Australia as an International Citizen: Refugees, Aid, and Climate

Introduction: Australia's Role in International Affairs

In the arena of international politics, Australia is one of the leading nations in the Asia-Pacific region, a status attributable mainly to its development economically, politically, and socially. This does not mean, however, that it is considered a leader among the countries in the region. Owing not only to its cultural differences with other Asia-Pacific nations, but also because of the seemingly autonomous stance it takes on critical issues affecting the region, Australia is both respected and criticized for assuming an independent position on matters of global concern.

The discussion that follows focuses on the integration of political analyses concerning Australia's behavior and actions as an international citizen operating within the framework of achieving the common good — as a member of international bodies and organizations spearheaded by developed nations, specifically the United States and Britain. Drawing on analyses by Peter Mares, Peter Singer and Tom Gregg, Patrick Kilby, and Matt McDonald, this paper argues that Australia has, in general, not been a good international citizen. This conclusion is based on Australia's policies and actions toward important issues, particularly its laws regarding refugee seekers, its aid programs addressing poverty, and its approach to global climate change. More specifically, Australia has not been a good citizen in improving policies on refugee seekers and addressing climate change, nor has it been fully responsive to the needs of poor, developing countries through its aid programs.

Mares and Singer: Australia's Response to the 1951 Refugee Convention

Peter Mares (2002), in his book Borderline, provided an in-depth look at Australia's policy on accepting refugees seeking asylum through the case of the MV Tampa incident. This incident attracted wide attention because of the unexpected action Australia took: all but 433 Iraqi, Afghan, and Iranian refugees seeking asylum were turned away and were not allowed to set foot on Australian soil (p. 230). This sparked controversy and caught the interest of developed nations that are often the target destinations of refugees from conflict-stricken regions — most cited were Middle Eastern, Central, and South American countries.

Mares' discussion of the Tampa incident was twofold. First, it explored the issue of revisiting and reviewing the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees as an international policy. Second, it confronted the reality that, despite the Convention granting protection to refugees, developed nations implementing it are in a crisis in determining the boundaries of this policy. These are critical issues that had not been widely discussed before the Tampa incident, making Australia the catalyst for a very timely debate centering on the role of developed nations in providing aid and security to refugees and victims of war and conflict.

The first issue covered in Mares' analysis was Australia's prompt action to refuse entry to arriving refugees. The Tampa case laid bare, according to the author, "how crude the business of border protection really is" (p. 231). This stringent implementation of border protection was an initial measure that enabled Australia to work its way around the Convention: by not allowing refugees to set foot on Australian soil, the country effectively disowned responsibility for caring for the refugees, regardless of whether or not their asylum applications would have been successful.

This brings into focus another issue inherent in accepting refugees — the cost of keeping them safe and secure while their applications are processed. The Australian government spent a total of $572 million dealing with refugees who arrived "unauthorized" in asylum boats between 2001 and 2002 (p. 236). Apart from this financial burden, Australia also faced difficulty in controlling the number of people entering the country both legally and illegally. Unfortunately, the Convention was not effective enough to promote legal entry of refugees into destination countries like Australia, and a system of corruption built around circumventing strict border protections proved lucrative — driven primarily by the reluctance of countries like Australia to accept refugees and, secondarily, by weak legislative measures in the Convention itself (p. 243). In effect, the weak implementation of the Convention, heightened border protection in destination countries, high costs of taking in asylum seekers, and a prevailing illegal transport network all made the issue of asylum seeking highly complex. These factors make Australia's case difficult to assess: whether the country was simply protecting its borders against individuals who were not genuine asylum seekers, or whether it was failing as a good citizen by implementing harsh and non-humanitarian measures to deflect responsibility for securing and protecting them.

These issues prompted other destination countries in Europe and North America to rethink how they handle asylum seekers crossing their borders. Mares cited an example in which both Australia and the United States developed systems designed to prevent asylum seekers from achieving their "desired migration outcome" (p. 234). That is, although destination countries would like to help asylum seekers, there is also the possibility that asylum seeking had become a means through which individuals from war-stricken — and often impoverished — countries could enter a developed nation via what was perceived as an easier route, legal or otherwise. Because the Convention offers protection to asylum seekers but provides little protection or assurance to destination countries, systems similar to those developed by Australia and the United States emerged to address migration security and border protection concerns.

These issues arising from the Tampa incident reflect the limited capacity of international organizations like the United Nations and of developed nations to address the increasing number of refugees seeking help outside their war- or conflict-stricken countries. With the United States' attack on Iraq in 2003 contributing to the increased diaspora from Middle Eastern countries, signatories of the 1951 Convention were suddenly confronted with the serious problem of dealing with a surge of asylum seekers. It was only after this influx of refugees from war-torn countries that the full weight of responsibility involved in becoming a host or destination country began to be felt, prompting signatories to revisit the Convention — and, in the meantime, as in the case of Australia and the United States, to devise systems for avoiding assumption of legal responsibility for the refugees.

While Mares did not explicitly state that Australia had been harsh in turning away refugees, Singer (2004) was more direct in describing Australia's actions from the perspective of international politics. For Singer, Australia violated the Convention, citing specific articles as supporting arguments. Identifying Australia as "one of a handful of nations with a policy of mandatory detention of asylum seekers," Singer argued that the Tampa incident constituted a violation of the Convention through Articles 33(1) and 32(1) (p. 70).

Singer stated that Australia violated both articles. Article 33(1) holds that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever… where his life would be threatened." Article 32(1) was also violated, as Australia, as a signatory to the Convention, "shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order" (p. 70). Through these violations, Singer argued, Australia was not "carrying its fair share of the burden" of resolving the refugee and asylum seeker problem.

Both Mares and Singer offered valid arguments against Australia's claim to good international citizenship, though they differed in degree. Regarding the Convention, each author made distinct recommendations. Singer, reflecting his strong belief in the Convention, argued that Australia had violated it in its handling of the MV Tampa refugees. Mares, meanwhile, expressed the need to revisit the Convention itself, given its inability to protect host and destination countries to the same extent that it seeks to help refugees.

Conclusion

Analyses of Australia's actions and positions on specific humanitarian and environmental issues demonstrate that it falls far short of being a good international citizen. As one of the developed nations enjoying a relatively mature socio-political and economic system, Australia is expected to perform not only for itself, but to extend its success by sharing resources and assistance with poor, developing countries. Unfortunately, based on the analyses of Mares, Singer, and McDonald, Australia was a poor international citizen in key respects because it chose to pursue its self-interest over the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the common good. While its aid program was not as harshly criticized by Kilby, AusAID's inadequate responsiveness to recipient countries' actual needs in achieving poverty reduction shows that Australia has also failed to fully act for the common good — contributing, ultimately, to the conclusion that Australia has not fulfilled the obligations of a good international citizen.

References

Kilby, P. (2007). The Australian aid program: Dealing with poverty? Australian Journal of International Affairs, 114–129.

Mares, P. (2002). Borderline: Australia's response to refugees and asylum seekers in the wake of the Tampa. Sydney: UNSW Press.

McDonald, M. (2005). Fair weather friend? Ethics and Australia's approach to global climate change. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 216–234.

Singer, P., & Gregg, T. (2004). How ethical is Australia? Melbourne: Griffin Press.