US Foreign Policy, Military Power, and Imperial Governance

Introduction: Foundations of US Foreign Policy

The government of America exists for its citizens' welfare, an obligation that encompasses responsibility for both internal and external affairs. The key principles of US foreign policy are: defense of the nation's physical territory, safeguarding citizens from attacks by enemies, promoting America's status and economic interests, and advancing the nation's democracy- and freedom-related values across the world. By the end of the twentieth century, US foreign policy entailed relationships with a total of 159 states that were typically competitive, sometimes supportive, and at other times clearly unfriendly (Deutsch, 1997).

The government's executive branch has largely remained in charge of US foreign policy. The President of the United States is accorded constitutional power to forge treaties, command the nation's armed forces, and enter into executive agreements that do not require congressional approval. Consequently, the President is ideally positioned to define and pursue the nation's international aims (Rosen, 2003).

A number of entities advise and attempt to influence the President on matters of foreign policy, including the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, senior citizens, the Council on Foreign Relations, and similar interest groups. Additionally, public opinion shapes foreign policy. The threat of being removed from office for an unpopular decision typically restrains excessively aggressive policymakers (Deutsch, 1997).

The disbanding of the Soviet Union was accompanied by a post-Cold War intermission in the United States, best understood now as a transitional era marked by insecurity, during which the nation struggled to define its role within a global system in which no single existential threat remained.

The culmination of the decades-long Cold War meant that military deterrence was no longer as central to American strategy. Terrorist acts — most notably the September 11, 2001 attacks — emerged as more pressing threats to national security. To safeguard the nation and its citizens against such attacks, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established by Congress in 2002. The Department's mission was to prevent terrorist attacks and aid with recovery efforts should such attacks occur. It consolidated numerous federal organizations, including the US Secret Service, the Coast Guard, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (Deutsch, 1997).

Thus began America's fight against terrorism, targeting both terrorist organizations and the states that supported them. The foremost action was leading an armed expedition with a global coalition to eliminate the al-Qaeda terrorist organization based in Afghanistan. Beyond targeting al-Qaeda — which claimed responsibility for the 9/11 attacks — the mission also aimed at overthrowing the Taliban regime, the Afghan government that had supported and sheltered al-Qaeda. By 2002, that regime had fallen and al-Qaeda fighters had been forced to flee. The United States vowed to continue its struggle against terrorism worldwide (Gill, 1993).

The Department of Defense reflects a consistent ethic of civilian control over the military, with the Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of the individual service branches all being civilians. The Department originally combined the naval and army departments, integrating them with the Air Force. Over time, however, its structure grew more dispersed, expanding to include organizations such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Agency (NSA) (Rosen, 2003).

The Department of Defense's jurisdiction largely covers the substantial share of tax revenue devoted to military spending. During the latter part of the 1990s, its annual budget exceeded $250 billion. Over three million individuals — both defense force members and civilians — were employed by the Department. The figures for 1998 were: 480,721 individuals actively serving in the US Army; 377,039 in the Naval Forces; 365,639 in the Air Force; and 173,031 in the Marine Corps (Deutsch, 1997).

The Post-Cold War Transition and Redefined National Interests

The start of the twenty-first century saw American citizens' lives increasingly interwoven with global affairs, events, and problems with local repercussions. Following the collapse of the USSR in 1991 — which marked the end of the Cold War — America developed new foreign policy doctrines. Among the most significant was an attempt to more narrowly define national interests. The end of the Cold War meant America no longer felt compelled to treat every international controversy as inevitably requiring some form of response.

Furthermore, US citizens favored the pursuit of national goals through negotiation and diplomacy; military force was seen as appropriate only when clear, achievable objectives existed. Americans became considerably less tolerant than they had been during the Cold War era of US military involvement abroad in pursuit of vaguely defined aims. Moreover, as the legislative and executive branches grew more partisan, Congress demonstrated a decreased willingness to support military action without comprehensive disclosure of information. Going forward, presidents would need to clearly articulate reasons for using force (Rosen, 2003).

