Russia's National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine

Introduction: Russia's Updated National Security Documents

According to Isabelle Facon, Russia found it necessary to update its national security strategy following the events that unfolded in Ukraine and the crisis that followed in Moscow. Russia adopted a new military doctrine on December 25, 2014, which was signed by the president a year later; Russia also adopted a new foreign policy concept on November 30, 2016.¹

The updated documents highlight several key issues that reflect Russia's traditional worldview and vision. They underscore the country's status as a world power and assert that its sovereignty must be respected. They also indicate that Russia's foreign policy must remain independent of outside influence. The general message conveyed by the documents is that the outside world is chaotic, dangerous, volatile, and marked by stiff competition for resources — including competition for control of Russia's resources, trade routes, and political power over its associates and major world powers. The documents emphasize Russia's need to maintain its political influence in the post-Soviet era. The implication is that Russia must control the political and military arrangements around its borders, including those of its neighboring countries.²

Key Themes in Russia's Security Strategy

Keir Giles identifies newer elements in the updated documents. The prospect of making Russia stronger comes at a price: there is formidable opposition from other world powers that reject the stance taken by Russia's new foreign policy documents. Part of the security strategy, notably, is to educate children in school to become responsible Russian citizens grounded in the traditional cultural and social values of the Russian state.

According to Giles, traditional Western powers have lost their grip on the economic front and are now making persistent attempts to reposition themselves and maintain the status quo in the new world order. Such moves cause instability in international relations and turmoil both regionally and globally.³ Russia interprets these Western efforts as a direct threat to its sphere of influence and uses them to justify the assertive posture reflected in its updated security documents.

Russia's Military Strategy and Operational Concepts

National security strategy is the science and art of allocating and applying military force in order to achieve national objectives in times of both peace and war. Ends are defined as the objectives or the reasons for the strategies used to achieve them. Strategic reach requires a combination of military power, economic sustenance, alliances, and diplomacy. Ways denote how a country's resources are applied, while means are the tangible and intangible resources available. A combination of means and ways thus provides the basis for devising strategic reach.⁴

Russia has actively conducted operations in former Soviet states in order to deter NATO and the EU from influencing those countries. Western analyses of these conflicts have highlighted the various forces that Russia and the Russian Federation Armed Forces (FRAF) have employed to achieve their ends. Russia has been reported to exploit cyber forces in countries such as Estonia, conventional military forces in Georgia, and its Special Operations Forces in the Crimea region of Ukraine. Analysts have also examined how Special Operations Forces, Airborne, and naval divisions functioned as rapid response units in these operations.

FRAF has shifted its offensive approaches and adopted a new operational style to achieve its intentions in neighboring countries. It has established spheres of influence within former Soviet states, seeking to protect Russian interests and those of Russian minorities abroad. In 2003, Russia drafted and released a white paper that supported this policy. It indicated a shift in military thinking and defined a new operational concept — one powered by the need to integrate operational, strategic, and tactical elements of force. An important aspect of the strategy was the swift disruption, destruction, and control of economic, communications, political, and infrastructural elements. These moves are intended to disable the enemy's command and control over its operational lines. Russia seeks to achieve this end by using proxy forces stationed within enemy territory, combined with cyber-attacks and information networks.⁵

It is evident that the current Russian military concept employs both military and non-military methods in a synchronized manner across informational and physical domains simultaneously. Russian forces intend to apply both direct and asymmetrical actions in the process. By creating chaos, disabling the enemy economically, seizing important installations and terrain, mitigating enemy capabilities, and isolating leadership controls, Russian forces aim to seize control before conventional force is ever decisively committed.

U.S. Interests and Objectives Regarding Russia

The difficult relationship between the United States and Russia has less to do with substantive ideological differences than with the inability of both sides to break from deep-seated mutual mistrust. Therefore, in order to advance U.S. interests with regard to Russia, the United States should adopt a mixed approach — employing a selective stance in its engagement with Russia.⁷ The U.S. needs to explore new relationship horizons, given that these two countries are no longer enemies in principle and are potentially partners.

In its discussions of tactical nuclear arms with Russia, the U.S. should initially focus on negotiating consolidation and verification measures rather than immediate reductions. For as long as it is feasible, efforts to achieve broader strategic goals in the relationship with Russia should take priority over expanding NATO in ways that could interfere with more important U.S. priorities. The U.S. should also push Russia to facilitate greater investment in the energy sector and make clear to Moscow that the mistreatment of Western and U.S. companies damages ideal investment conditions and Russia's international image. Such actions also undermine bilateral relations more broadly.⁸

Bibliography

Facon, Isabelle. "Russia's National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine and Their Implications for the EU." European Parliament, 2017. doi: 10.2861/635490.

Giles, Keir. "Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020." ETH Zurich, June 2009.

Graham, Allison, Robert D. Blackwill, Dimitri K. Simes, and Paul J. Saunders. "Russia and U.S. National Interests: Why Should Americans Care?" Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard, October 2011. https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/20057953/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf.

Selhorst, A.J.C. "Russia's Perception Warfare." Militaire Spectator 185, no. 4 (2016): 148–164.

Yarger, Richard. "Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model." Air University, 2010. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/stratpap.htm.