Ethics in Counterintelligence: Lessons from the Angleton Era

Introduction

Intelligence and counterintelligence operations have always been a part of the American Republic (Federation of American Scientists 1996). General Washington was aware of the threat of foreign espionage and the need to counter it (Wettering 2000, 165). The need to deceive those whose intention is to deceive one's nation is in fact an ancient one, identified by Sun Tzu thousands of years ago (Select Committee on Intelligence 1986). Practicing deception while remaining free from the corrupting influences of deceivers has proven to be a challenge, however (Valentine 2016, 45). The circumstances under which counterintelligence in the US was formerly developed and pursued in its infancy, childhood, and adolescence could be said to have predicted what that program would become in its adulthood. Abuses, errors, and mistakes were so rampant that the CIA's counterintelligence program, run by James Jesus Angleton from its inception in the 1950s through the 1970s, effectively had to be reconstructed by Director Colby, who faced mounting pressure from Congress and the public (Church Committee 1976, 171). The problem of ethics in counterintelligence is one that to this day has yet to be adequately answered. However, by understanding what counterintelligence was in the beginning, one may be better situated to understand what it is today and why its policies are what they are. By learning from the mistakes made in the past, a better foundation can be set in place for the future.

Both Angleton and the era in which the counterintelligence program was formally organized shaped the nature of counterintelligence at a time when the nation itself was buckling under the stress of paranoia, anger, frustration, and mistrust (Valentine 2016, 23; Wettering 2000, 165). To some degree, the nation has never fully recovered from the stresses of the post-war climate that birthed the counterintelligence program in America (Valentine 2016, 9). When Director Colby dismissed Angleton from his position as head of counterintelligence at the CIA, Colby inherited a staff that was by that time fully grown. Facing political, social, and economic pressures, the CIA was compelled to reorganize, and as the Church Committee reported, it was "an end of an era in CIA counterintelligence" (Church Committee 1976, 171). Yet the consequences of that era remained. The structure that Angleton had created and the nature of counterintelligence itself had already come into being, much like Frankenstein's monster. Victor Frankenstein rejected his own creation, but that did not mean the creation ceased to exist — in fact, the creation went on to destroy the creator.

Such an ominous analogy may be appropriate, at least according to Wettering (2000), the retired Central Intelligence Agency operations officer who oversaw clandestine operations in Europe and Africa for more than three decades. Director Colby certainly felt as much in the 1970s, when it became apparent that the program the federal government had reared into adulthood was not exactly what the state had hoped for. The Church Committee noted that by 1976 the issues facing the counterintelligence program concerned "how best to protect the United States, including the proper degree of compartmentation of CI information, methods of operation, approaches to security, research priorities, extent of liaison cooperation, and emphasis on deception activities" (Church Committee 1976, 172). One dominant issue the Senate uncovered was the lack of cooperation among the various agencies on the counterintelligence front (Wettering 2000, 270). Tension between the CIA and the FBI had been high since the former's birth, and while the two agencies could point to a collaborative spirit in the 1970s, the lack of any substantial counterintelligence office in the FBI meant that the bulk of the work was coordinated by the CIA.

William Evanina, director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, has gone so far as to warn that the challenge of counterintelligence is no longer one the government can address on its own — the private sector must bear some of the burden and weight of protecting data and ensuring digital security in the face of snooping foreign actors (Nakashima 2020). An additional consideration put forward by Tromblay (2017) is that technology has developed rapidly in the last two decades alone, and the counterintelligence program has been slow to cross the generational divide between itself and the digital natives of the 21st century who have grown up using technology. In response to the rise of new, global technological advances, the counterintelligence program has appeared much like a member of an older generation attempting to catch up on what members of younger generations take for granted. Tromblay (2017) calls this the problem of counterintelligence's reactionary orientation — a characteristic of the program that was defined by the circumstances of its birth. Moreover, with so much data now in the hands of private industry, there is an increased need for counterintelligence to work more closely with the private sector. Intelligence operations have always included work within private industry, but in many cases this work was compromised by conflicts of interest (Valentine 2016, 40).