For a time, US dominance appeared unparalleled and unchallenged. Russia was weakened by the struggle to overcome the legacy of seven decades of Communist rule. The European continent was consolidating and NATO was expanding. The greatest conventional security concern — preventing another great-power war — seemed to have been eliminated. American policy appeared to guide and resolve key regional disputes, including those in Korea and the Middle East (Rosen, 2003).

However, without a central organizing policy idea, this era was characterized by inconsistency — a step forward matched by a step backward. The nation achieved considerable progress in international economics, with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but faced unexpected setbacks: the expiry of Fast Track trade authority, the disastrous 1999 WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle, and a series of global financial crises. Democracy experienced unprecedented expansion during this period, though in several regions it remained shallow-rooted and susceptible to collapse and backlash.

During the final decade of the twentieth century, the Yugoslav succession wars and the crises in Somalia, Haiti, and other "failed states" thrust humanitarian intervention to the forefront of the US foreign policy agenda. Kosovo represented a measure of success, while Rwanda proved an utter disaster. Confusion reigned over both policy objectives and the means to pursue them (Rosen, 2003).

Nevertheless, despite this ambiguity, a majority of Americans sensed a seemingly unstoppable positive trend in global developments. Foreign engagement appeared to be a matter of choice rather than necessity. The world beyond America's borders seemed to offer a privileged degree of security to US citizens, since their primary threat — the Soviet Union — had collapsed. Despite growing transnational threats arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), contagious diseases, environmental deterioration, and terrorism, Americans felt secure at home. Protecting everyday life from external threats appeared to be a manageable, affordable secondary concern (Haass, 2002).

The September 11 Attacks and the War on Terror

That brief period of self-satisfaction came to an abrupt and ugly end with the shocking attacks of September 11, 2001, targeting the US Pentagon and the World Trade Center. The envisaged post-post-Cold War era of security and complacency never materialized. The United States was forced to confront the reality that foreign policy remains critically important, and that its oceans and intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot, by themselves, guarantee safety from hostile actors. The events of that day underscored the fact that if a nation fails to engage with the rest of the world, the rest of the world may nonetheless engage with it — and not always in ways it would choose (Rosen, 2003).

Thus, 9/11 marked the end of the nation's naïveté and the dawn of an era in which increasingly powerful international forces intersect with conventional concerns that continue to hold significance. The attacks served as a stark reminder of the way globalization amplifies the risks of transnational violence. The perpetrators used the internet and mobile phones to communicate, transferred funds electronically, and turned civilian aircraft into weapons, claiming nearly 3,000 innocent lives on American soil.

Transnational threats of this kind pose obvious dangers to citizens' way of life and demand a firm response. At the same time, the nation cannot afford to focus exclusively on such threats (Rosen, 2003), since conventional challenges persist and remain capable of causing considerable harm. These challenges mostly fall within the security domain and concern questions of peace and war — usually, though not exclusively, between nation-states. Among the pressing conventional challenges in the aftermath of 9/11 were the situations in the Middle East, Korea, Colombia, and on the Pakistan-India border, as well as the threat posed by Iraq's potential possession of weapons of mass destruction (Haass, 2002).

References

Dougherty, J. E. (1997). Contending theories of international relations: A comprehensive survey. Addison Wesley Publishing Company.

Gill, S. (Ed.). (1993). Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations (Vol. 26). Cambridge University Press.

Gill, S. (Ed.). (2013). Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations (Vol. 26). Cambridge University Press.

Haass, R. N. (2002). Defining US foreign policy in a post-post-Cold War world: The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, remarks to the Foreign Policy Association.

Haass, R. N., & Director, P. P. S. (2002). Defining US foreign policy in a post-post-Cold War world. Remarks to the Foreign Policy Association.

Kroenig, M. (2017). The case for Trump's foreign policy: The right people, the right positions. Foreign Affairs, 96, 30.

Rosen, S. P. (2003). An empire, if you can keep it. The National Interest, (71), 51–61.