FBI Counterproliferation Strategy: WMDs, Covert Ops & Homeland Security

Introduction

The USS Cole bombing in October 2000 was a prelude to the intense focus on the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that the FBI took up in earnest one year later, in the wake of and in response to 9/11. With the killing of several crewmen and the wounding of several more, the USS Cole bombing was in reality just one more terrorist incident in an already growing line of attacks—both foreign and domestic—that revealed a pressing need for a counterproliferation strategy. When the USS Cole was hit in Aden harbor, the FBI began focusing on suspects who would later be tied to 9/11 and the spread of terror cells throughout the Middle East.¹ It was not, of course, the only incident to spark that focus—but it was an important factor in the development of a new counterproliferation strategy that would inevitably become the plan to stop the spread and usage of WMDs by terrorists against America.

As the primary research question of this study is "In what ways can the nonproliferation regime connect and collaborate with homeland security as a way to improve counterterrorism strategy?" this literature review will focus on identifying sources that can help answer that question, including covert operations that the FBI has engaged in to help prevent the proliferation of WMDs throughout the world.

The Development of a Strategy

As Mauroni points out, the plan to stop the spread and usage of WMDs by terrorists against America and American interests was "based on a counterproliferation strategy developed in response to the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons to military forces in the 1990s."² Yet it was 9/11 that truly introduced an intensely broadened scope, especially with regard to homeland security.³ The origins of the strategy can ultimately be found in the Gulf War crisis of 1991 under the George H. W. Bush administration—and its culmination was witnessed under his son, George W. Bush's administration. Yet, as Mauroni notes, there is still room for the strategy of counterproliferation to be improved even further.⁴

The reason more work remains to be done in developing a strategy to address counterproliferation needs is that globalization has made the world an increasingly dangerous place—one in which rogue nations can obtain WMDs and threaten or hold hostage the rest of the civilized world.⁵ The covert mission of rogue nations to possess WMDs is a threat to the international community, which means there must be a high level of interaction, cooperation, collaboration, and communication among allied nations. A counterproliferation strategy that lacks this level of collaboration will not be an effective one.

The problem that the current strategy faces is fundamentally political: with the rising tide of populism and nationalism around the world, more and more nations that should be allied within the international community are becoming less open to working or collaborating with one another. Tensions are fueled by economic warfare—such as sanctions—and by the withdrawal from treaties, as recently occurred between the U.S. and Russia with respect to the suspension of the Nuclear Arms Control Treaty.⁶ The destabilization of the relationship between East and West is evidence of the growing nature of this challenge. Furthermore, the degree to which mistrust pervades international relations makes true collaboration and cooperation extremely difficult to achieve. Consequently, the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction has identified a role for covert operations within the overall counterproliferation strategy.

Covert Operations

Organizing to combat the proliferation of WMDs "requires a clear delineation of responsibilities," according to the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.⁷ The Commission was established in 1998, and its report was presented the following year to Congress. The Commission observed that to stop proliferation, action must be taken both domestically and abroad, but that overall the strategy "requires specific mechanisms to plan and execute operational responses to the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction, whether diplomatic initiative, foreign assistance, security assurances, covert action, or military retaliation."⁸ The emphasis on covert action is particularly important insofar as the FBI is concerned. The infiltration of organizations and enemy groups has always been a mainstay of U.S. intelligence. From COINTELPRO to today, covert action is an important process in preventing cells or groups from taking steps to undermine or attack American interests.

Ash Carter noted that one covert operation the FBI can use is the tactic of "tagging," which involves covertly placing some kind of marker or identifying feature on any and all objects destined for a WMD laboratory.⁹ The tag can be a transmitter, a chemical marker, or anything that allows the Bureau to trace the movement of the material. This is one example of a covert operation the FBI can implement in order to halt proliferation, especially given the rampant movement of goods and materials in the globalized world. The better able the Bureau is to monitor this traffic, the more likely it is to secure America's borders and interests both domestically and abroad, so that another bombing like that of the USS Cole or an attack like 9/11 cannot occur in the future.

