Universal Human Rights: The Debate Over Universality

Introduction: A Contested Concept

One of the most highly contested issues in international political theory is the question of universal human rights. Its interpretation depends on the manner in which particular theorists understand it, the moral obligations related to it, and the relationship between those obligations and international law. The fundamental question of what rights exist and the extent to which those rights are accepted and enjoyed by everyone forms the basis of the philosophical debate about whether human rights are universal (Kessler). The varied transition of value systems arising from philosophical theories and practical politics makes the debate even more complex.

The debate over the universalization of human rights takes place within a world that contains numerous independent systems — diverse, and sometimes conflicting — shaped by the cultures and political viewpoints of different regions and countries. The debate about the universal application of human rights continues even as advances have been made to formulate an international code for human rights requirements. These efforts are sometimes in conflict with questions of national obligation, the need to respect the sovereignty of a region or country, and the justifications for intervention into sovereign rights.

At its core, the debate about the universality of human rights hinges on the availability of sufficient proof that universally applicable rights exist and that such rights are genuinely accessible to everyone. Theorists and philosophers have for centuries tried to codify and formulate various human rights principles so that they are applicable universally. Nevertheless, significant debate remains, relating to human rights issues that are dependent on particular cultures and countries — and even on what is considered right and wrong within cultures and subcultures (Donnelly).

The Case for Universal Human Rights

For example, many cultures and societies perceive the roles and responsibilities of women to be primarily limited to the home and family. Such cultures and societies view women as primarily responsible for the management of households, children, and family life; women are not expected to earn a living — that is regarded as the responsibility of men. To many philosophers and thinkers, this constitutes a violation of women's human rights. Yet in societies where this culture is prevalent, it is naturally accepted. To conclude that women have equal human rights to men with respect to personal responsibilities and economic participation may be applicable in some cultures and societies but not in others.

There are, however, a number of viewpoints within political theory that can be used to claim the universal applicability of human rights. Such theories hold that certain rights apply simply by virtue of one's being a human being (Donnelly). These rights rest on the conviction that every human being shares equal rights simply because they are members of a global community. According to Pogge (1992), one such theory is cosmopolitanism, which emphasizes the need for equal "legal rights and duties" among the "fellow citizens of a universal republic" (Pogge). Thinkers who follow this line of thought assume that the international community bears a responsibility to ensure universal rights for every global citizen and that such human rights are upheld globally.

Human rights thinkers also stress the importance of a moral duty with respect to interstate relations when they discuss human rights in reference to "the nature of human duty or obligation" (Baylis and Smith, p. 194). Since every government or state has a moral duty to uphold a set of human rights applicable to all global citizens, intervention into the affairs of a state by the international community can be justified if that state fails to fulfil its moral duty to uphold the human rights of its citizens. The arrest of Pinochet in 1998 "on an international warrant and extradition request from Spain" (Langer) is an example of this universal human rights principle in action. The extradition of Fujimori from Chile to stand trial in Peru in 2007 is another such example.

The Case Against Universality: Cultural Relativism and Communitarianism

However, a large portion of human rights philosophers and thinkers continues to debate the limits of extending human rights so that they can be considered universal. Such thinkers claim that human rights are not inherited by every individual simply by virtue of being human. Rather, they argue, humans acquire their rights from membership in a specific community. The communitarian strand of political theory, for instance, stresses the "fundamental differences among groups in their moral norms and values and accompanying world views" (Nickel, p. 69). This means that it is virtually impossible to create a single code for human rights that is applicable, acceptable, and accessible universally, given the necessity of moral relativism and the respect owed to cultural differences. Related theories of morality support this position, arguing that cultural differences produce differences in morality and warning of the dangers of universalizing any moral framework — even one with honorable intentions — in a manner that is essentially "incompatible with a commitment to human rights" (Nickel, p. 69).

Many philosophers point to the marked differences between the cultures of indigenous communities and the more urbanized descendants of European colonial powers in places such as Latin America. The extent of cultural divergence between such communities also creates differences in morality and, consequently, in conceptions of human rights, since morality often drives what is considered right or wrong. The relative definitions of human rights are determined by differing cultural factors within indigenous communities, and such definitions often vary considerably from those held by foreign powers. Thus, according to Shapcott (2008), it is incumbent upon liberal states to accept that they "have no cosmopolitan duties to globalize their own conception of distributive justice" (Baylis and Smith). Human rights, on this account, are intricately dependent on culture and therefore vary in their nature.

Conclusion

From the discussions above, it can be concluded that universal human rights are a very relative concept, not accepted by all. Despite the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the universal application of the concept remains doubtful. Theorists and philosophers have argued about the universal applicability of human rights for many years. They hold that human rights flow from the concept of what is right and what is wrong for individuals within a community — and what is right or wrong is itself dependent on the way various communities, cultures, and societies define these terms. This, in turn, flows from morality, which varies from one culture or society to another.

Therefore, the concept of human rights, arising from differing notions of right and wrong within communities, also varies with varying cultures and societal norms. There are further debates about whether an individual acquires rights simply by being a human being or by being part of a specific community. These debates make clear that the concept of universal human rights is not truly universal and depends, to a significant extent, on the cultures, societal norms, and the ways in which various communities define the rights of their members.

References

"The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948." Un.org. N.p., 2016. Web. 31 Mar. 2016.

Baylis, John, and Steve Smith. The Globalization of World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Print.

Donnelly, Jack. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003. Print.

Hutchings, Kimberly. Global Ethics. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010. Print.

Kessler, Gary E. Voices of Wisdom. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1992. Print.

Langer, M. "The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction." The American Journal of International Law 105.1 (2011): 1–49. Web.

Nickel, James W. Making Sense of Human Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. Print.

Pogge, Thomas W. "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty." Ethics 103.1 (1992): 48–75. Web.