Bophuthatswana Crisis 1994: Conflict and Negotiation

Overview of the Bophuthatswana Crisis

The Bophuthatswana crisis of 1994 was a devastating political upheaval that began when the Bophuthatswana president, Lucas Mangope, attempted to suppress widespread demonstrations and labor unrest. The people of South Africa were demanding the incorporation of the Bophuthatswana territory into South Africa ahead of the country's first multiracial election in 1994 (Holomisa, 2011; Lawrence & Manson, 1994). Lucas Mangope presided over a Bantustan — a nominally independent homeland created under the apartheid system (Lentz, 2014). The crisis provoked violent protests after President Mangope announced on 7 March 1994 that Bophuthatswana intended to boycott South Africa's general elections (Appiah & Gates, 2010). The violence quickly escalated into a mutiny by local armed forces and a strike by civil servants. The crisis was further complicated when right-wing extremists arrived with the intention of preserving Mangope's government (Cawthra, 1997).

The confrontations lasted nearly four days before Mangope succumbed to the pressure and consented to allowing the people of Bophuthatswana to participate in the forthcoming elections (Marina, 1993). Shortly afterward, however, Mangope reversed that decision. The South African Defence Force responded to this sudden change of heart by deposing Mangope and taking control of Bophuthatswana on 12 March 1994. The crisis confirmed that Mangope's government was deeply unpopular and signaled the collapse of the Bantustan system of government for most residents of the region (Cawthra, 1997).

The Bophuthatswana crisis is perhaps most vividly remembered for the live television broadcast of the shooting of three AWB (Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging) militants. The shooting profoundly demoralized the AWB movement, whose primary goal was to preserve white minority rule. The three men were shot by a black South African police officer (Wood, 2007).

Reasons for Selecting This Conflict

At the height of racial conflict and negotiations for South African liberation, Lucas Mangope was obsessed with maintaining control of the Bophuthatswana region. His determined refusal to consider the broader goal of a united front against white minority rule led him to align himself with right-wing extremists in an effort to keep Bophuthatswana out of the 1994 multiracial elections. During his rule, Mangope deprived Bophuthatswana of political freedom: those who opposed the state were banished, subjected to extrajudicial harassment, and arrested. The African National Congress (ANC) was also declared illegal under his government.

Rather than negotiate with the interests of black South Africans at heart, Mangope chose to collaborate with right-wing extremists backed by white minority interests. This demonstrated the deeply self-serving character of his leadership, which ultimately resulted in bloodshed and the destruction of his regime.

Conflict Resolution Theories and Their Application

According to Fisher and Ury (1991), the first principle of conflict resolution is separating the people from the problem. In order to reach a conclusive resolution, the parties in conflict must be considered separately from the dispute itself as the two sides engage in negotiation. There are three dimensions to this principle: communication, emotion, and perception. Fisher and Ury (1991) acknowledge that negotiators are, first and foremost, human beings with emotions, cultural backgrounds, and differing values. These human dimensions can either hinder or assist the resolution process. Negotiations can build understanding and trust, forming positive relationships — but they can equally result in dissatisfaction and frustration. Fisher and Ury (1991) examine how interpersonal relationships between the parties are affected by the very problem being negotiated.

Fisher and Ury (1991) also discuss the principle of focusing on interests rather than positions. They recommend that both parties concentrate on the underlying interests that inform each side's stated position, and remain open to the arguments of the other party. The third principle they describe is the exploration of options that will facilitate mutual gain — seeking solutions that benefit all parties positively, so that neither side feels exploited. The fourth principle is the use of objective criteria in negotiation: decisions must be grounded in practical and objective standards, and the conversation should remain productive.

The fifth principle offered by Fisher and Ury (1991) is BATNA — the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. They argue that no method is likely to produce successful outcomes if one side holds all the leverage. Each party should first protect its own interests and then use the resources within its power to negotiate effectively. These five principles together form the foundation of principled negotiation, a framework directly applicable to the failures of leadership observed in the Bophuthatswana crisis.

Conclusion

These principles and perspectives from multiple scholars will inform an in-depth understanding of the Bophuthatswana crisis and the steps that Lucas Mangope ought to have taken to avert conflict and war in the wake of multiracial elections and the broader struggle against apartheid.

References

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