Climate Change, Migration, and Security in the Pacific

Introduction

One of the expected effects of climate change in the Pacific region is environmental migration (Martin, 2010). Although the relationship between climate change and migration has been characterized as non-linear, environmental shock remains a focus of concern for researchers in the field of migration studies (Gray and Bilsborrow, 2013). As is common in most fields, disagreement persists over the manner in which climate change and climate variability affect populations. Gray and Bilsborrow (2013) argue that populations actually have many tools they can use to respond to climate variation without resorting to migration. In the Pacific region, where climate change is often cited as a problem affecting migration, concern over how to address security issues stemming from climate migration naturally arises (Tacoli, 2009). Researchers contend that as climate change worsens, mass migration will inevitably result, posing security problems for nations viewed as having a duty to respond (McMichael, Barnett, and McMichael, 2012). The issue that Tacoli (2009) identifies, however, is this: not enough attention is given to the nuance of migration in the Pacific, particularly in an era of high mobility. The objective of this paper is to examine the problem of climate change and migration from an alternate perspective so as to better identify security implications as well as possible preventive strategies that could be employed to mitigate adverse outcomes related to the issue. The research question is: What is the effect of climate change on migration, and what strategies can be employed to reduce any threat to security that might result from that relationship?

Climate change is not well defined in the popular imagination; it is alternatively used as a term referring to climate variability, environmental shock, or a kind of apocalyptic scenario in which the planet is irreversibly on course to self-destruct (Bostrom et al., 1994). Some view climate change as a man-made problem; others view it as natural; still others deny the apocalyptic scenario and regard pollution as an isolated phenomenon (Kempton, 1997). Reynolds et al. (2010, p. 1521) define climate change as "global warming [which] is primarily due to increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and the single most important source of this carbon dioxide is the combustion of fossil fuels." Yet even that definition is disputed by researchers who discount the extent to which climate change is synonymous with global warming or the degree to which the burning of fossil fuels is the main factor (Angus, 2013). Thus, part of the problem of defining climate change is the lack of consensus among researchers about what it actually is. This is why more precise terms — such as climate variability and environmental shock, which refer to one-off climate events or short-term environmental catastrophes — are often used in research (Gray and Bilsborrow, 2013). For that reason, part of the aim of this paper is to examine the nature of climate change from the perspective of high mobility, which offers an alternate explanation for migration in an age of heightened concern about climate change (Tacoli, 2009). It is hypothesized that at the local level, barring instances of environmental shock and catastrophe, most people migrate for reasons other than climate change precisely because of the options that the era of high mobility affords; and when climate change is seen as a challenge at the local level, communities have tools at their disposal to address these matters.

The significance of this work is that it challenges a notion commonly found in public discourse regarding the effects of climate change on migration. To bring balance to the discourse, it is often necessary to introduce an alternate perspective that can facilitate critical thought and sound decision-making. For policy makers focusing on security in the developed world, some understanding of the nuance behind climate migration can be of assistance. The scope of this work is limited to describing the issue of climate change with respect to the Pacific region, where considerable concern has been expressed in recent years. The limits of this work are that it does not consider all possible scenarios or extreme weather events that could cause migration; instead, it focuses on the factors of strategy and security in terms of disaster response and what local populations believe they can do in the face of climate variability.

The outline of this paper is as follows. Chapter 1 examines the different perspectives on the effect of climate change on migration in the Pacific. Chapter 2 describes security issues that may result. Chapter 3 discusses possible mitigation strategies that can be implemented to address security concerns.

Chapter 1: The Effect of Climate Change on Migration

To focus on the problem of climate migration in an era of high mobility, a search for scholarly literature was conducted using snowball sampling. Keywords searched across databases (Elsevier, ScienceDirect, and SAGEPub) included "climate change," "climate migration," and "climate change debate." Articles focusing on the nuances of climate migration were identified and selected for analysis because they provided the alternative perspective called for by Tacoli (2009) and more recently by Gray and Bilsborrow (2013).

Mortreux and Barnett (2009) examine the effects of climate change on the island of Funafuti by describing the intentions of its people to migrate. Their survey of the island's inhabitants showed that for most people there, climate change was not a matter of concern and few were considering migrating in response to it. Moreover, for those inhabitants who were considering migration, climate change was not identified as the motivating factor. The key factors keeping people on Funafuti are their preference for the lifestyle it affords, the culture it maintains, and the identity they hold there (Mortreux and Barnett, 2009). This study indicates that for at least this island of Tuvalu, climate change is not a pressing concern. Farbotko and Lazrus (2012) corroborate these findings in their follow-up analysis of the people of Funafuti, examining the way in which a narrative of climate refugees has been constructed to explain the situation there even though it does not actually match the reality they found on the ground. McNamara and Gibson (2009, p. 475) note that Pacific ambassadors to the United Nations have resisted the label of "climate refugees" and have argued that the people there do not desire to leave their lands.

