Military Drones and the Global War on Terror: Costs vs. Gains

Introduction

Throughout history, nations have constantly searched for the best weapons available to defend their interests at home and abroad, and this quest continues today. When they were first introduced roughly 150 years ago, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), more commonly known as "drones," appeared to represent the pinnacle of weapons technology. Here was a powerful weapon that could strike at the heart of enemy territory without risking friendly human lives in the process. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the use of drones became virtually synonymous with the global war on terror, and the United States continues to rely on these weapons to fight terrorism around the world.

Although the U.S. has enjoyed some military successes with drones since 9/11, many critics argue that the collateral damage caused by these devices only serves to further radicalize Islamic populations. The purpose of this paper is to review the relevant literature and demonstrate that the use of drones by the United States and its allies has had a primarily negative effect on winning the global war on terror. Following this review, a summary of the research and important findings concerning the actual effects of drone usage on the global war on terror are presented in the conclusion.

Overview of Military Drone Capabilities and History

At first blush, drones appear to represent the pinnacle of modern warfare (Sadat, 2012). These unmanned aircraft vary in size from model airplanes to full-sized Cessna aircraft, and some more recent models can even operate underwater. In sharp contrast to the smaller, camera-equipped drone models favored by private citizens, the drones used for military applications are aptly named — with a corresponding price tag to match. As Dalziel (2019) reports, "As may be inferred from their names, the Predator, Reaper, Fire Scout, and Global Hawk are some of the models equipped with Hellfire missiles capable of reaching targets from up to 65,000 feet, with a comparably low price tag (the smallest costing approximately US$4 million)" (p. 3).

Although drones differ in size, function, and capabilities, they share the common characteristic of projecting military might without jeopardizing friendly human lives — or so the argument goes (Yolcu, 2019). In reality, critics of drone use by the U.S. military and intelligence agencies maintain that these practices only serve to heighten existing local and regional tensions and further radicalize Muslim populations, especially those that may have been politically moderate prior to being attacked from above by unseen weapons, typically without warning.

The use of military drones by the United States has increased significantly since they were first used for reconnaissance during the Vietnam War (Dalziel, 2019). The main catalyst for this rapid escalation was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, though even earlier uses attracted significant criticism. According to Dalziel (2019), "Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration enlisted armed drones in counter-terrorist operations — a usage that has proved controversial" (p. 4). Based on recommendations from American military leaders, President Barack Obama authorized the continued use of drones following his accession to the executive office, and President Trump likewise continued this authorization (Sterio, 2018). The comparison to mustard gas in World War I is instructive: what seemed like a great idea until the wind changed direction and killed the troops that deployed it has an analogue in drones, as terrorist groups have begun using these weapons for attacks against the United States and its allies abroad.

Civilian Casualties and the Radicalization Effect

The word "controversial" may be an understatement, especially given the actual number of civilian casualties caused by U.S. military drones. Researchers conclude that there have been fewer than 70 total civilian deaths caused by U.S. military drones since 2008, compared to 2,160 Islamic belligerents killed (Abbott & Ahmed, 2013). Given the severe backlash that has resulted from America's use of drones, it remains unclear whether these limited results justify their continued deployment against Islamic militants. Moreover, while fewer than 70 civilian deaths may appear to be a small number, each of those lives held meaning, and the families and friends of those individuals did not view their deaths as insignificant. More importantly, any casualty who even appears to resemble an Islamic terrorist is counted as such, regardless of whether that individual was an innocent civilian (Coyne & Hall, 2016).

The incalculable cost of innocent human lives lost to drone strikes calls into question the fundamental rationale for their initial and continued use. While U.S. military tacticians may be forgiven for their original lack of understanding regarding the potential blowback from drone usage, the results to date clearly indicate that the U.S. is not only failing to learn from its mistakes but is also failing to receive enough "bang for the buck." Drones are expensive and are actually creating more terrorists than they eliminate (Terrill, 2013). As Dalziel (2019) argues, "To fight terror the United States has employed terror in the form of drone strikes, a strategy which has not defeated al-Qaeda, which responds with a mere shuffle of human resources [and] the War on Terror persists" (p. 3).

Just as one individual's terrorist is another's freedom fighter, characterizing military drones as weapons of terror changes the calculus in important ways. If military drones are, as the U.S. and like-minded proponents claim, legitimate weapons of war specifically designed to minimize collateral civilian casualties, then their use should be accepted and embraced by the international community. This viewpoint, however, is not shared by the people on the receiving end of drone strikes, irrespective of how carefully those strikes have been aimed and guided. Although this emotionally charged reaction by populations in Arab nations targeted by U.S. drones may not be immediately understandable to many Americans preoccupied with domestic concerns, the citizens of targeted countries endure those same everyday challenges combined with the threat of being killed by a silent weapon from above.

It is little wonder that critics of U.S. drone use cite the increasingly hostile reactions that inevitably follow strikes in foreign countries as a compelling reason to end the program. Nevertheless, the U.S. government has not advanced any indication of its intention to stop using drones for the foreseeable future, despite demands from the leaders of targeted nations to do so (Ahmed, 2012). For example, following a drone strike in Pakistan in November 2011 that left 24 soldiers dead, Pakistani lawmakers issued a demand for the United States to "review its footprints in Pakistan [which] means the cessation of drone strikes inside Pakistan" (Ahmed, 2012, p. 37).

Conclusion

The research showed that drones have been used by the military for more than 70 years for a wide range of applications, most especially surveillance and as weapons delivery platforms. Although the model drones favored by civilian hobbyists carry their own risks for aviation safety and privacy, the use of drones by the military is another matter entirely. Military drones are not only incredibly fast but potentially deadly to anyone in their proximity, whether they are accurately delivered or not.

In the final analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that if people poke a hungry tiger with a sharp stick long enough, they will eventually regret it — and this has also been the case with the use of drones by the United States in its prosecution of the global war on terror. The evidence reviewed here consistently indicates that drone strikes are radicalizing large portions of the Islamic world against Western interests in general and those of the United States in particular, all while failing to deliver sufficient strategic value to justify their continued and expanding use.

References

Abbott, S. & Ahmed, M. (2013, October 31). Pakistan says 3% of drone deaths civilians. USA Today.

Ahmed, I. (2012, March 20). What does Pakistan want from US? An apology, more money, no drones. The Christian Science Monitor, 19.

Coyne, C. J. & Hall, A. R. (2018, Summer). The drone paradox: Fighting terrorism with mechanized terror. Independent Review, 23(1), 51–55.

Dalziel, N. (2014, May–June). Drone strikes: Ethics and strategy. New Zealand International Review, 39(3), 2–5.

Rosenthal, D. J. & Schulman, L. D. (2019, August 10). Trump's secret war on terror: Drone strikes continue and spread — away from public scrutiny or congressional oversight. The Atlantic.

Sadat, L. N. (2012, Fall). America's drone wars. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 45(1–2), 215–222.

Sterio, M. (2018, Summer). Lethal use of drones: When the executive is the judge, jury, and executioner. Independent Review, 23(1), 35–39.

Terrill, W. A. (2013, Winter–Spring). Drones over Yemen: Weighing military benefits and political costs. Parameters, 42, 17–21.

Yolcu, F. H. (2019, Winter). We kill because we can: From soldiering to assassination in the drone age. Insight Turkey, 21(1), 225–234.