action

Niebuhr's view of political action holds that the "only adequate account of the limits and possibilities of just and humane politics depended on a religious conception of history and life. The Christian faith was not an impediment to political action but was its foundation" (Patterson, 2008, p. 119). Niebuhr maintained that sin was both "universal and comprehensive, affecting all persons and every aspect of human life. No person was exempt from sin and no human action could successfully overcome self-love. Since reason itself could be tainted by sin, reliance on moral principles could provide only a proximate guide to ethical action" (Patterson, 2008, p. 119).

Niebuhr's political ethics framework claimed that there was a "necessity of power to promote and maintain a humane communal order" (Patterson, 2008, p. 119). Additionally, in Niebuhr's view, "there is no single, overarching value that should guide political thought" (Patterson, 2008, p. 122). This pluralism of values, grounded in a frank acknowledgment of human sinfulness, distinguishes his Christian realism from more idealistic approaches to political ethics.

Niebuhr on Inaction and the Dangers of Perfectionism

Niebuhr, while cautioning against "overambitious, self-righteous political initiatives," was equally concerned with the dangers of inaction resulting from an ethic of perfectionism (Patterson, 2008, p. 122). He was critical of those moralists so focused on their own moral purity that the result was an unwillingness to "confront injustice and tyranny because such action would result in compromising the ideal of love" (Patterson, 2008, p. 122).

It was Niebuhr's belief that the only method of ensuring a world that was somewhat stable and in some way humane was not by "individually modeling Jesus' love ethic. For the Christian realm, the quest for a just international peace necessitated morally inspired, courageous political action" (Patterson, 2008, p. 1). Niebuhr warned against expecting too much from political initiatives; nevertheless, he stressed the "importance of collective action in the service of freedom and justice" (Patterson, 2008, p. 122). According to Niebuhr, in order to "reconnect politics with the vital center of human activity," it is necessary to pursue a "collective strategy that seeks to build and sustain free, democratic societies and a stable international order that inhibits aggression and tyranny" (Patterson, 2008, p. 122).

According to Rice, Niebuhr held that "intelligent action was preferable to the extremes of evolutionary change and revolutionary ardor," stating that "the stubbornness of evolutionary change and the blindness of men sometimes make social convulsions and catastrophes inevitable" and that an approach utilizing violence was "a wasteful method of change," since there could be "no guarantee that the new order will be any more just than the old" (Rice, p. 85).

During the Depression of the 1930s, Niebuhr lamented that the prolonged economic crisis had failed to move a "politically and socially lethargic people to the kind of social realism which many had hoped for and longed for" (Rice, p. 87). He pondered how the institutions and organizations of the church "would respond to the harsh reality of class conflict — a reality that he reported to be such that smelled of 'hatred and warfare and seems incompatible with the ideal of love'" (Rice, p. 86). Niebuhr reminded the church that the class struggle was historically documented: socialists did not invent this reality, but if it were not acknowledged, the church would effectively abandon and ignore those most affected by it.

Arendt's Vision of Action and the Public Realm

According to Thiele (2009), Hannah Arendt is known best "for her trenchant analysis and original evaluation of political life. The sine qua non of politics is human action, which she celebrates above all other human capacities" (p. 1). In Arendt's view, action equals freedom, and action taken collectively equals power. Action is the key component of power and results in freedom, since action serves to formulate and maintain the public realm. In her account, politics is "a facet of the human condition distinct from — and in many respects superior to — the biological and the social realms, with their characteristic activities of labor, work, and life management. Political action, occupying the highest echelon of the vita activa, is also distinguished from the vita contemplativa, that is to say, from the intellectual realm, characterized by reflective thought" (Thiele, 2009, p. 1).

Thiele (2009) reports that "Arendt's depreciation of the philosophical, social, and biological facets of life is frequently censured. Critics chafe against her apparent nostalgia for the vita activa of antiquity and question whether action (specifically, and politics more generally) deserves Arendt's accolade as the defining feature of a truly human existence, the sole bearer of freedom, the most endangered faculty in the modern world and, consequently, the feature of contemporary life most in need of our solicitude. In particular, critics reject Arendt's comprehensive divorce between the public and the private spheres, a divorce Arendt employs to champion political action over social concerns" (p. 1).

According to Arendt, the public realm — the space utilized for free exchange in a democracy concerning political actions and ideas — "is exactly what is eliminated by totalitarian regimes. This action is often rooted in speech. It is these actions that occur in the public sphere in which we reveal ourselves to each other. Totalitarianism undermines this crucial element of the public sphere. It takes away spontaneous interaction, which is a part of the human condition" (Philosophy Talk, n.d., p. 1).

Thiele (2009) cites Arendt's own words on the nature of action:

"For in every action what is primarily intended by the doer, whether he acts from natural necessity or out of free will, is the disclosure of his own image. Hence it comes about that every doer, in so far as he does, takes delight in doing; since everything that is desires its own being, and since in action the being of the doer is somehow intensified, delight necessarily follows…. Thus, nothing acts unless [by acting] it makes patent its latent self." (p. 1)

Arendt held that the political realm is "a place of appearances, or better said, a place of performances. The agency involved in these performances is not seated in a pre-existing, unified, deliberate, self-knowing subject. Rather, Arendt's actors are fragmented beings that achieve coherence by way of a self-revelatory, theatrical performance. In this vein, Arendt understood the Greek polis as 'a kind of theater where freedom could appear'" (Arendt, 1968, p. 154, as cited in Thiele, 2009, p. 1).

Conclusion

While Niebuhr was concerned with inaction on the part of those who are politically involved, Arendt was concerned with the vulnerability of the public spaces that enable political action; however, each of these thinkers had persuasive views and pertinent knowledge about what enables the political action of the collective whole of a country or state. Each was outspoken about their beliefs concerning political action, and each was on the receiving end of considerable criticism — as are all outspoken individuals when it comes to political action and the public realm.

It is true that without the public realm of spaces in which to initiate conversations of concern regarding politics, the public is severely limited in any type of collective action. While these thinkers may not have focused exclusively on freedom in a democracy such as the United States as it is commonly conceived, each offered relevant points about what stifles political action by the collective population within a country or state.

It is certain that without public spaces in which to meet and to converse, there will be no changing of any political aspects within a country or state. When a government attempts to forbid gathering and conversation among a population about its concerns, that government has become a totalitarian regime, and the political action of those under that regime is thereby forbidden and restricted. It is this point that Arendt makes so clearly in her account of the necessity of the public forum — the public realm — as the very precondition for political action to take place.