James Moor's Computer Ethics: Policy Gaps and the Digital Age

Introduction: Moor's Enduring Relevance

Given how new the field of computing was in the mid-1980s, it is no surprise that the field of computer ethics was still evolving when James Moor wrote his foundational article. Issues that were mainly theoretical at the beginning of the computer revolution have since become matters with which most people in the world's industrialized nations must grapple on a daily basis. What is remarkable is how well Moor anticipated these ethical issues, despite the fact that computing was a relatively new field at the time he wrote. He described some of the major issues facing computer users and offered his opinion about how those issues might develop unless they were addressed.

Though an evolving field, computer ethics is still plagued by many of the issues Moor noted a quarter of a century ago. This means that not only was Moor able to identify ethical dilemmas related to computers at the start of the Computer Revolution, but he was also able to identify those issues that would be the most difficult to solve — ones that would seem almost inherent in computer usage itself.

The Policy Vacuum and Its Modern Manifestations

One of the things that Moor noticed in 1985 was a policy vacuum. By this, he meant that there was no consensus about how computers should be used. Furthermore, different groups of people — even those without criminal or obviously immoral intent — might hold different views regarding the appropriate use of computers. Further complicating the issue is the fact that each time computers present new capabilities to their users, those capabilities bring attached ethical questions. This is an issue that has only grown in magnitude since Moor wrote his article.

The internet connects people in ways that were barely imaginable at that time, and what people can do with computer applications goes far beyond what people should do with them. There are now some social policies that prohibit certain ethically questionable behaviors, but detection remains difficult, leaving most individuals to determine for themselves what constitutes an ethical use of computer technology.

A recent example of the policy vacuum was the question of how to handle internet gambling sites when gambling was illegal in some but not all states and the sites were organized offshore. That vacuum has since been partially filled by the prohibition of online gambling for cash. However, the personal vacuum still exists, because it remains very easy for people to gamble online with little concern about detection. Another example is that the internet has greatly facilitated the trade in child pornography. The criminal justice system has done meaningful work in criminalizing the online transmission of child pornography, but the vast resources of the internet make it virtually impossible to detect and punish all offenders. Moreover, that trade actively harms its victims and is unlikely to be self-regulated in any fashion. More stringent public policies — which might hamper legitimate information transfer in other areas — may be the only effective social remedy.

Conceptual Vacuums and Competing Frameworks

In addition to the policy vacuum, Moor identifies a conceptual vacuum that can be even more difficult to address. According to Moor, a coherent conceptual framework is necessary in order to provide the policies needed when a policy gap exists. Computer-related issues create conceptual challenges because there is a wide range of ways to view them. For example, are computer programs subject to copyright or patent protection? Determining the conceptual framework helps determine the solution to the underlying problems.

Moor does not explicitly state that the conceptual vacuum comes first, but in practice it does. Almost all social policy has developed over hundreds of years, long before anything resembling computing was possible. Even those social policies developed in the wake of the Industrial Revolution could not have anticipated the rise of the computer. Therefore, while the policy vacuum may become apparent first, the conceptual vacuum exists as soon as a new technology becomes possible.

One contemporary example of the conceptual vacuum is how to treat freeware software applications that are modified by end users — can an individual hold a property interest in something based on freeware? Another example is how to treat internet communications: should they be classified like telecommunications, like other forms of written communication, or as a unique form of communication entirely? These questions illustrate that the conceptual groundwork often lags behind the technology it must govern.

Logical Malleability and the Computer Revolution

The vacuums described above exist in part because of what Moor calls the logical malleability of computers. Computers can be shaped and molded to perform virtually any activity based on logical operations, which means they can appear to simulate even activities that do not seem rooted in logic. A vivid modern example is the IBM computer that defeated two Jeopardy! champions in open competition. The computer used the words in each clue to search for the most probable answer. However, what it could not do — because of its logical limitations — was determine whether an answer simply sounded right. Though the computer was rarely wrong, when it did err, the answers were sometimes strikingly absurd. That is a compelling illustration of logical malleability. What makes it even more instructive is that the same computer, programmed to play a trivia game, could be reprogrammed to do something entirely different.

Moor argues that this logical malleability forms the basis of the Computer Revolution, because computers are capable of such a wide variety of tasks. He also draws a parallel between the Computer Revolution and the English Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution was significant because industrial technology was unlike any innovation that had come before it, ushering in an era of social change unprecedented in scope. The Computer Revolution has done the same. The most significant change is that the world is now truly global, and the degree of information sharing possible today is simply without historical precedent. While people had access to international news for most of the twentieth century, much of that information was filtered. Now, with individuals able to contribute directly to the global conversation, the exchange of information is extraordinary.

Computers are affordable, abundant, and involved in virtually every aspect of society. It is precisely because computers pervade almost every area of life — and are logically malleable enough to fit into other areas still — that makes them revolutionary. The Computer Revolution is complete in the same sense that the Industrial Revolution is complete: computers already permeate nearly every domain of modern life. Yet, just as change continued within the areas enabled by the Industrial Revolution, one can expect continued change within the Computer Revolution. Consider the rapidly evolving mobile telephone market: cellular phones are no longer mere communication devices but full communications platforms. Another frontier is artificial intelligence. No current computer possesses genuine emotion — only logic. The development of true artificial intelligence would signal the beginning of a different kind of revolution, because it would, once again, fundamentally change the playing field.

Conclusion: Questions for Moor

Moor did such a thorough job of describing and anticipating the ethical issues related to computers that it would be genuinely interesting to learn his personal ethical views on some of today's most troubling digital dilemmas. For example, it would be worth asking him whether he would support or oppose restrictions on internet usage designed to curtail unethical behavior, or whether he would consider such restrictions more unethical in themselves because they reflect systemic control of information. One might also ask Moor whether he considers WikiLeaks ethical or unethical — since, at its core, WikiLeaks attempts to uncover precisely the kind of invisibility that Moor finds so ethically troubling. Finally, one might ask whether Moor believes the Computer Revolution has ended or is still underway. His framework suggests the latter: as long as computing continues to expand into new domains of human life, the ethical questions it generates will continue to evolve as well.

References

Moor, J. (1985). What is computer ethics? Metaphilosophy, 16(4), 266–275.