FAA Pilot Rest Requirements: Costs, Benefits & Safety

Introduction

On January 15, 2009, Captain Chesley Sullenberger successfully landed U.S. Airways Flight 1549 — a scheduled commercial passenger flight from LaGuardia Airport in New York City to Charlotte/Douglas International Airport in North Carolina — onto the waters of the Hudson River. The plane, an Airbus A320-214, had been struck by a flock of birds, causing an immediate and complete loss of thrust in both engines. Had Captain Sullenberger and the crew of Flight 1549 not responded as they did, in a uniformly calm and composed manner while adhering to FAA safety regulations, there is a strong chance that all 155 occupants aboard the aircraft would not have survived (Sturcke, 2009).

On February 12, 2009, in the wake of the excitement that followed Sullenberger's heroic controlled water landing, a small crew aboard Colgan Air Flight 3407 — a flight from Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey to Buffalo Niagara International Airport in Buffalo, New York — faced a similarly perilous situation. Their aircraft, a 74-seat Bombardier DHC8-402 Q400, began to lose speed dangerously in the cold air over Buffalo. The pilot and copilot, who may have been suffering from fatigue, reacted in the exact opposite manner required in a stall situation. Instead of lowering the nose of the plane to gain speed and improve lift, the pilot, Captain Marvin Renslow, ignored protocol and raised the nose higher and higher, further slowing the aircraft's airspeed until it effectively stalled and crashed, killing all 49 people on board and one person on the ground (NTSB, 2010).

This tragedy — the first fatal commercial plane crash in the United States in several years — compelled the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. Department of Transportation to reexamine pilot policies and procedures for domestic and international flights. Following an investigation into the Colgan crash and a review of pilot policies, U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Ray Lahood and FAA Administrator Randolph Babbitt identified pilot fatigue as a top concern for airline safety. Shortly thereafter, Administrator Babbitt championed several initiatives that would "specify limitations on the hours of pilot flight and duty time to address problems relating to pilot fatigue" (Dorr & Duquette, "Pilot Fatigue," 2010).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the proposed changes in pilot flight time and duty time as well as the factors that precipitated them. Additionally, this paper will weigh the costs of the proposed changes against the potential benefits to determine whether these changes would make a positive impact on the aviation industry. In short — assuming these new pilot rest regulations and fatigue mitigation strategies are adopted — will the airways actually be safer?

What Happened in Buffalo?

To understand the context of the proposed changes in pilot flight time and duty time, it is helpful to understand what precipitated them — and to consider whether these changes represent thoughtful policy reform or a knee-jerk reaction by government bureaucrats. As with most things, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Policies concerning flight rest have been debated for decades; the last substantive proposal regarding a change in pilot rest was submitted in 1995. In large part, due to airline lobbyists and the Air Transport Association (ATA), along with a claimed lack of sufficient evidence that pilot fatigue was truly a systemic issue, those earlier FAA efforts were stymied (Brandon, 2000). At the same time, one can argue that new policy changes sometimes represent government overreach — an attempt to "fix" a problem that has been amplified by a recent tragedy, ensuring that no crisis goes to waste.

To understand the tension between doing what is genuinely right and doing something merely for the sake of appearances, it is useful to revisit the Colgan crash in detail.

Based on the findings of the National Transportation Safety Board investigation, the turboprop Bombardier Q400 began flying at a dangerously slow speed — 135 knots (250 km/h) — at low altitude. A safety device known as the "Stick Shaker" sounded to alert the pilots of the low-speed condition. Instead of following established pre-stall procedures — lowering the nose and adding power to gain speed — Captain Renslow did nearly the opposite: he raised the nose of the plane and added only 75% power. The aircraft slowed to 131 knots (243 km/h), at which point the last-resort safety device known as the "Stick Pusher" activated to automatically lower the nose and prevent a stall. Captain Renslow overrode the Stick Pusher and pulled back on the control yoke, attempting to lift the plane. The aircraft stalled — stalling being a loss of lift and increase in drag that occurs when an aircraft is flown at an angle of attack greater than the angle for maximum lift (NTSB, 2010) — and roughly 26 seconds later, all aboard Colgan Air Flight 3407, along with a civilian on the ground, were dead (NTSB, 2010).