Tacoli (2009, p. 513) likewise identifies a problem in how climate migration is framed in polemical discourse: "Frequently cited figures estimate that by 2050, the number of people forced to move primarily because of climate change will range between 200 million and 1 billion." These alarming predictions raise substantial security concerns, should they prove accurate — but as Tacoli (2009, p. 513) notes, there are motives to consider in this framing of the problem: "Underlying these predictions is the view that migration reflects a failure to adapt to changes in the physical environment, and that migrants are a relatively undifferentiated group all making similar emergency responses and moving to unspecified destinations, including international ones." To better understand climate migration, there is a need to appreciate the nuance of migration, which can best be described in terms of "duration, destination and composition" (Tacoli, 2009, p. 513). It is important to consider this nuance because it has direct implications for security policy.

The issue of climate change in the Pacific has been politicized in spite of the "complex and unpredictable" nature of the phenomenon (Brown, 2008, p. 7). Because of this, researchers have asked whether assumptions about migration in a high-mobility era are correct (McNamara and Gibson, 2009; Mortreux and Barnett, 2009; Tacoli, 2009). Tacoli (2009, p. 516) warns that "there is also little evidence that people who have already been exposed to environmental degradation do actually move in the ways and numbers predicted by the environmental refugees model." For this reason, some circumspection is warranted when addressing security concerns.

Conclusion and Outlook

The first chapter showed that in Funafuti, climate change is not a driving factor in migration. It is not cited among the population as a reason for moving, despite the narrative that has been constructed around them as climate refugees. They prefer to stay in their region because of the lifestyle it affords and the culture it supports, and they do not see climate variability as a reason for leaving. This is a common perspective throughout the Pacific, where ambassadors to the UN have resisted the categorization of the people there as climate refugees.

In spite of these findings, dire predictions of mass migration continue to be made. These predictions rest upon an assumption the research does not support: local populations are not living in fear of climate change, and they only migrate out of necessity in extreme weather events when their local community fails to support their needs and no international disaster relief response is available. The research indicates that the factors driving climate migration are more nuanced than the popular narrative warrants.

Chapter 2 showed that security concerns are warranted only in the event that nations have no plan in place for addressing climate disasters. Climate variability alone does not pose a significant risk to populations. Even when extreme weather events cause hardship, mass migration is not a guaranteed outcome. It depends instead on the extent to which local governments transcend issues of corruption and poor planning. When a planned response is available and responsible authorities are engaged in alleviating hardship, climate migration is unlikely.

Chapter 3 showed that the best strategy is geopolitical cooperation and planning. When nations of the globalized society work together to respect the human rights of individuals, the risk of climate migration can be reduced and the security of nations ensured through appropriate disaster response planning. This was found to be important in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, wherein out-migration was not a significant factor. In a catastrophe like Katrina in New Orleans, where the response was disorganized, out-migration to other regions occurred.

Thus, the major problem in climate migration is not necessarily climate change itself but the lack of a disaster response plan. Local governments must work with the international community, because in a globalized society migration affects everyone. Local populations in the Pacific would prefer to stay where they are, and those who do migrate generally do so for reasons other than climate change. In a high-mobility era, this is to be expected. Preparing for environmental disasters is the key strategic course of action to ensure the security of nations and local populations. From a deontological perspective, nations owe it to the global community to respect the rights of all people and provide support in the case of a climate emergency so that migration remains a last resort.

Further study on this matter should expand the research into other parts of the world to determine whether climate migration is motivated by the same factors — namely, a lack of local government support and corruption. While cultures differ around the world, it may be a universal phenomenon that people tend to want to stay in their communities and that climate alone is not the main driving force behind migration. Additional research on this matter will inform the planning and shaping of strategic response policies with regard to climate migration risks.

References

Angus, I., 2013. The myth of 'environmental catastrophism.' Monthly Review, 65(4), p. 15.

Bostrom, A., Morgan, M.G., Fischhoff, B. and Read, D., 1994. What do people know about global climate change? 1. Mental models. Risk Analysis, 14(6), pp. 959–970.

Brown, O., 2008. Migration and climate change. IOM Migration Research Series No. 31. International Organization for Migration, Geneva.

Farbotko, C. and Lazrus, H., 2012. The first climate refugees? Contesting global narratives of climate change in Tuvalu. Global Environmental Change, 22(2), pp. 382–390.

Gray, C. and Bilsborrow, R., 2013. Environmental influences on human migration in rural Ecuador. Demography, 50(4), pp. 1217–1241.

Kempton, W., 1997. How the public views climate change. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 39(9), pp. 12–21.

Martin, S., 2010. Climate change, migration, and governance. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 16(3), pp. 397–414.

McMichael, C., Barnett, J. and McMichael, A.J., 2012. An ill wind? Climate change, migration, and health. Environmental Health Perspectives, 120(5), pp. 646–654.

McNamara, K.E. and Gibson, C., 2009. 'We do not want to leave our land': Pacific ambassadors at the United Nations resist the category of 'climate refugees.' Geoforum, 40(3), pp. 475–483.

Mortreux, C. and Barnett, J., 2009. Climate change, migration and adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu. Global Environmental Change, 19(1), pp. 105–112.

Samaan, J.L. and Verneuil, L., 2009. Civil–military relations in Hurricane Katrina: a case study on crisis management in natural disaster response. Enhancing Transatlantic Governance on Disaster Relief and Preparedness, 1.

Tacoli, C., 2009. Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility. Environment and Urbanization, 21(2), pp. 513–525.