Euthanasia, Sanctity of Life, and Utilitarian Ethics

Introduction: The Singer Debate

The central question in debates about euthanasia — whether there are some lives not worth living — sits at the intersection of utilitarian philosophy, disability rights, and the sanctity of life. Examining the arguments of Peter Singer, Harriet McBryde Johnson, and James Rachels reveals the profound complexity of this ethical terrain.

Singer's Utilitarian Framework and Infanticide

Professor Peter Singer is a well-known utilitarian who advocates the right of parents to commit infanticide based upon utilitarian premises. He argues that the resources expended on keeping severely disabled children alive are too great, and that it would make more sense to allow families to adopt healthy children with a greater chance at happiness.

Johnson's Disability Rights Counter-Argument

Disability activist Harriet McBryde Johnson, who notes that she would not be alive if this type of calculus had been employed, challenges Singer directly: "But like the protagonist in a classical drama, Singer has his flaw. It is his unexamined assumption that disabled people are inherently 'worse off,' that we 'suffer,' that we have lesser 'prospects of a happy life'" (Johnson 2003: 12).

However, Johnson also argues against assisted suicide entirely, even with the consent of the person who feels that his or her life is no longer worth living. She argues instead for a society where care is more available to those who need it: "As a society, we should pay workers to provide that care, in the home" (Johnson 2003: 9).

Rachels and Consent at the End of Life

Philosopher James Rachels provides a counterbalancing argument to Johnson's, namely that for many people their lives are agonizing and consciously experienced as not worth living. The problem with infanticide, Rachels would likely counter, is that the infant has no ability to consent as to whether his or her life is meaningful at life's beginning. This situation is very different at the end of life, or after a period of profound suffering.

Rachels admits that a strictly utilitarian argument along the lines of Singer can lead to untenable premises — such as the notion that anyone who was miserable would be better off dead. A possible response to this objection, however, is that psychological misery is a transient state, while a terminal illness cannot, by definition, be alleviated. The objective of utilitarianism is not the erasure of all pain, but the spirit of utilitarianism does call upon us to ask: if someone is dying from a terminal illness and wishes to die, is societal happiness promoted by forcing him or her to undergo heroic measures? Singer would no doubt add that resources are finite and could be better used to prolong the lives of those who actually wished to live.

Conclusion

Of course, objectors like Doerflinger (1989) fear that allowing assisted suicide in one context will lead to a "slippery slope" of permitting it in others — such as for persons struggling with extreme depression. Assisted suicide must still be carefully regulated at the societal level to ensure that it takes place in an appropriate fashion and remains rare. But to prohibit it entirely seems equally dangerous, given the extent to which modern technology is enabling people to live longer and longer, often well after patients themselves have expressed that they no longer wish to do so.

References

Doerflinger, J. (1989). Assisted suicide: Pro-choice or anti-life?

Johnson, H. (2003). Unspeakable conversations. The New York Times.

Rachels, J. (1986). The morality of euthanasia.