The most pressing question following the crash was: what caused it? The NTSB, after its investigation, identified pilot error as the primary cause. In its detailed report, the Board stated:

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew's failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the low-speed cue, (2) the flight crew's failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain's failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air's inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions" (NTSB, 2010).

Although several factors are cited in the NTSB's probable cause statement, pilot error is clearly the primary reason 50 people lost their lives. While sterile cockpit violations and inadequate training may have played a role, failure to follow proper stall procedures is inexcusable. Aviation experts found Renslow's response baffling. Michael Barr, at the University of Southern California's Aviation Safety and Security Program, remarked, "It's just the opposite of what any pilot would do" (Levin, 2009).

Renslow's anomalous response to the pre-stall conditions led many observers — especially aviation experts — to speculate about what caused him to act as he did. Some suggested he was simply a poor pilot; he had failed four previous FAA check flights and one airline check, though he subsequently passed each upon retaking the tests, and Colgan Air stated his skills were adequate (Levin, 2009).

Aviation professional Henry Bowles offered a different perspective: "Most pilots expected sleep deprivation to play the leading role in the Colgan 3407 accident. The industry has averaged nearly an accident a year for the past twenty years with fatigue listed as a contributing factor" (Bowles, 2010). However, the NTSB was careful to note that "the pilots' performance was likely impaired because of fatigue, but the extent of their impairment and the degree to which it contributed to the performance deficiencies that occurred during the flight cannot be conclusively determined" (NTSB, 2010). In other words, fatigue probably played a role, but the findings remain inconclusive.

Despite those inconclusive findings, many in the aviation community, including FAA Administrator Babbitt, maintained that fatigue is a serious concern. As Babbitt stated in an FAA press release: "I know firsthand that fighting fatigue is a serious issue, and it is the joint responsibility of both the airline and the pilot. After years of debate, the aviation community is moving forward to give pilots the tools they need to manage fatigue and fly safely" (Dorr & Duquette, "Pilot Fatigue," 2010).

Research supports the view that fatigue is genuinely dangerous. As Bowles noted, "Numerous studies have concluded that significant sleep deprivation is equivalent to operating while under the influence of alcohol. The British Medical Journal concluded that after 17–19 hours without sleep, performance on some tests was equivalent to or worse than performance at a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.05%. Response speeds were up to 50% slower for some tests and accuracy measures were significantly poorer than at that level of alcohol. After longer periods without sleep — up to 28 hours — performance reached levels equivalent to the maximum alcohol dose given to subjects (BAC of 0.10%)" (Bowles, 2010).

Yet precisely how much fatigue contributes to airline accidents remains difficult to quantify. One airline transport pilot noted, "Seventy percent of the accidents in aviation are due to pilot error, and fatigue is a major cause of those errors" (Brandon, 2000). The problem with such a claim is that it assumes fatigue was a major cause without objective proof. Most pilots agree that fatigue is a concern, but measuring it is extraordinarily difficult — partly because every pilot has different sleep requirements, and partly because there is usually no way to assess how alert a pilot was at the time of a crash.

The FAA itself acknowledges the science, stating: "Although sleep science is evolving, research has indicated that most people need eight hours of sleep in 24 hours to perform effectively, and the average person needs in excess of nine hours of sleep per night to recover from accumulated sleep debt" (Dorr & Duquette, "Pilot Fatigue," 2010). This is admittedly a generality, but it provides a reasonable starting point for refining pilot rest policy.

History of FAA Fatigue Policy

Regardless of whether fatigue is definitively a major cause of airline accidents, and regardless of whether new rest requirements will measurably reduce accidents, change was clearly on the horizon after the Colgan crash. It served as a catalyst to prompt policy change, pending ratification of the new rule changes proposed in Administrator Babbitt's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), issued in September 2010, with a final ruling targeted for August 1, 2011.

A brief history is instructive. A fatigue-related policy proposal was submitted as far back as 1995, specifically addressing concerns similar to those being raised today. As noted, the lobbying power of the ATA and the lack of consensus evidence were enough to block meaningful change at that time (Brandon, 2000).

