Narco-Terrorism: Drugs, Terror, and Global Security

The Shadowed Face of Narco-Terrorism

"You live in the shadow of a monster — the Afghan opium trade that threatens not only your nation, but the world." — Karen Tandy, Administrator, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (Peters, 2007)

"The war on drugs would support the fight against terrorists," Karen Tandy, administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), stresses (Peters, 2007). Consequently, Pakistan and Afghanistan need to cooperate more in their fight against this region's "exploding opium trade," Tandy contends (Peters, 2007). Tandy warns both countries that because of the Afghan opium trade, they "live in the shadow of a monster" — a monster of narco-terrorism that not only threatens their nations, but others around the world (Peters, 2007).

Narco-terrorism, Douglas J. Davids explains in his book Narco-Terrorism: A United Strategy to Fight a Growing Terrorist Menace, constitutes "terrorism that aims to protect and support the activities of illegal drug traffickers," as well as "terrorism by organizations that use the financial profits of narco-trafficking to support their political, religious, or other goals" (Saskiewicz, 2006).

History of Narco-Terrorism

In 1983, former Peruvian President Belaunde Terry described the Shining Path Marxist rebels' terrorist-type attacks against Peru's anti-narcotics police as "narco-terrorism." During 1986, former U.S. President Ronald Reagan also invoked the term when discussing "purported links between international drug trafficking and terrorism among allies of the Soviet Union (Cuba, Nicaragua)" (Chouvy, 2004).

More recently, a DEA official similarly asserted that "the war on terror and the war on drugs are linked." The DEA contends that narco-terrorism refers to terrorist acts carried out by groups "directly or indirectly involved in cultivating, manufacturing, transporting, or distributing illicit drugs" (Chouvy, 2004).

Hutchinson (2002) discusses the connection between drugs and terrorism, noting that Afghanistan — a major source of heroin in the world — produced approximately 70% of the world's supply of opium (converted to heroin) during 2000. During this period, the Taliban, then the ruling authority, taxed the drug trade and in some cases issued tax receipts for revenue collected from heroin traffickers. Hutchinson also noted that the DEA "received multi-source information that Osama bin Laden [financed and facilitated] heroin-trafficking activities."

To put this in perspective, one area of the world was producing 2,700 metric tons of opium, compared to less than 100 metric tons of heroin consumed in the United States — a massive overproduction of supply. As Hutchinson (2002) observed, this presented both a tremendous challenge and an opportunity for the international community to cooperate in addressing the supply flowing out of Afghanistan.

Colombia. In Colombia, three groups designated as terrorist organizations by the State Department operate: the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia); the ELN (National Liberation Army); and the AUC (United Self-Defenses of Colombia). At least two of these — the AUC and the FARC — are heavily engaged in drug trafficking, receiving enormous funds from the narcotics trade. The State Department estimates that the FARC receives approximately $300 million a year from drug sales to finance its terrorist activities (Hutchinson, 2002).

Peru. In Peru, the Shining Path has historically benefited from taxing coca cultivation in the regions it controls. Evidence suggests the group was responsible for a car bombing that killed nine people prior to President Bush's visit to Peru. As Hutchinson (2002) observed, "the facts demonstrate that drugs are a funding source for terrorism and violence against government."

Mexico. Hutchinson (2002) recounted a visit to Mexico City in February 2002 in which he met with Attorney General Macedo de la Concha. Upon shaking hands with prosecutor Mario Roldan Quirino — who was handling a case involving a multi-ton seizure of cocaine from a fishing vessel — Hutchinson departed the city. Within one hour, Roldan was shot 28 times and assassinated outside Mexico City.

The Toll on Law Enforcement. In the first few months of 2002 alone, 13 law enforcement officers were murdered in Mexico. As Hutchinson (2002) argued: "When you're going after government officials [and] judicial officials to impact the stability of a government, in my judgment, it is terrorism."

Impact of Narco-Terrorism

As a new and sinister "monster," narco-terrorism presents a shadowy "aspect of the international terrorist phenomenon because its effects are insidious, persistent and more difficult to identify than are the sporadic, violent outbursts of the armed assailant" (Thackrah, 2004, p. 177).

Drugs, as a vital component of the terrorist portfolio, serve as a source of revenue to support terrorist organizations' general activities. In addition, the use of drugs in target countries — such as the United States — constitutes part of the terrorists' program to undermine the enemy country's integrity by weakening society's moral fiber, fostering widespread addiction, and nurturing the socially debilitating criminal activities that accompany the drug trade.

In his analytical study of narco-terrorism, Davids reveals numerous ways in which revenues earned from illicit drugs sold on the international market have repeatedly financed terrorist organizations, insurgencies, and known U.S. enemies. Through seven case studies, he identifies links between global illegal drug use and the financial support of internationally recognized terrorist organizations. Due to a dearth of international cooperation to establish a counternarcotics plan, the rigid interpretation of national sovereignty that thwarts law-enforcement agencies (LEAs) from tracking narco-traffickers who flee to neighboring countries, and a flawed approach overemphasizing the LEAs' role while limiting military force, Davids stresses that contemporary drug eradication and interdiction efforts continue to fail (Saskiewicz, 2006).

The majority of Americans, according to Davids, do not realize that profits from illegal drugs finance insurgencies and international terrorist organizations. Members of the U.S. public need to be educated about the international drug-terrorist connection. Those who fail to comply with U.S. drug laws need to be held accountable for their actions. Repeat offenders, drug distributors, and dealers, Davids argues, ought to be extradited to foreign nations adversely affected by narcotics-funded insurgencies or terrorist organizations (Saskiewicz, 2006).

An abundance of evidence confirms connections between the international narcotics trade and terrorist organizations. The Palestine Liberation Organization, for instance, "has been involved in over a hundred operations in the last decade involving drugs, and linking that organization through Bulgaria, Cuba, and Syria to drug traffic to the U.S.A." (Thackrah, 2004, p. 177). Organized crime networks, which also serve to distribute drugs, routinely involve drugs-for-arms transactions.

Narco-terrorism in the United States has been uncovered during investigations of illegal immigration, organized crime, and political corruption. For some years, the Sandinista guerrillas were involved in the international drug trade both before and after achieving power in Nicaragua. The narco-terrorist — connected to drug traffic and employing random killing of innocent bystanders — is a very special hybrid and the latest in a long line of terrorist groups. The Federal Government has long been aware of the narco-terrorist threat to the integrity of the state but has generally been unable to control the spread of the problem.

The links between terrorist and insurgent groups and traffickers are most substantial in drug source countries including Burma, Colombia, Peru, and Thailand. In Colombia, four major insurgent organizations work in collaboration with cocaine traffickers. In 1982, the FARC reportedly obtained over $3.8 million per month by collecting protection money (Thackrah, 2004, p. 177).