Penetrating the information infrastructure is another covert operational strategy the FBI can use in its counterproliferation plan. This strategy uses signals intelligence—allowing cell phones, laptop computers, local area network devices, and other information infrastructure to be penetrated and exploited—so that the Bureau can monitor what information is being passed through networks and devices belonging to groups suspected of engaging in terrorist activity.¹⁰

Technology obviously plays a major role in the FBI's ability to engage in covert operations. Miniaturization is one technological advancement that supports this process: it involves shrinking monitoring technology to a size small enough to go undetected. One application of miniaturization is in verifying that allies and treaty signatories in the international community are actually staying true to their commitments and not engaging in proliferation.¹¹

In order to successfully penetrate, mitigate, and disrupt proliferation networks around the world, the FBI must engage in covert operations—or risk its objectives becoming known to the very parties and networks it aims to thwart.¹² One additional avenue for FBI covert operations lies in legal mechanisms: for example, the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) allows the Bureau to use possible violations of the ECRA "as a predicate offense to obtain search warrants, conduct undercover operations, conduct both domestic and foreign investigations, and make arrests."¹³ To this end, the FBI can deploy undercover agents, as it did when it ensnared Brussels-based Kaiga and disrupted his illicit activities regarding the export of aluminum tubes from the U.S. that were believed to be destined for WMD labs in Iran.¹⁴

Undercover operations, lure operations, and sting operations are all part of the FBI's counterproliferation strategy today.¹⁵ They are all useful in building criminal cases against suspects and targets. Another example of undercover operations can be found in the Department of Homeland Security's sting operation in which Jiang Guanghou Yan was caught trafficking counterfeit goods.¹⁶ The natural link between the FBI and Homeland Security should allow for a more comprehensive sweep of international groups and networks, reducing the risk of proliferation. Using undercover, sting, and other covert means and methods, an alliance between the FBI and Homeland Security could pay off considerably in terms of preventing WMDs from falling into the wrong hands.¹⁷ Indeed, Mike McConnell has already shown that the DHS and the FBI are developing an integrated approach to intelligence gathering in hopes of addressing the issue of counterproliferation and the spread of WMDs.¹⁸

The FBI's use of covert operations has not been without controversy. COINTELPRO, for example, was a covert operation that focused on placing undercover agents inside domestic organizations deemed radical and a threat to national security. Agents infiltrated various radical organizations that emerged during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and many of them attained positions of power within the very organizations they penetrated.¹⁹ The program was largely used to contain Communist groups and supremacist groups. Today, however, covert operations can be used to infiltrate hate groups, radical Islamist terror cells, and other extremist groups that could participate in the proliferation networks that the FBI also monitors through covert means.

Part of the danger involved in covert operations can be seen in just how difficult it was for the FBI to investigate the USS Cole bombing in 2000 in Yemen. When FBI agents arrived on the scene, they were greeted by hostile Yemeni soldiers and constantly harassed in their residences by soldiers out in the streets. At no point did the agents feel safe or secure, and their removal by helicopter from the environment ended with a diverting maneuver out of fear that hostiles would use surface-to-air missiles to attack the aircraft.²⁰ Thus, for the safety of agents in the field, covert operations present a better way to conduct investigations and to prevent attacks in the first place—particularly when the strategies discussed by Ash Carter can be utilized in the field and operated from a safe distance.

Conclusion

The FBI's counterproliferation strategy can be successful if it follows the recommendations of the scholars and researchers cited in this review. Those recommendations include: engaging in greater collaboration with other nations in the international community; employing covert operations to track goods and materials that might be used in the manufacturing of WMDs; conducting undercover operations to build cases against criminals both domestic and foreign; and rethinking what the term "WMD" actually means and what the real threat of a WMD entails. If loss of life is the primary measure of threat, then the drug trade—and synthetic opioids in particular—must also be considered a WMD-type threat and addressed within the broader counterproliferation framework accordingly.