Prior to the Colgan crash, in June 2008, the FAA sponsored an event called the "Fatigue Symposium: Partnerships for Solutions," designed to encourage a proactive industry response to pilot fatigue through new fatigue management and mitigation techniques (Dorr & Duquette, "Pilot Fatigue," 2010). Limited to 300 attendees, the symposium was viewed by some as a largely perfunctory exercise.

It is also worth noting the political context. At the time of the Colgan crash in February 2009, Administrator Babbitt had not yet assumed his position; acting Administrator Lynne Osmus was in charge. When Babbitt took office in June 2009, he may have felt particular pressure to make his mark on safety policy quickly. Not long after the NTSB published its report on the Colgan crash in February 2010, Babbitt issued the landmark NPRM in September 2010.

Conclusion

There is reason for skepticism and reluctance regarding these new rules and restrictions. But perhaps the biggest reason to be skeptical about the proposal has nothing to do with the proposal itself; rather, it has to do with human nature — a constant that is impossible to completely control. One can put every regulation and preventive measure in place to curb drunk driving, and people will still drive drunk. Likewise, with pilot fatigue, the FAA could proceed with its $1.25 billion reform and discover a decade later that all its fatigue mitigation policies were implemented in vain — that no matter what rules exist, some pilots will fly while fatigued and make mistakes. This is an inherent risk associated with aviation. As a point of comparison, roughly 40,000 people died each year in the United States in automobile accidents over the previous decade, a number that has remained stubbornly persistent despite billions spent on highway safety campaigns, drunk-driving awareness programs, policy changes, and speed limit enforcement. The question becomes whether spending $1.25 billion will meaningfully correct the fallible nature of human beings who fly planes.

In a rather candid way, Gilligan acknowledged this basic reality in her Congressional testimony:

"In the past, I have said something that is worth repeating now: regardless of what regulatory framework is in place, mitigating the effects of fatigue is a shared responsibility. The FAA has the responsibility to put the framework in place. The air carrier has the responsibility to schedule its flight crews responsibly and in accordance with that framework. The pilot has the ultimate responsibility to use the hours set aside for rest to actually rest, to report for duty in a fit condition, and to notify the airline when he or she is too fatigued or otherwise not fit for duty. Nothing about the latest proposal changes those basic responsibilities" (P. Gilligan, Testimony, September 16, 2010).

Those two words — "ultimately responsible" — cut to the heart of the entire issue. It should be a simple directive, well received and well understood: if you are intoxicated, do not drive; if you are on medication, do not operate heavy machinery; and if you are exhausted, do not fly a plane. Yet in practice, the simplest directives are often the hardest to follow.

At the end of the day, the FAA will most likely adopt these changes. Billions of dollars will be spent in the name of improved aviation safety. Accidents will still occur. But hopefully, when one looks back ten years hence, it will be possible to say conclusively that these new pilot rest regulations were worthwhile — that fewer pilots flew while fatigued, and that fewer lives were lost as a result.

Works Cited

Bowles, H. (2010, February 8). Colgan Pilot Fatigue & NTSB. Better Job Safety. Retrieved from

Brandon, M. (2000, September). The Effects of Fatigue on Performance and Safety. AirlineSafety.com. Retrieved from

Dorr, L., & Duquette, A. (2010, September 16). Fact Sheet — Pilot Fatigue. Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=11857

Dorr, L., & Duquette, A. (2010, September 16). Fact Sheet — Pilot Flight Time, Rest, and Fatigue. Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=6762

Hradecky, S. Crash: Colgan DH8D at Buffalo on Feb 12th 2009, Impacted Home While on Approach. Aviation Herald. Retrieved from http://avherald.com/h?article=414f3dbd/0037&opt=0

Levin, A. (2009, May 13). Buffalo crash: Pilots acted 'just opposite' of normal practices. USA Today. Retrieved from

National Institute of General Medical Sciences. (2008). Circadian Rhythms Fact Sheet. Retrieved from

National Transportation Safety Board. (2010, February 2). Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc., Operating as Continental Connection Flight 3407, Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, Clarence Center, New York, February 12, 2009. (NTSB/AAR-10/01). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Sturcke, J. (2009, January 16). Profile: Chesley 'Sully' Sullenberger. Guardian Online. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/17/hudson-plane-crash-pilot-sullenberger

Towles, R. (2010, September 3). Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved from www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/FAA_2010_22626.pdf