The research question is: How can the US counterintelligence enterprise support collaboration among the various USIC members and the private sector in an ethical and productive manner? To understand the issues and policies of counterintelligence today, it is worth examining the mistakes and lessons that can be learned from the past — specifically from when the counterintelligence program formally began under Angleton. The purpose of this study is to propose a standardized ethical framework for guiding the counterintelligence program as it works to collaborate with the private sector in the 21st century.

Literature Review

To understand the mistakes and the lessons that can be learned from the past, it is necessary to consider the role that ethics plays in the field of counterintelligence. Counterintelligence is, after all, an exercise in deception. Bellaby (2012) defines counterintelligence as "any action or activity that is knowingly designed and intended to encourage an audience of some sort to believe in something which is untrue" (147). Erskine (2004) states that "not only is deception intrinsic to clandestine collection, but it is also central to counter-intelligence activities such as the deployment of 'double agents' and the sending of false messages when it is we who would rather keep our secrets to ourselves" (372). More pointedly, in terms of the danger posed by an unethical approach to counterintelligence, Bellaby (2012) assesses the underlying reason for past failures within the program: the application of widespread deception represents a danger for one's own nation because "lying can damage society as it chips away at, and could destroy, the social bonds of trust and as a result breaks down the moral and social relationships that hold a society together" (149). This danger is highlighted by Valentine (2016), who cites the Phoenix Program — initiated in Vietnam as a template for corruption within the intelligence community — as one that is still promoted to this day (40). A further problem, identified by Bailey and Galich (2012), is that there is no standardized ethical framework used within the counterintelligence program. Just as freedom of religion can quickly lead to freedom from religion, freedom of choice with regard to ethics can quickly lead to freedom from ethics. That problem has been documented extensively by Valentine (2016) and others. The fact is that deception is part of the trade in counterintelligence: "intelligence professionals around the world are taught and encouraged by their leaders and agencies to use unethical tactics or 'tradecraft' (e.g., lie, deceive, steal, and manipulate) in order to obtain [crucial] information" (Coyne et al. 2013, 27).

Valentine's study of the CIA from its inception is unique among other researchers, as he was given special access to CIA agents by Director Colby, and much of the information shared with him was considered "safe" because the agents assumed Valentine was affiliated with the CIA and would not publish what he was told. Valentine's reporting provides a unique but personal look into the history of intelligence in the US. It differs from other studies, such as those of Bellaby (2012) and Pfaff and Tiel (2004), which are scholarly in orientation rather than historical. Valentine's work thus serves as a historical record of errors, mistakes, and problems within the intelligence and counterintelligence enterprise resulting from a lack of ethical imperatives.

Pfaff and Tiel (2004) indicate that practitioners essentially combine aspects of deontology and Lockean ethics, in that the practice of deception is perceived as a duty to the state — one that must be practiced in order to safeguard the state's own secrets and to prevent foreign actors from acquiring truthful information that might compromise a field mission. Yet, as both Pfaff and Tiel (2004) and Valentine (2016) demonstrate, deontology and Lockean ethics have not safeguarded the intelligence community from errors and abuses.

In summation, the literature shows that the problem of ethics in counterintelligence has had no easy solution and that the art of deception fosters a gray zone of disinformation, conflicts of interest, and corruption. The outcome of this situation was that counterintelligence suffered from a poor culture and various other dysfunctions, resulting ultimately in the dismissal of Angleton and an attempt to restart the program. As the program now tries to address the issues of the 21st century, guidance could help steer the counterintelligence program away from the same errors and policies that derailed it in the past. The literature suggests that a need exists to address this problem, and that a theoretical approach should be defined to help respond to that need.

Conclusion

Just as Erikson's model of human development enables psychologists to understand the adult by examining the age-related conflicts that must be overcome before the child can proceed successfully to later stages of development, one could potentially gain insight into the policies and issues of counterintelligence today by examining the early days of the counterintelligence program as it grew through its infancy, childhood, and adolescence during the post-war and Cold War era (Valentine 2016, 10). This study aims to show how conflict, dysfunctional relationships, and a lack of ethical standards led to problems in counterintelligence — and to propose a framework that can guide the program's collaboration with the private sector more effectively and ethically in the future.