Israeli-Egyptian Conflict and the Iraq War: Just War Analysis
This paper examines two major modern conflicts — the 1967 Israeli-Egyptian War (the Six-Day War) and the 2003 Iraq War — through the lens of just war theory. The paper evaluates the circumstances leading to Israel's preemptive strike on Egypt, including Egyptian military buildup, the withdrawal of UN forces, and Arab coalition threats, and assesses whether Israel's action qualifies as morally justified under a spectrum of war justification. It then turns to the Iraq War, exploring the background of unresolved tensions from the 1991 Gulf War, disputes over weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of No-Fly Zones as context for the 2003 coalition invasion.
- Introduction to the Israeli-Egyptian Conflict: Origins and causes of the 1967 war
- Preemptive Strike and Intelligence Assessments: CIA and U.S. analysis of Egyptian military intent
- Just War Justification for the 1967 War: Applying just war criteria to Israel's preemptive strike
- Background to the Iraq War: Origins of 2003 Iraq War from Gulf War tensions
- Conclusion: Final evaluations of both conflicts
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What makes this paper effective
- The paper applies a clear analytical framework — the just war spectrum — to evaluate two distinct conflicts, giving the analysis a consistent evaluative lens throughout.
- It draws on specific historical evidence (CIA assessments, UN resolutions, presidential statements) to support its claims rather than relying solely on general assertions.
- The paper acknowledges ambiguity honestly, noting that the 1967 war falls in a gray zone of justification rather than forcing a definitive moral verdict.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates comparative case analysis: two separate historical conflicts are examined using the same ethical framework, allowing the reader to see how the same criteria yield different conclusions depending on the facts and context of each case. This technique is particularly effective for applied ethics and political science writing.
Structure breakdown
The paper is organized into two main case studies. The first covers the 1967 Israeli-Egyptian conflict, moving from historical background through intelligence analysis to a just war assessment. The second introduces the 2003 Iraq War, establishing its origins in the unresolved 1991 Gulf War and WMD disputes. Each section follows the same pattern: factual context, key actors and decisions, and evaluative commentary. The conclusion section appears to have been cut from the source but is flagged accordingly.
Introduction to the Israeli-Egyptian Conflict
On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a surprise attack on Egypt that quickly spread to involve other neighboring states, with both ground and air forces becoming engaged in the conflict. Israel claimed that the attack was provoked by a massive Egyptian military buildup along the Israeli border. On May 27 of that year, Egyptian President Abdel Nasser stated that Egypt's basic objective was the destruction of Israel (BBC, 1967). Although Israel had consistently attempted to negotiate with its neighbors, its overtures were repeatedly rejected (Bard, 2008).
Intelligence indicated that the Arab states were preparing to go to war against Israel, with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria being aided by Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Algeria. On May 16, President Nasser ordered the withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Forces from the Egyptian-Israeli border. Later that month, Egypt signed a pact with Jordan declaring that an attack on one was an attack on both. Israel viewed this as a clear sign of preparation for war. Israel claimed that a preemptive strike was necessary because the element of surprise was the only way it could stand any chance of defending itself against the increasing threat from neighboring states (BBC, 1967).
Preemptive Strike and Intelligence Assessments
Subsequently, Nasser asserted to U.S. President Lyndon Johnson that his troops in the Sinai Peninsula had been positioned to defend against a possible Israeli attack. The U.S. State Department had warned Egypt that there were rumors a conflict might be imminent. However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed that Nasser's military presence in the Sinai was defensive in nature, stating: "Armored striking forces could breach the UAR's double defense line in the Sinai in three to four days and drive the Egyptians west of the Suez Canal in seven to nine days. Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or Jordan during this period" (Hammond, 2010).
Just War Justification for the 1967 War
Given the criteria presented in the spectrum of justification for war, this conflict may be classified as an easier-to-justify preventive war. The Arab states had indeed demonstrated acts of hostile intent, taken preparatory steps toward hostile action, and made inflammatory rhetoric in the face of reasonable offers of negotiation. However, since there is some room for doubt that an attack was actually imminent, this war cannot be classified as fully justified under the strictest standards. Whether or not Israel was morally justified in taking this action is debatable; nonetheless, when placed in the context of the time, a strong argument can be made that it was. The Six-Day War remains one of the most studied and contested cases in the ethics of preemptive military force.
Conclusion
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